defty, and uniformity of conduct, are felf duties. Thefe duties contribute to private happiness, by preferving health, peace of mind, and self-esteem: which are inestimable bleffings: they contribute no lefs to happiness in fociety, by gaining the love and efteem of others, and aid and fupport in time of need.

Upon reviewing the foregoing duties refpecting others, we find them more or lefs extenfive; but none fo extenfive as to have for their end the good of mankind in general. The most extenfive duty is that of restraint, prohi biting us to harm others; but even that duty has a limited end; for its purpofe is only o protect others from mifchief, not to do them any politve good. The active duties of doing pofitive good are circumfcribed within ftill narrower bounds, requiring fome relation that connects us with others: fuch as thofe of parent, child, friend, benefactor. The fighter relations, unless in peculiar circumstances, are not the foundation of any active duty; neighbourhood, for example, does not alone make benevolence a duty; but fupposing a neighbour to be in diftrefs, it becomes our duty to relieve him, if it can be done without diftrefs to ourfelves. The duty of relieving from diftrefs, feldom goes farther; for though we always fympathife with our relations, and with thofe under our eye, the diftrefs of perfons remote and unknown affects us very little. Pactions and agreements become neceffary, if we would extend the duty of benevolence, in any particular, beyond the limits mentioned. Men, it is true, are capa. ble of doing more good than is required of them as a duty, but every fuch good must be a free will offering.

And this leads to arbitrary actions, viz. thofe that may be done or left undone; which make the fecond general head of moral actions. With refpect to thefe, the moral fenfe leaves us at freedom: a benevolent act is approved, but the omiffion is not condemned. his holds ftri&tly in fingle acts; but in viewing the whole of a man's conduct, the moral fenfe appears to vary a little. As the nature of man is complex. partly focial, and partly felfifh, we have an intuitive perception, that our conduct ought to be confomable to our nature; and that in advancing our own intereft, we ought not altogether to neglect that of

others. The man accordingly who confines his whole time and thoughts within his own little sphere, is condemned by all the world as guilty of wrong conduct; and the man himself, if his mortal perceptions be not blunted by felfishness, must be fenfible that he deferves to be condemned. On the other hand, it is poffible, that free benevalence may be extended beyond proper bounds. The just temperament is a fubordination of benevolence to felf-love; but where benevolence prevails, it commonly leads to excefs, by prompting a man to facrifice a great interest of his own to a fmall intereft of others; and the moral fenfe dictates, that fuch conduct is wrong.

Thus, moral actions are divided into two classes:` the first regards our duty, containing actions that ought to be done, and actions that ought not to be done; the other regards arbitrary actions, containing actions that are right when done, but not wrong when left undone. The wellbeing of fociety depends more on the first class than on the fecond; fociety is indeed promoted by the latter; but it can fcarce fubfift, unlefs the former be made our duty. Hence it is, that actions only of the first clafs are made indifpenfible; thofe of the other claís being left to our free-will. And hence alfo it is, that the various propenfities that difpofe us to actions of the first fort, are diftinguished by the name of primary virtues; leaving the name of fecondary virtues to thofe propenfities which difpofe us to actions of the other fort *.

The deduction above given makes it evident, that the general tendency of right actions is to promote the good of fociety, and of wrong actions, to obftruct that good. Univerfal benevolence is indeed not required of man; becaufe to put that principle in practice, is beyond his utmost abilities. But for promoting the general good. every thing is required of him that he can accomplish; which will ap pear from reviewing the foregoing duties. The prohibi tion of harming others is an eafy tafk; and upon that account is made univerfal. Our active duties are very dif ferent man is circumfcribed both in capacity and power:

* Virtue fignies that difpofition of mind which gives the af cendant to mortal principles. * Vice fignifies that difpofition of mind which gives little or no afcendant to moral principles.

he cannot do good but in a flow fucceffion; and there fore it is wifely ordered, that his obligation to do good fhould be confined to his relations, his friends, his benefactors. Even distress makes not benevolence a general duty all a man can readily do, is to relieve thofe at hand; and accordingly we hear of diftant misfortunes with little

or no concern.

At the fame time, let not the moral fyftem be mifap. prehended, as if it were our duty, or even lawful, to pro. fecute what upon the whole we reckon the most beneficial to fociety, balancing ill with good. The moral fenfe permits not a violation of any perfon's right, however trivial, whatever benefits may thereby acccrue to another. A man, for example, in low circumftances, by denying a debt he owes to a rich mifer, faves himself and a hopeful family from ruin. In that cafe, the good effect far outweighs the ill, or rather has no counterbalance: but the moral fenfe permits not the debtor to balance ill with good; nor gives countenance to an unjust act, whatever benefit it may produce. And hence a maxim in which all moralifts agree, That we must nut do ill to bring about even the greatest good; the final cause of which fhall be given below (a).

