that here, as in every other cafe, the conduct of Providence to man, is uniform. It leaves him to be directed by reason, where liberty of choice is permitted: but in matters of duty, he is provided with guides lefs fallible than reafon; in performing his duty to man, he is guided by the moral fenfe: in performing his duty to God, he is guided by the fenfe of Deity. In thefe mirrors, he perceives his duty intuitively.

It is no flight fupport to this doctrine, that if there really be a Deity, it is highly prefumable, that he will reveal himself to man, fitted by nature to adore and worship him. To other animals, the knowledge of a Deity is of no importance: to man it is of high importance. Were we totally ignorant of a Deity, this world would appear to us a mere chaos: under the government of a wife and benevolent Deity, chance is excluded; and every event, the result of established laws, is perceived to be the best on the whole. Good men fubmit to whatever happens, without repining, trufting that every event is ordered by divine Providence: they fubmit with entire refignation; and fuch refignatión is a fovereign balfam to every misfor

tune.

The fenfe of Deity resembles our other fenfes, which lie dormant till a proper object prefent itself. When all is filent about us, the fenfe of hearing is dormant; and if from infancy a man were confined to a dark room, he would be as ignorant of the fenfe of feeing, as one born blind. Among favages, the objects that roufe the fenfe of Deity, are uncommon events above the power of man; an earthquake, for example, a hurricane, a total eclipfe of the fun, a fudden fwell of a river that prevents their efcape from an impending enemy. A favage, if he be acquainted with no events but what are familiar, has no perception of fuperior powers; but thunder rattling in his ears, or the convulfion of an earthquake, roufes in him the fenfe of Deity, and directs him to fome fuperior being as the cause of these dreadful effects. The favage, it is true, errs, in afcribing to the immediate operation of a Deity, things that have a natural caufe: his error however is evidence that he has a sense of Deity, no lefs preg

nant, than when he more juftly attributes to the immediate operation of deity, the formation of man, of this earth, of all the world.

The fenfe of Deity, like the moral fenfe, makes no capital figure among favages; the perceptions of both fenfes Eng in them faint and obfcure. But in the progrefs of nations to maturity, these senses turn more and more vigorous, fo as among enlightened nations to acquire a commanding influence; leaving no doubt about right and wrong, and as little about the existence of a Deity.

The obfcurity of the fenfe of Deity among favages, has encouraged fome fceptical philofophers to deny its exiftence. It has been urged, that God does nothing by halves; and that if he intended to make himself known to man, the fenfe of Deity would produce equal conviction with that of feeing or hearing. When we argue thus about the purposes of the Almighty, we tread on flippery ground, where we feldom fail to ftumble. What if it be the purpofe of the Deity, to afford us but an obfcure glimpfe of his being and attributes? We have' reason from analogy to conjecture that this may be the cafe. From fome particulars mentioned above (a), it appears at leaft probable, that entire fubmiffion to the moral fenfe, would be ill-fuited to man in his prefent ftate; and would prove more hurtful than beneficial. And to me it appears evident, that to be confcious of the prefence of the Great God, as I am of a friend whom I hold by the hand, would be inconfiftent with the part Providence has defined me to act in this life. Reflect only on the reftraint one is under, in prefence of a fuperior, fuppofe the King himfelf; how much greater our restraint with thè fame lively impreffion of God's awful prefence! Humi lity and veneration would leave no room for other paffions: man would be no longer man; and the fyftem of our prefent ftate would be totally fubverted. Take another inflance: Such a conviction of future rewards and punishments as to overcome every inordinate defire, would reduce us to the condition of a traveller in a paltry inn, ha,

(a) Book 2 sketch 1.

ving no wifh but for day-light to profecute his journey. For that very reafon, it appears agreeable to the plan of Providence, that we should have but an obfcure glimpse of futurity. As the fame plan of Providence is vifible in all, I conclude with affurance, that a certain degree of obfcurity, weighs nothing against the sense of Deity, more than against the moral fense, or against a future ftate of rewards and punishments. Whether all men might not have been made angels, and whether more happinefs might not have refulted from a different fyftem, lie far beyond the reach of human knowledge. From what is known of the conduct of Providence, we have reafon to prefume, that our present state is the refult of wisdom and benevolence. So much we know with certainty, that the fense we have of Deity and of moral duty, correfpond accurately to the nature of man as an imperfect being; and that these senses, were they absolutely perfect, would unhinge his nature, and convert him into a very different being.

