he charged respondentia interest. Lord Mansfield said as to the question, whether the words " goods, specie, and effects," extended to this interest, I should think not, if we were to consider only the words made use of. But here is an express usage which must govern our decision. A great many captains in the East India service swear, that this kind of interest is always insured in this kind of way. I observe the person insured here is the captain." Secondly: it has been held that the master's clothes, or The master's the ship's provisions, do not come under the term "goods;" ship's provinor "goods" lashed on deck, unless sanctioned by usage. In the case of Ross v. Thwaite, Sit. after Hil. 16 Geo. 3, at term "goods" Guildhall (a), the action was brought upon a policy of insurance lashed on deck, " clothes, or the sions, do not come under the nor goods of "the captain's goods" for six months certain. The loss toned by he consented. a And in another case Mr. J. Chambre and a special jury, decided that "goods stowed on deck," were not within general policy on "goods." Backhouse v. Ripley. Sit. after Mich. 1802, in C. P. (b). But where there was an insurance on "forty carboys of vitriol," it was held to be sufficient, that they were carefully "stowed on deck," that being a usual place for that commodity, without informing the underwriter of it; and, although "Goods" stowed on deck not within general policies on "goods" unless sanctioned by usage. it was usual sometimes to bed them in sand in the hold. De Costa v. Edmonds (a.) The Court afterward confirmed the decision at Nisi Prius (b). And in the recent case of Gould v. Oliver (c), it has been decided that the owner of a cargo of timber "laden on deck," pursuant to the custom of the particular trade, was entitled to contribution from the shipowner in the case of a "general average." A subsequent action was brought by the plaintiffs against the shipowner on the charter-party, in which the plaintiffs had a verdict with general damages. The reader is referred to the full report of this case, when cause was shown in the Common Pleas, against a rule which had been obtained for a new trial (d); he will find in this case the subject of the "loading of a deck cargo," and the practice and usage relating thereto, fully discussed by the argument at the Bar, with reference to the evidence given at the trial. As the case was not on a policy of insurance, I must content myself with a few observations, copied from the judgment of Lord C. J. Tindal. He begins by stating, "this was an action of assumpsit on a charter-party, made between the defendant therein described as the owner of the ship, called the 'Christopher,' then lying at London, of the one part, and the plaintiffs therein described as merchants of the other part, whereby it was agreed that the ship should sail with all convenient speed to Quebec, or as near thereto as she could safely get, and there load from the factors of the plaintiff, a full and complete cargo of pine timber deals, &c., 'not exceeding what she could reasonably stow and carry over and above her tackle,' &c. The declaration assigned three breaches: first, that the defendant would not load in and on board the said ship, a full and complete cargo, not exceeding what she could reasonably stow and carry, over and above her tackle, &c.; but on the contrary, loaded on board the ship a cargo, much exceeding what the said vessel could reasonably stow and carry over (a) 4 Camp. 142. (b) 2 Chitty, 227. (c) 5 Scott, 445; B. N. C. 134; and see the case of Milward D. Hibbert, 3 Q. B. 120. (d) 2 Scott's N. R. 241. and above her tackle," &c. The second breach was for 'carelessly and improperly loading part of the cargo on deck,' whereby the plaintiffs were prevented from insuring: and the third, for not taking proper care of the cargo, whereby it was lost. One objection to the direction of the Judge is, that he told the jury that if the loading the deck cargo increased the danger of navigation it was an improper practice'; thereby, as it is said, excluding the consideration of usage, and making the increase of danger the absolute test of 'improper stowage.' But the language of the learned Judge must be viewed with reference to the case before the jury. If a particular mode of stowage' be conformable to the established usage of trade, it may not be improper, though another mode of stowage' may be more safe." In this case it was proved that the practice of "stowing timber upon deck" was very general, but also shown when the cargo was so loaded and a loss occurred, the shipowners in the absence of any stipulation to the contrary, had paid the loss to the shipper: and no instance was given in which the loss had been sustained by the shipper. It was further shown that insurances upon "deck cargo" could not be made unless at a triple premium: and still that it was not unusual to insert a special clause in the charter-party, that the ship should have a "deck load." Prima facie, "the deck" is an improper place for the cargo, or any part of it. The duty of stowing the cargo belongs