is a wonder,, no lefs than if born without a mouth, or with more than one.

Secondly, The innate fenfe mentioned dictates, that the common nature of man in particular, is invariable as well as univerfal; that it will be the fame hereafter as it is at prefent, and as it was in time paft, the fame among all nations, and in all corners of the earth: nor are we deceived; because, allowing for flight differences occafioned by culture and other accidental circumftances, the fact correfponds to our perception.

Thirdly, We perceive that this common nature is right and perfect, and that it ought to be a model or standard for every human being. Any remarkable deviation from it in ftructure of an individual, appears imperfect or irregular; and raises a painful emotion: a monstrous birth, exciting curiofity in philofophers, fails not at the fame time to excite averfion in every spectator.

This fenfe of perfection in the cominon nature of man, comprehends every branch of his nature, and particularly the common sense of mankind with refpect to right and wrong; which accordingly is perceived by all to be perfect, having authority over all men as the ultimate and unerring ftandard of morals, even in contradiction to private conviction. Thus, a law in our nature binds us to regulate our conduct by that ftandard: its authority is univerfally acknowledged, as nothing is more common in every difpute about meum et tuum, than an appeal to it as the ultimate and unerring ftandard.

At the fame time, as that standard through infirmity or prejudice, is not confpicuous to every individual, many are misled into erroneous opinions, by mistaking a false ftandard for that of nature. And hence a distinction between a right and a wrong fenfe in morals; a diftinction which every one understands, but which, unless for the conviction of a mortal standard, would be altogether unintelligible.

The final cause of this branch of our nature is confpicuous. Were there no standard of right and wrong for determining endless controverfies about matters of intereft, the ftrong would have recourfe to force, the weak to cunning, and fociety would be intolerable. Courts of law could

afford no remedy; for without a ftandard of morals, their decifions would be arbitrary, and of no authority. Hap py it is for men to be provided with such a standard: it is neceffary in fcciety that our actions be uniform with refpect to right and wrong; and in order to uniformity of action, it is neceffary that our perceptions of right and wrong to be alfo uniform: to produce fuch unifor mity, a ftandard of morals is indifpenfible. Nature has provided us with that ftandard, which is daily applied by courts of law with fuccefs.

In reviewing what is faid, it muft afford great fatisfaction, ro find morality established upon the most solid of all foundations, viz intuitive perception, which is not only a fingle mental act, but is complete in itfelf, having no dependence on any antecedent proposition. The most accurate reafoning affords not equal conviction; for every fort of reafoning, as explained in the sketch immediately foregoing, requires not only felf-evident truths or axioms to found upon, but employs over and above various propofitions to bring out its conclufions. By intuitive perception folely, without reafoning, we acquire knowledge of right and wrong; of what we may do, of what we ought to do, and of what we ought to abstain from: and confidering that we have thus greater certainty of moral laws, than of any propofition difcoverable by reafonjng, man may well be deemed a favourite of heaven, when he is fo admirably qualified for acting the part that is agrecable to his Maker. The moral fenfe or confcience is the voice of God within us; conftantly admonishing us of our duty, and requiring from us no exercise of our faculties but attention merely. The celebrated Locke ventured what he thought a bold conjecture, That moral duties might be fufceptible of demonftration: how agree. able would the discovery have been to him, that they are founded upon intuitive perception, fill more convincing and authoritative!

By one branch of the moral fenfe, we are taught whatwe ought to do, and what we ought not to do; 'and by another branch, what we may do, or leave undone. Lut fociety would be imperfect, if the moral fenfe ftopred here, There is no particular that tends more to

complete fociety, than what is mentioned in the firft fec tion, viz. That every man is accountable for his conduct to his fellow-creatures; and he is rendered accountable by a third branch of the moral fenfe, which teaches him that this is his duty. And it will be made evident afterwards, in the 3d fketch, that we are accountable to our Maker, as well as our fellow-creatures.

To complete this theory, I add, that an action is right or wrong, independent of the actor's own opinion. Thus, when a man, excited by friendship or pity, refcues a heritic from the flames, the action is right, even though he think it wrong, from a conviction that heretics ought to be burnt. But we apply a different rule to those who act: a man is improved, and held to be innocent, when he does what he himfelf thinks right; he is difapproved, and held to be guilty, when he does what he himself thinks wrong. Thus, to affaffinate an atheift for the fake of religion, is a wrong action; and yet the enthufiaft who com. mits that wrong, may be innocent: and one is guilty, who, against confcience, eats meat' in lent, though the action is not wrong. In short, an action is perceived to be right or wrong, independent of the actor's own opinion: but he is approved of or difapproved, held to be innocent or guilty, according to his own opinion.

