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SKETCH II.

GOVERNMENT OF ROYAL BOROUGHS IN SCOTLAND..

BY a royal borough is in Scotland understood an incorporation that hold their lands of the crown, and are governed by magiftrates of their own naming. The adminiftration of the annual revenues of a royal borongh, termed the common good, is trufted to the magiftrates; but not without control. It was originally fubjected to the review of the Great Chamberlain; and accordingly the chap. 39. 45. of the Iter Camerarii, contains the following articles, recommended to the Chamberlain to be enquired into. "Giff there be an good affedation and uptaking of the common good of the burgh, and gif "faithful compt be made thereof to the community of "the burgh; and giff no compt is made, he whom and "in quhaes hands it is come, and how it paffes by the "community." In purfuance of thefe inftructions, the chamberlain's precept for holding the ayre, or circuit, is directed to the provost and bailies, enjoining them, “to "call all thofe who have received any of the town's reve 66 nues, or ufed any office within the burgh, fince the last "chamberlain-ayre, to answer fuch things as fhall be laid "to their charge." Iter Camer. cap. 1. And in the third chapter, which contains the forms of the chamberlain-ayre, the first thing to be done after fencing the court, is to call the bailies and ferjeants to be challenged and accufed from the time of the last ayre.

This office, dangerous by excefs of power, being fuppreffed, the royal boroughs were left fn a state of anarchy. The magiftracy being now no longer under any check or controul, was coveted by noblemen and gentlemen in the neighbourhood; who, under the name of office-bearers, laid their hands on the revenues of the borough, and converted all to their own profit. This corruption was heavily complained of in the reign of James V.; and a remedy was provided by act 26. parl. 1535, enacing 1ft, that none be qualified to be provoft, bailie,

or alderman, but an indwelling burgefs. 2dly, "That "no inhabitant purchase lordship out of burgh, to the "terror of his comburgeffes. And, 3dly, That all pro"vofts, bailies, and aldermen of boroughs, bring yearly "to the chequer at a day certain, the compt-books of "their common good, to be feen and confidered by the "Lords Auditors, giff the fame be spended for the com "mon well of the burgh, or not, under the penalty of ❝lofing their freedom. And that the faid provofts, bai"lies, and aldermen, warn yearly, fifteen days before

their coming to the chequer, all thofe who are willing "to come for examining the faid accounts, that they may "impugn the fame, in order that all murmur may cease “in that behalf." And to enforce these regulations, a brieve was iffued from the chancery, commanding the magiftrates to present their accounts to the exchequer, and fummoning the burgeffes to appear and object to the fame.

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A defect in this ftatute made it lefs effectual than it was intended to be. Magiftrates, to avoid the penalty, brought the count-books of their common good to the exchequer; but they brought no rental of the common good to found a charge against them. This defect was' remedied by act 28. parl. 1693, containing the following preamble. "That the royal boroughs, by the male"administration of their magiftrates, have fallen under great debts and burdens, to the diminution of their dignity, and the disabling of them to ferve the crown and government as they ought; and that the care, "overfight, and control of the common good of boroughs, belong to their Majefties by virtue of their prerogative royal; therefore, for preventing the like abufes and "mifapplications in all time thereafter, their Majefties "fatute and ordain, That every burgh-royal, fhall, "between this and the firft of November next, bring to the Lords of Treafury and Exchequer, an exact ac"count of charge and discharge, fubfcribed by the magiftrates and town-clerk, of their whole public-good and revenues, and of the whole debts and incumbrances ❤that affect the fame." This completed the remedy, by

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putting means into the hands of the Barons of Exchequer, to control the accounts enjoined by the former statute to be yearly given in.

The foregoing regulations are kept in obfervance. Every year a precept iffues from the exchequer, figned by one of the Barons, addreffed to the director of the chancery, requiring him to make out a brieve for every royal borough. The brieve is accordingly made out, returned to the exchequer, and fent to the feveral fheriffs, to be ferved in all the royal boroughs within their bounds, as directed by the ftatute. These brieves are accordingly fo ferved by the fheriffs; and particularly it is a conftant form in moft of the royal boroughs, to iffue a proclamation fifteen days before the day named for appearance in exchequer, warning the inhabitants to repair there, in order to object to the public accounts of the town: and further, in order to give them opportunity to frame objections, the book and accounts are laid open for these fifteen days, to be infpected by all the inhabitants.