to the master; and no evidence was given of a general custom to load "a deck cargo" at the risk of the shipper. So far as the evidence upon this subject went, it showed that whenever a loss had occurred, it had been made good by the shipowner, and consequently, he had no right by custom to throw the loss upon the shipper. The learned Judge, therefore, told the jury, that they were not to consider the matter with reference to the custom, but with reference to the fact, whether the stowage was actually improper; that is to say, whether it was such as to increase the perils of the navigation. The great body of the evidence on both sides was directed to the Money, jewels, may under the de nomination of "goods." J. Park's opinion. question, whether the danger was increased or diminished, by the stowage on the deck? the plaintiff's witnesses stating the former, and the defendant's the latter. The question left to the jury was, whether the timber stowed upon the deck was properly or improperly stowed? the Judge telling the jury, "that if it increased the danger of the ship, or increased the danger to that part of the cargo, in either case it was an improper stowage, because it tended to the injury of the shipper." It was finally left to the jury in the language of the issue,"was this cargo improperly stowed? The jury found that it was improperly stowed: and we do not think the direction to the jury, under the circumstances of the case, to exclude from their consideration the evidence of the practice, was wrong. For these reasons we are of opinion, that the defendant is not entitled either to enter a verdict for her, or to have a new trial, but we think a venire de novo should be awarded." Thirdly, it has been thought that there was some doubt respecting the recovery of money, gold and silver coin, and bullion, after a loss under a policy on "goods and merchandises." This question does not appear to have had sufficient doubt cast upon it to afford any decision in our courts of law, as there is (according to the statement of the late Mr. J. The late Mr. Park, in his treatise) no case in the books in which the doubt was ever raised. In the case of Da Costa v. Firth (a), the subject-matter of the insurance was bullion, and the policy was general on "goods and merchandises," but no objection seems to have been taken at that time. Magens, in his book "On Insurances," states, "that gold and silver, coined or uncoined, pearls, and other jewels, may be insured at London, Hamburgh, and other places, under the expression in the policy of goods and merchandises' (b), and as goods declared in the policy bullion,' 'coin,' &c., there would be a sufficient notice of the value of the goods to inform the underwriters." The same writer gives a list of the ordinances of Magens. 66 several foreign states in which money shall not be recovered, unless it be expressed in the policy "that it is money which is to be insured" (a). In France, these articles may be insured In France, Emerigon's." under the general terms "goods" and "merchandise," provided the transport of them be not prohibited (b). Roccus, Roccus. in his treatise, concurs in the opinion that these things may be insured under the general expression of the policy, where they form part of the cargo, and he draws a distinction between them and money, jewels, and such things as are on the persons or designed for the wear of passengers on board: the former, he says, is clearly liable to contribute to a general average, and the latter not. He says,-" Assecurans merces in talem navem immissas intelligitur assecurare pecuniam, aurum, argentum, gemmas margaritas et annulos in dicta navi existentes, quæ omnia appellatione mercium in navem immissarum, comprehendentur, licet expressa non fuissent Santerna declarat, quod si pecuniæ, margaritæ et annuli erant destinati ad vendendum vel mercandum alias merces, tunc appellatione mercium veniunt, et in assecuratione comprehenduntur et loco mercium habentur: vocat dictas res merces, cum occasione earum habeat locum contributio, sicut aliarum rerum, ne in istis assecurationibus mercatorum potius apices juris, quam veritas observari videantur: et tandem quia largè comprehenduntur omnes res, quæ sunt destinatæ ad negotiandum, et facit etiam, quod confiscatio mercium navis extenditur etiam ad pecuniam numeratam" (c). men not the sub ject of a marine insurance. Neither can any seaman Fourthly, the wages of mariners are not, by the laws of Wages of seathis country, allowed to form the subject-matter of an insurance; and this rule is agreeable, likewise, to the laws of all foreign trading countries (d). This rule of law, though apparently severe on the mariner, is nevertheless, it must be admitted, based on good policy, as one of the greatest secu- the ship or rities for the safe arrival of the vessel by the exertions of the cargo. sailors, which would, as a matter of course, be much diminished if they could protect themselves by such means. This (a) 2 Magens, 71, 89, 131, 187. (6) Emerigon, tom. 1, p. 297. (c) Roccus, Not. 17. avail himself of the insurance of |