SECT. III.

LAWS OF NATURE RESPECTING OUR MORAL CONDUCT IN SOCIETY.

A fandard being thus cftablished for regulating our moral conduct in fociety, we proceed to investigate the Jays that refult from it. But firft we take under confideration, what other principles concur with the moral fenfe to qualify men for fociety,

When we reflect on the different branches of human knowledge, it might feem, that of all fubjects human nature fhould be the best understood; becaufe every man has daily opportunities to fudy it, in his own paffions and in his own actions. But human nature, an interefting fubject, is feldom left to the investigation of philofophy. Writers of a weet difpofition and warm imagination

Book III. hold, that man is a benevolent being, and that every man ought to direct his conduct for the good of all, without regarding himself but as one of the number (a). Those of a cold temperament, and contracted mind, hold him to be an animal entirely selfish; to evince which, examples are accumulated without end (b). Neither of thefe fymptoms is that of nature., The felfish fyftem is contradicted by the experience of all ages, affording the cleareft evidence, that men frequently act for the fake of others, without regarding themselves, and fometimes in direct oppofition to their own interest. And however much selfishness may prevail in action, it certainly prevails not in fentiment and affection: all men confpire to put a high eftimation upon generofity, benevolence and other focial virtues; while even the most selfish are disgufted with selfishness in others, and endeavour to hide it in themselves. The most zealous patron of the selfish principle will not venture to maintain, that it renders us altogether indifferent about our fellow creatures. Laying afide felf-intereft, with every connection of love and hatred, good fortune happening to any one is agreeable to all, and bad fortune happening to any one is difagreeable to all. On the other hand, the fyftem of univerfal benevolence, is no lefs contradictory to experience: from which we learn, that men commonly are difpofed to prefer their own interest before that of others, efpecially where there is no ftrict connection: nor do we find that fuch bias is oppofed by the moral fenfe Man in fact is a complex. being, compofed of principles, fome benevolent, fome selfish; and these principles are fo juftly blended in his nature, as to fit him for acting a proper part in fociety, It would indeed be lofing time to prove, that without fome affection for his fellow creatures he would be ill qualified for fociety. And it will be made evident afterwards (c), that univerfal benevolence would be more hurtful to fociety, than even absolute selfishness*.

* "Many moralifts enter fo deeply into one paffion or bias of "human nature, that, to use the painter's phrafe, they quite overcharge it. Thus I have feen a whole fyftem of morals

We are now prepared for investigating the laws that refult from the foregoing principles. The feveral duties. we owe to others fhall be firft difcuffed, taking them in order, according to the extent of their influence. And for the fake of perfpicuity, I fhall first present them in a general view, and then proceed to particulars. Of our duties to others, one there is fo extenfive, as to have for its object all the innocent part of mankind. It is the duty that prohibits us to hurt others: than which no law is more clearly dictated by the moral fenfe; nor is the tranfgreffion of any other law more deeply ftamped with the character of wrong. A man may be hurt externally in his goods, in his perion, in his relations, and in his reputation. Hence the laws, do not fteal; defraud not others; do not kill nor wound; be not guilty of defamation. A man may be hurt internally, by an action that occafions to him diftrefs of mind, or by being im preffed with falfe notions of men and things. Therefore confcience dictates, that we ought not to treat men disrefpefully; that we ought not caufelefsly to alienate their affections from others; and, in general, that we ought to forbear whatever may tend to break their peace of mind, or tend to unqualify them for being good men, and good citizens.

The duties mentioned are duties of restraint. Our active duties regard particular perfons; fuch as our relations, our friends, our benefactors, our masters, our fervants. It is our duty to honour and obey our parents; and to establish our children in the world with all advantages internal and external; we ought to be faithful to our friends, grateful to our benefactors, fubmiffive to our mafters, kind to our fervants, and to aid and comfort

"founded upon a fingle pillar of the inward frame; and the en"tire conduct of life, and all the characters in it, accounted for, "fometimes from fuperftition, fometimes from pride, and most commonly from intereft. They forget how various a creature "it is they are painting; how many fprings and weights, nicely adjusted and balanced, enter into the movement, and require "allowance to be made for their feveral clogs and impulfes, ere you can define its operation and defe&s." Enquiry into the life and writings of Homer.