We learn from the records of exchequer, that from the year 1660 to the year 1683, accounts were regularly given in the exchequer, in obedience to the ftatute. The town of Edinburgh only having failed for fome fhort time, Captain Thomas Hamilton, merchant there, by an action in exchequer, compelled the magiftrates to produce upon oath their treasurer's accounts, which were accordingly audited. And we alfo learn, that from the Restoration down to the union, a clerk to the borough-roll was appointed by the crown, whose proper bufinefs it was to examine and audite the accounts of the boroughs.

Notwithstanding the foregoing falutary regulations, and the form conftantly practifed to make them effectual, the boroughs of late years have forborn to prefent their accounts in exchequer; hoping that they would be overlooked by the English court of exchequer, established in Scotland after the union; which accordingly happened. Tais neglect in the court of exchequer is greatly to be regretted, because it reduces the royal boroughs, by the ml-administration of their magiftrates, to the fame mi

ferable condition that is fo loudly complained of in the ftatutes above mentioned. It is undoubtedly in the power of the Barons to restore good government to the boroughs, by compelling the magiftrates to account year. ly in the court of exchequer, according to the foregoing regulations. And to that end no more is neceffary, but to fignify publicly that they are refolved hereafter to put thefe regulations in execution.

How beneficial that ftep would be to this country in general, and to the royal boroughs in particular, will appear from confidering, firft, the unhappy confequences that refult from fuffering magiftrates to difpofe of the town's revenues, without any check or control: and next the good effects that must result from a regular and careful management, under the infpection of the King's judges.

The unhappy confequences of leaving magiftrates without any check or control, are too vifible to be disguised. The revenues of a royal borough are feldom laid out for the good of the town, but in making friends to the knot who are in poffeffion of the magiftracy; and in rioting and drunkenness, for which every pretext is laid hold of, particularly that of hofpitality to ftrangers. Such mifmanagement tends to idlenefs, and corruption of manners; which accordingly are remarkable in most royal boroughs. Nor is the contagion confined within the town; it commonly spreads all around.

Another confequence, no lefs fatal, of leaving magiftrates to act without control, is a strong defire in every licentious burgefs, of ftepping into the magistracy, for his own fake, and for that of his friends. Hence the factions and animofities that prevail in almost all the royal boroughs; which are violently and indecently purfued, without the lealt regard to the good of the community.

The greatest evil of all, refpects the choice of their reprefentatives in parliament. A habit of riot and intemperance, makes them fit objects to be corrupted, by every adventurer who is willing to lay out money for purchafing a feat in parliament. Hence the infamous

practice of bribery at elections, which tends not only to corrupt the whole mafs of the people, but, which is ftill more dreadful, tends to fill the Houfe of Commons with men of diffolute manners, void of probity and honour.

But turning from fcenes fo difmal, let us view the beautiful effects that refult from an administration regularly carried on, as directed by the ftatutes above mentioned. The revenues of the royal boroughs are supposed to be about L.40,000 yearly. And were this fum, or the half of it, prudently expended, for promoting arts and indufry among the numerous inhabitants of royal boroughs, the benefit, in a country fo nartow and poor as Scotland, would be immenfe: would tend to population, it would greatly increase induftry, manufactures, and commerce, befide augmenting the public revenue. In the next place, as there would be no temptation for defigning men to convert the burden of magiftracy into a benefit, faction and difcord would vanish; and there would be no lefs folicitude to fhun the burden, than at prefent is feen to obtain it. None would fubmit to the burdea but the truely patriotic, men who would chearfully beftow their time, and perhaps their money, upon the public; and whofe ambition it would be to acquire a charac. ter by promoting industry, temperance, and honefty, among their fellow-citizens.

And when the government of the royal boroughs comes to be in fo good hands, bribery, which corrupts the very vitals of our conftitution, will be banished of courfe. And confidering the proper and conftitutional dependence of the royal boroughs upon the king's judges, we may have reasonable afsurance, that few representatives will be chofen, but who are friends to their country and to their fovereign,