and has a man a right to indemnity because he has lost the chance of receiving a gift? Had the ship arrived in safety, the captors would have had the chance of a grant from the Crown; but can they, in respect of that chance, insure the ship's arrival? To what extent could they insure? Not to the whole, because the grant might have been of a part; nor to any given part, because it must have been uncertain what part, if any, would have been granted. The utmost extent is the value of the chance; and how is that to be estimated? Independently of the difficulty of fixing the value, and supposing such a chance insurable, must not the interest be so described in the policy?-(or a man, who has no right, legal or equitable, either in ship or freight, might effect an insurance on either, merely because he has a chance some collateral benefit may come to him if the ship and cargo should arrive in safety.) The declaration must aver an interest in the subject insured, and that interest must be proved; and how can it be said that these captors have any interest when the ship is altogether the king's-the freight is altogether the king's? And the captors have no interest in either, nor other concern in respect to the same, beyond a mere chance that the king may be induced to give them something out of the produce of the ship and freight. As to the second count, that the captors had the lawful possession, and were responsible either to the Crown or to the Danish owners for the safe custody of the vessel, is this a true representation of their situation? They certainly had the lawful possession, but were they responsible for the ship's safety, unless as far as that safety might be endangered by any wrongful acts of their own? The seizure was warranted by the king's proclamation: that made their possession lawful. The subsequent declaration of hostilities put an end to any claim by the Danish owners, and, of course, to all responsibility of the captors as to them. It then became their duty to act for the best, with a view to the safety of the ship, and the mere interest of the Crown therein. They were bound to leave Lisbon; it was for the interest of the Crown that they should make the ship instrumental in withdrawing from Lisbon as much property

If a party make

an insurance for the benefit of another, without his knowledge, the latter may ratify it, and the insurance will enure to his benefit.

as she could possibly carry with propriety. They acted for the best, and were consequently justified in respect to the Crown in what they did. The Crown cannot call upon them for damages; and they have no right to ask for a sum as an indemnity, when they have not been, and (under the circumstances stated) could not have been damnified. The consequence is, that the plaintiff has no right to recover upon the policy. The question then arises, whether he has any right to recover his premium? And, as there was no fraud in the captors, in effecting this policy: as there was no illegality in the voyage or insurance: and as the resistance of the underwriters to the claim, upon the ground that there was no risk: the plaintiff is entitled to his premium, and the verdict should be entered accordingly."

Subsequently to the above action, another action on the same facts was brought by the plaintiff against the defendant, who has subscribed for 300%. The action was commenced on the 21st June, 1810, upon insurance made by him in his firm of P. & H. Le Mesurier and Co., dated 12th November, 1807, upon the ship Knud Terkelson, valued at 3500%, and on freight not valued, "at and from Lisbon to London." The interest was averred to be in his Majesty, and the loss to be by perils of the sea. The defendant pleaded the general issue; and at the trial, before Lord Ellenborough, at the Sit. after Trin. Term, 1800, at Guildhall, a verdict was found for the plaintiff, subject to the opinion of the Court upon a special case. The argument on the case was heard in Hil. Term, 1811.

Lord Ellenborough, C. J.-" The points made for our consideration are, first, whether the king had an insurable interest, supposing him to have been apprised of his right at the time when the insurance was made, and had determined to insure it; and next, whether he could adopt it after it was made. The facts are that, after a proclamation by the king in council for the detention of Danish vessels, an armed ship, in the service of his Majesty, took possession of the Danish ship in question. Was it taken on behalf of the king? It was taken by his servants, in an armed brig engaged in his