A theory efpoufed by feveral writers ancient and modern, must not be overlooked; because it pretends to compofe the world without a Deity; which would reduce the fenfe of Deity to be delufive, if it have any existence. The theory is, That the world, compofed of animals, vegetables, and brute matter, is felf-existent and eternal; and that all events happen by a neceffary chain of caufes and effects. In this theory, though wifdom and benevolence are confpicuous in every part, yet the great work of planning and executing the whole, is understood to have been done blindly without intelligence or contrivance. It is fcarce neceffary to remark, that this theory, affumed at pleafure, is highly improbable, if not abfurd; and yet that it is left naked to the world without the leaft cover or fupport. But what I chiefly in fift on is, that the endless number of wife and benevolent effects, difplayed every where on the face of this globe, afford to us complete evidence of a wife and benevolent caufe; and as thefe effects are far above the power of man, we neceffarily afcribe them to fome fu

perior being, or in other words to the Deity (a). And this is fufficient to remove the prefent objection against the existence of a sense of Deity. But I am not fatisfied with this partial victory. I proceed to obferve, that nothing more is required but the proof of a Deity, to overturn the fuppofition of felf-existence in a world composed of many heterogeneous parts, and of a chain of causes and effects framed without intelligence or forefight, tho' full of wifdom and contrivance in every part. For if a Deity exift, wife and powerful above all other beings, felf-existence ought to be his peculiar attribute; and no perfon of rationality will have any hefitation in rejecting the felf-exiftence of fuch a world, when fo natural a fuppofition lies in view, as that the whole is the operation of the truely felf-exifting Being, whofe power and wisdom are fully adequate to that arduous task.

Many grofs and abfurd conceptions of Deity that have prevailed among rude nations, are urged by fome writers as another objection against a fenfe of Deity. That objection fhall not be overlooked; but it will be answered to better purpofe, after thefe grofs and abfurd conceptions are examined; which shall be done in the chapter immediately following.

The proof of a Deity from the innate fenfe here explained, differs materially from what is contained in effays on morality and natural religion (b). The proof there given is founded on a chain of reafoning, altogether independent on the innate fenfe of Deity. Both equally produce conviction; but as the fenfe operates intuitively without reafoning, the fenfe of Deity is made a branch of human nature, in order to enlighten thofe who are incapable of a long chain of reafoning; and to fuch, who make the bulk of mankind, it is more convincing, then the most perfpicuous reafoning to a philofopher.

(a) Firft fketch of this third book, fect. x.

(b) Part 2 fect. 7.

PROGRESS OF OPINIONS WITH RESPECT TO DEITY.

THE fenfe of Deity, like many other delicate fenfes, is in favages so faint and obfcure as easily to be biaffed from truth. Among them, the belief of many fuperior beings, is univerfal. And two caufes join, to produce that belief. The first is, that being accustomed to a plurality of vifible objects, men, mountains, trees, cattle, and fuch like, they are naturally led to imagine the fame plurality in things not vifible; and from that flight bias, flight in deed but natural, is partly derived the fyftem of Polytheism, univerfal among favages. The other is, that favages know little of the connection between causes and effects, and ftill lefs of the order and government of this world: every event that is not familiar, appears to them fingular and extraordinary; and if such event exceed human power, it is without hesitation ascribed to a fuperior being. But as it occurs not to a favage, nor to any person who is not a philofopher, that the many various events exceeding human power and feemingly unconnected, may all proceed from the fame caufe; they are rea dily afcribed to different beings. Pliny afcribes Polytheif to another cause, viz. the consciousness men have of their imbecility: "Our powers are confined within nar

row bounds: : we do not readily conceive powers in the "Deity much more extenfive; and we fupply by num"ber what is wanting in power." Folytheifm, thus founded, is the firft ftage in the progrefs of theology; for it is embraced by the rudeft favages, who have neither capacity nor inclination to pierce deeper into the nature of things.

The next ftage is diftinguishable from others, by a belief that all fuperior beings are malevolent. Man by nature weak and helplefs, is prone to fear, dreading every new object and every unusual event. Savages, having no protection againft ftorms, tempefts, or other external accidents, and having no pleafures but in gratifying hungery thirst, and animal love, have much to fear, and lit

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