every one of thefe perfons when in diftrefs. To be obliged to do good to others beyond these bounds, must depend on pofitive engagement; for, as will appear afterward, univerfal benevolence is not a duty,

This general fketch will prepare us for particulars. The duty of refraint comes firft in view, that which bars us from harming the innocent; and to it correfponds a right in the innocent to be fafe from harm. This is the great law preparatory to fociety; because without it, fociety could never have exifted. Here the moral fenfe is inflexible it dictates, that we ought to fubmit to any diftrefs, even death itself, rather than procure our own fafety by laying violent hands upon an innocent person. And, we are under the fame reftraint with refpect to the property of another; for robbery and theft are never upon any pretext indulged. It is indeed true, that in extreme hunger I may lawfully take food where it can be found; and may freely lay hold of my neighbour's horse, to carry me from an enemy who threatens death. But it is his duty as a fellow creature to affift me in distress and when there is no time for delay, I may lawfully use what he ought to offer were he prefent, and what I may prefume he would offer. For the fame reafon, if in a ftorm my fhip be driven among the anchor-ropes of another fhip, I may lawfully cut the ropes in order to get free. But in every cafe of this kind, it would be a wrong in me to use my neighbour's property, without refolving to pay the value. If my neighbour be bound to aid me in dif trefs, confcience binds me to make up his loss*.

* This doctrine is obviously founded on juftice; and yet, in the Roman law, there are two paflages which deny any recompenfe in fuch cafes "Icem Labeo, fcribit, fi cum vi ventorum navis impulfa effet in funes anchorarum alterius, et nautæ funes præcidiffent; fi nullo allo modo nifi præcifis funibus, explicare fe potuit, nullam actionem dandam ;" . 29. § 3. ad leg. Aquil. Quod dicitur damnum injuria datum Aquilia perfequi, fic erit acciplendum, ut videatur damnum injuria datum quod cum damno injuriam attulerit;, nifi magna vi cogente, fuerit factum. "Celfus fcribet cires cum, qui incendii arcendi gratia vicines ædes "intercidit; et five pervenit ignis, five ante extinctus eft, exifti“mat legis Aquilliæ actionem ceffare,” 1. 49 § 1. cod.---In English

Ut

The prohibition of hurting others internally, is perhaps not effential to the formation of focieties, because the tranfgreffion of that law doth nor much alarm plain peo ple: but where manners and refined fentiments prevail, the mind is fufceptible of more grievous wounds than the body; and therefore, without that law, a polished fociety could. baye no long endurance...

By adultery, mifchief is done both external and internal. Each fex is fo conftituted, as to require ftri&t fidelity and attachment in a mate: and the breach of thele duties is the greatest external harm that can befal them: it harms the alfo internally, by breaking their peace of mind. It has indeed been urged, that no harm will en fue, if the adultery be kept fecret; and confequently, that there can be no crime. where there is no difcovery. But fuch as reafon thus do not advert, that to declare fes cret adultery to be lawful, is in effect to overturn every foundation of mutual trust and fidelity in the married Bate. It is clear beyond all doubt, fays a reputable wri ter, that no man is permitted to violate his faith; and that the man is unjust and barbarous who deprives his wife of the only reward the has for adhering to the austere duties of her fex. But an unfaithful wife is fill more cri

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tbus: In the opinion of Labeo, if a fhip is driven by the violence of a tempeft among the anchor-ropes o another ship, and "the failors cut the ropes, having no other means of getting free, there is no aion competent. The Aquilian Law must be underflood to apply only to fuch damage as carries the idea of an injury along with it, unlefs fuch injury has not been wilfully done, bia from neceffity. Thus Celfus put the cafe of a perfon, who, to stop the progress of a fire, pulls down his neighbour's houfe; and whether the fire had reached that houfe which is pulled down, or was extinguished before it got to it in neither "cafe, he thinks, will an action be competent from the Aquilian law."- Thefe opinions are undoubted y erroneous And it is not difficult to fay what has occafioned the error: the cafes mentioned are treated as belonging to the lex Aquilia, which being confined to the reparation of wrongs, lays it justly down for a rule, That no action for reparation can lie, where there is no culpa, But had Labeo and Celfus adverted, that thofe cafes belong to a different head, viz. the duty of recompenfe, where one fuffers lots by benefiting another, they themselves would have had no difficul ty of fuftaining a clim for making up that lofs,

minal, by diffolving the whole ties of nature: in giving to her husband children that are not his, the betrays both, and joins perfidy to infidelity (a).

Veracity is commonly ranked among the active duties; but erroneously: for if a man be not bound to speak, he cannot be bound to speak truth. It is therefore only a reftraining duty, prohibiting us to deceive others, by affirming what is not true. Among the many correfponding principles in the human mind that in conjunction tend to make fociety comfortable, a principle of veracity, and a principle that leads us to rely on human teftimony, are two: without the latter, the former would be an useless principle; and without the former, the latter would lay us open to fraud and treachery. The moral fenfe accordingly dictates, that we ought to adhere ftrictly to truth, without regard to confequences.