SECT. IV.

PRINCIPLES OF DUTY AND OF BENEVOLENCE.

HA

AVING thus fhortly delieneated the moral laws of our nature, we proceed to an article of great im portance, which is, to enquire into the means provided by our Maker for compelling obedience to thefe laws. The moral fenfe is an unerring guide; but the most expert guide will not profit thofe who are not difpofed to follow. This confideration makes it evident, that to complete the moral fyftem, we ought to be endued with fome principle. or propenfity, fome impulfive power, to enforce obedience to the laws dictated by the moral fenfe.

The author of our nature leaves none of his works imperfect. In order to render us obfequious to the moral fenfe as our guide, he hath implanted in our nature the (a). Sect 7.

principles of duty, of benevolence, of rewards and punish ments, and of reparation. It may poffibly be thought, that rewards and punishments, of which afterward, are fufficient of themselves to enforce the laws of nature with out neceffity of any other principle. Human laws it is true, are enforced by thefe means; because no higher fanc tion is under command of a terreftrial legiflator. But the celestial legiflator, with power that knows no controul, and benevolence that knows no bounds, hath enforced his laws by means no less remarkable for mildness than for efficacy; he employs no ex eitai compulfion; but in order to engage our will on the right fide, bath in the breast of every indivi dual eftablished the principles of duty and benevolence, which efficaciously excite us to obey the dictates of the moral fenfe.

As the reftraining, as well as active duties, are effenti. al to fociety, our Maker has wifely ordered, that the principle which enforces thefe feveral duties, fhould be the moft cogent of all that belong to our nature. Other prin. ciciples may folicit, allure, or terrify; but the principle of duty affumes authority, commands, and must be obeyed.

ous.

As one great purpofe of fuciety, is to furnish opportu nities without end of mutual aid and fupport, nature feconding that purpofe, hath provided the principle of benevolence; which excites us to be kind, benficent and gener. Nor ought it to escape obfervation, that the Author of nature, attentive to our wants and to our well-being, hath endued us with a liberal portion of that principle. It enforces benevolence, not only to thofe we are connec. ted with, but to cor neighbours, and even to thofe we are barely acquainted with. Providence is peculiarly attentive to objects in diftrefs, who require immediate aid and' reTo the general principle of benevolence, it hath fuperadded the paffion of pity, which in every feeling heart" is irrefiftable. To make benevolence more extenfive, would be fruitlefs, becaufe here are objects in plenty to fill the most capacious mind. It would not be futlefs only, but hurtful to fociety: I fay hurtful; for inability to pro. cure gratification, rendering benevolence a troulefome gueft, would weaken the principle itfelf, and attach us the

lief.

At

more to selfishness, which we can always gratify. the fame time, though there is not room for greater variety of particular objects, yet the faculty we have of uniting numberless individuals in one complex object, enlarges greatly the sphere of benevolence: by that faculty our country, our government, our religion, become objects of public fpirit, and of a lively affection. The indivi duals that compofe the group, confidered apart, may be too minute, or too distant, for our benevolence; but when comprehended in one great whole, accumulation makes them great, greatnefs renders them confpicuous; and affection, preserved entire and undivided, is beftowed upon an abstract object, as upon one that is fingle and vifible; but with much greater energy, being proportioned to its fuperior dignity and importance. Thus it appears, that the principle of benevolence is not too fparingly fcattered among men. It is indeed made fubordinate to felf-intereft, which is wifely ordered, as will afterward be made evident (a); but its power and extent are nicely proportioned to the limited capacity of man, and to his fituation in this world; fo as better to fulfil its deftina-` tion, than if it were an overmatch for felf-intereft, and for every other principle.

SECT. V.

LAWS RESPECTING REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS.

Reflecting on the moral branch of our nature, qualify. ing us for fociety in a manner fuited to our capacity, we cannot overlook the hand of our Maker; for means fo finely adjusted to an important end, never happen by chauce. It must however be acknowledged, that in many individuals, the principle of duty has not vigour nor authority fufficient to ftem every tide of unruly paffion: by the vigilance of fome paffions, we are taken unguarded; deluded by the fly infinuations of others; or overwhelmed with the ftormy impetuofity of a third fort. Moral evil is thus introduced, and much wrong is done. This new

(a) Sect. 7:

B