service; and, if not taken piratically, must have been taken for him. The king, therefore, had possession of the Danish ship; for as between his Majesty and those who were acting on his behalf and under his authority, and who were accountable to him if they damaged or embezzled the property, their possession was for this purpose his possession. Then had the king a lawful possession? Was it ever made a question whether the king were a wrong-doer in seizing the vessels of a foreign nation? If, then, his Majesty had a lawful possession, may he not insure the property against loss? He was legally competent to do so, though not in the practice of insuring his own ships of war. But, it may be said, that he knew nothing at the time of insurance. It was made, however, by the orders of his officers, whose duty it was to take care of the property, and who were responsible to him for it. Then may he not adopt the act? The insurance is not, indeed, made in terms in the king's name, but it was by the direction of Sampson, who had been made agent by the captors for the prize. But the captors had no interest of their own in it, and therefore, for their own benefit, they were not competent to appoint an agent; they must therefore be taken to have appointed him as agent on the part of the Crown, whose servants and agents they were. Then Sampson writes the letter authorizing the insurance being made, and therein he desires insurance to be made "for my account." That, certainly, was not intended as a direction to insure his own individual interest, but merely credit was to be given to him for the premiums; and he proceeds to state that the insurance is to be made of the Danish vessel, Knud Terkelson, which had been detained by his Majesty's armed ship, Duchess of Bedford, and for which he was authorized to act as agent. There was no communication of the names of the particular persons for whose benefit the insurance was to be made, nor was it necessary that the agent should then know who they were; but it was to be effected in the name of the agent, for the benefit of those who should be concerned in interest: and the underwriters bound themselves to indemnify those

who should appear to be interested in the prize, in case of loss; it must, therefore, enure for the benefit of the Crown, which alone had any interest in the captured vessel. The Crown, then, having an insurable right, afterwards adopt this act of its servants and agents. And if the policy were made for the benefit of those concerned, and the Crown were concerned in interest, there can be no doubt it may adopt the act; and it has adopted it. The case of Craufurd v. Lucena is full in point to this. The Dutch commissioners were strangers to the property before it came within the ports of this kingdom, though connected with it in trust when it was brought there; but the Crown afterwards adopted the insurance, and the House of Lords held that to be a valid adoption, as well in respect of the ships taken before as afterwards (a). Here, then, there was an adoption by the Crown of the act by which the property was acquired; and there was also an adoption of the insurance made afterwards to protect it. By the adoption of the act of taking possession, there was an insurable interest in the king; and the adoption of the insurance gave him also an interest in the policy. The facts, therefore, being expressly stated from whence this conclusion may be drawn, and which it was left to us by the statement of the case, there is no occasion to send the question again to a jury." Routh v. Thompson (b).

The principle of law decided in the above case was recognised likewise in a more modern case of Hagedorn v. Oliverson (c). In which it was decided that where the plaintiff made an insurance (d) on " ship" as well in his own name as, for, and in the name of all and every other person, &c., in the usual form, for the benefit of one F. S. Schroeder, an alien enemy, and procured a license to legalize the voyage, and a loss happened, and two years afterwards, Schroeder, by letter

(a) See ante, p. 7, and see by Lord Ellenborough himself, Lucena v. Craufurd, 1 Taunt. 385.

(b) 13 East, 274.

(c) 2 M. & S. 485.

(d) It was stated upon the argument that the plaintiff gave the order to the broker to make the insurance.

to the plaintiff, adopted the insurance, the plaintiff might recover against the underwriter, averring the interest in Schroeder (a). The plaintiff had a verdict before Lord Ellenborough at Guildhall, subject to the opinion of the Court.

After argument in Easter Term, 1814; Lord Ellenborough, C. J., said "The plaintiff had a right to make an insurance, on the chance of its being adopted for the benefit of all those to whom it might appertain, which are the words of the policy. He might insure for those who were actually interested, and possibly who might be interested. Schroeder was interested, and might become privy to this insurance by subsequent adoption, according to Lucena v. Craufurd, and Routh v. Thompson. He has adopted it, and now it is made a question, whether he can become privy to the benefit of it. It appears to me, upon those authorities he may make use of the name of the person at the head of the policy, as the person who had given the order to effect the insurance, which will satisfy the stat. 28 Geo. 3, c. 56 (b). It seems to me that this action is maintainable for the benefit of Schroeder, who was interested at the time, and has become privy by adoption."

The next case which, from its importance with respect to the law of insurances on "prizes," deserves mentioning, is the case of Stirling and others v. Vaughan (c). This was an action on a policy of insurance effected by the plaintiffs as agents, upon a ship called The Prize, No. 3, and her cargo, "from Monte Video to London." The subject of insurance was a prize taken from the Spaniards, by the conjoint forces of the army and navy upon the expedition to the river Plata: the interest was averred in the first count to be in the king; by the second to be in the captors; there was a third count, not necessary to mention. The loss was alleged to be by perils of the sea, on the voyage home. At the trial before Lord Ellenborough at Guildhall, Admiral Murray was called