It must not be inferred, that we are bound to explain our thoughts, when truth is demanded from us by unlawful means. Words uttered voluntarily, are naturally relied on, as expreffing the fpeaker's mind; and if his mind differ from his words, he tells a lie, and is guilty of deceit. But words drawn from a man by torture, are no indication of his mind; and he is not gailty of deceit in uttering whatever words may be agreeable, however alien from his thoughts: if the author of the unlawful violence fuffer himself to be deceived, he dught to blame himself, not the Speaker.

It need fcarce be mentioned, that the duty of veracity excludes not fable, nor any liberty of speech intended for amufement folely.

Active duties, as hinted above, are all of them direct

(a) Emile, liv. 5.

Truth is always uppermost, being the natural iffue of the mind it requires no art nor training, no inducement nor temptation, but only that we yield to natural impulfe. Lying, on the contrary, is doing violence to our nature; and is never practifed, even by the work of men, without fome temptation. Speaking truth is like ufing our natural food, which we would do from appetite although it answered no end: lying is like taking phyfic, which is naufeous to the tafte, and which no man takes but for fome end which he cannot otherwife attain. Dr. Reid's Enquiry into the human mind.

ed to particular perfons. And the first I fhall mention is, that which fubfifts between a parent and child. The relation of parent and child, the ftrongest that can exilt be. tween individuals, binds thefe perfons to exert their ut molt powers in mutual good offices. Benevolence among other blood relations, is allo a duty; but not fo indifpenfable, being proportioned to the inferior degree of rela tion.

Gratitude is a duty directed to the perfon who has been kind to us. But though gratitude is ftrictly a duty, the meafure of performance, and the kind, are left mostly to our own choice. It is fcarce neceffary to add, that the active duties now mentioned, are acknowledged by all to be abfolutely inflexible, perhaps more fo than the reftraining duties many find excufes for doing harm; but no one hears with patience an excufe for deviating from truth, friendship, or gratitude..

Diftrefs tends to convert benevolence into a duty. But diftrefs alone is not fufficient, without other concurring circumstances: for to relieve every perfon in diftrefs, is beyond the power of any human being. Our relations in diftrefs claim that duty from us, and even our neigh bours; but diftant diflrefs, without a particular connection, fcarce roufes our fympathy, and never is an object of duty. Many other connections, too numerous for this fhort effay, extend the duty of relieving others from dif trefs; aud these make a large branch of equity. Though in various inftances, benevolence is thus converted into a duty by diftrefs, it follows not, that the duty is always proportioned to the degree of diftrefs. Natore hath more wifely provided for the fupport of virtue. A virtuous perfon in diftrefs commands our pity: a vicious perfon in diftrefs has much less influence; and if by vice he has brought on the difirefs, indignation is rajfed, not pity (a.)

One great advantage of fociety, is the co-operation of many to accomplish fome ufeful work, where a fingle hand would be infufficient. Arts, manufactures, and commercial dealings, require many hands: but as bands Cannot be fecured without a previous engagement, the performance of promifes and covenants, is, upon that ac

(a) Ses Elements of Criticism, vol. 1. p. 187. edit. 5.

count, a capital duty in fociety In their original occupations of hunting and fishing, men living fcattered and dif perfed, have feldom opportunity to aid and benefit each other; and in that fituation, covenants being of little use, are little regarded; but husbandry requiring the co-operation of many hands, draws men together for mutual affiltance; and then covenants make a figure: arts and commerce make them more and more neceffary; and in a polished fociety great regard is paid to them.

But contracts and promifes are not confined to commercial dealings: they ferve alfo to make benevolence a duty: and are even extended to connect the living with the dead. A man would die with regret, if he thought his friends were not bound by their promifes to fulfil his will after his death and to quiet the minds of men with refpect to futurity, the moral fenfe makes the performing fuch promifes our duty. Thus, if I promise to my friend to erect amonument for him after his death, confcience binds me, even though no perfon alive be entitled to demand performance; every one perceives this to be my duty, and I mufl expect to fuffer reproach and blame, if I neglect my

engagement.

To fulfil a rational promife or covenant, deliberately made, is a duty no lefs inflexible than thofe duties are which arife independent of confent. But as man is fallible, often misled by ignorance or error, and liable to be deceived, his condition would be deplorable, did the moral fenfe compel him to fulfil every engagement, however imprudent or irrational. Here the moral fenfe gives way to human infirmity; it relieves from deceit, from impofition, from ignorance, from error; and binds a man by no engagement but what aufwers the end fairly intended.

The other branch of duties, viz. thofe we owe to our felves, fhall be difcuffed in a few words. Propriety, a branch of the moral fenfe, regulates our conduct with refpect to ourselves; as Fustice, another part of the moral fenfe, regulates our conduct with respect to others. priety dictates that we ought to act up to the dignity of our nature, and to the flation allotted us by Providence : it dictates in particular, that temperance, prudence, mo

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