policy made by a broker, describing himself therein as agent, has sufficiently complied with the requisition of the statute. It is to be presumed, after verdict, that the plaintiff fell within one or other of the descriptions in the act (a). And Lord Ellenborough held at nisi prius, that an allegation, both in the policy and the declaration, that the policy was made for the plaintiffs by the firm A. B. C., was satisfied by proof that it was made by the firm A. & B., there being two firms having two members in common, Dickson v. Lodge (b). act the hus band of the ship had no right to insure for any partowner without his particular direction, nor for all the general, without their general direction. owners in Before the passing both of 25 Geo. 3, and 28 Geo. 3, it Before the was decided that the husband of a ship had no right to passing of this insure for any part-owner, without his particular direction, nor for all the owners in general, without their general direction, or something equivalent to it, French v. Backhouse (c). But it has recently been held in the case of Robinson and another, Assignee, &c., v. Gleadow and others (d), that where one of several part-owners of a ship, and who was the managing owner, without any express authority from the others, effected a joint insurance upon the entire ship, charging the premium and commission in the ship's accounts, which were open to the inspection of, and were actually inspected by, the other owners, and not objected to, the jury were warranted in finding that the managing owner had a joint authority to make an insurance for the whole; and that all the owners were liable to the amount of the premium and commission, notwithstanding the credit was, in the first instance, given to the managing owner alone, it appearing that the broker was ignorant of the name of the other owners. And if partowners of a ship, be in partnership generally, an order to insure given by one, renders all liable, Hooper v. Lusby (e). This first section, which is now concluded, treats solely of the first sentence in the policy, which was taken as the head (a) Bell v. Gilson, 1 B. & P. 345. Mellish v. Bell, 15 East, 4. (b) 1 Stark. 226. (c) 5 Burr. 2727. Bell v. Humphries, 2 Stark. 345. Ogle v. Wrangham, coram Kenyon, sit. (d) 2 Scott, 250; 2 B. N. C. 156. of this section, and, which the reader will observe, called upon me, according to the plan I have proposed, merely to state briefly the persons capable of being the assured in the policy of insurance, and what rules have, by Legislative enactments, been laid down to restrict such parties who legally can sue on the policy to those persons alone who answer the several descriptions mentioned in the act of Parliament, in every case of a contract of insurance made by the assured, or his agents, with the assurers. Let us now proceed to the next immediate words of the policy. The words "lost or not lost" are very important. SECTION II. 66 LOST OR NOT LOST." These words "lost or not lost," which follow the word "insured" in the policy, are words of the greatest importance in this contract; and they are peculiar to English policies, and are not inserted in the policies of foreign countries (a). They are certainly very hazardous for the underwriters; for their meaning and purport are," that if the ship or goods should be lost at the time of the insurance, still the underwriter, provided there is no fraud, is liable. (b) These "words" of this instrument have been used in practice by the merchants and underwriters of this country, till they have, at length, formed a material clause in the policy; and the effect of them on the parties to the contract, is fully upheld by the Courts of law. In the practice and law of marine insurance, the assured makes no assurance to the underwriter, that at the time of making the policy, the ship or goods are safe, or even in existence at that moment. This might appear at first sight too hazardous for the underwriters; but it must be borne in mind the value of the amount of the premiums, of the great number of the insurances (a) Roccus, No. 175; 5 Burr. 2802. (b) Molloy, b. 2, c. 7, s. 5. See the case of Blackhurst v. Cockrell, Trin. T. 29 Geo. 3, 3 T. R. 360. they underwrite, not one of which premiums, one may venture to say, out of a hundred, is paid under such circumstances, that the assured are by law enabled to recover them back from the underwriters. gent event has happened at the time of making the insurance to the knowledge of one only of the policy is void on the ground parties, the of fraud. There is nothing illegal in an underwriter, who has received the cuting afterwards the policy with a full knowledge to himself and If the loss has happened at the time of the execution of If the continthe policy, to the knowledge of the assured: or if the underwriter knows at the time he subscribes the policy of the safe arrival of the vessel, it is clear that, in both these cases, the policy would be void on the ground of fraud. There is a recent decision in the Court of King's Bench, in the case of Mead v. Davison, (a) in which the question of law arose, how far the circumstance of both parties to the contract being acquainted with the loss at the time of executing the policy, had an effect upon the contract; and the Court held that there was nothing illegal in an underwriter, who had received the consideration for entering into the contract, executing it afterwards with a full knowledge to both himself premium, exeand the assured, that the loss had actually happened. Lord Denman, C. J., in delivering the judgment, says, "The case of Earl of March v. Pigot (b), is a direct authority in favour of the right to recover, if the loss had been known to neither party at the time of executing the policy. According to that case, and indeed on the plainest general principles, if the loss had been known to the assured only, the policy would have been void. But no case has determined that an underwriter, who chooses to execute a policy with full knowledge that the loss has actually happened, may not be bound by it. His conduct might, indeed, appear extraordinary, if it were not clear that he had a good legal consideration for entering into the contract, viz., the payment of the premium which may be regarded as a price actually given, and received for the underwriter's indemnity against the contingency which has happened. The assured has bought and paid for the underwriter's promise to indemnify. If his ship had arrived safe, the underwriter would have kept the whole premium; though the assured that the loss had happened at the time. A party may make an assurance on goods "lost or not lost," though he may have acquired his interest in them after a partial loss, unless he bought them with a know ledge of the damage. she has perished, he cannot be relieved from his agreement. Equity would have compelled him to execute the formal policy in voluntarily executing it, he has only performed a manifest duty, and cannot now retract the obligation." A very recent case (argued in the Court of Exchequer, H. Vacation, 1843), of Sutherland v. Pratt (a), may be conveniently mentioned in this place as very applicable to the subject. The facts will be sufficiently gathered for our purpose, from part of the judgment of the Court delivered on a subsequent day. The Parke, B.—“In this case the plaintiff declares in the usual form, that he caused to be made a policy of assurance, purporting thereby 'that Boggs, Taylor and Co., as well in their own name, as for all persons to whom the same did, might, or should appertain, made assurance, and caused themselves and them to be assured with the General Maritime Assurance Company, lost or not lost, from Bombay to London,'” upon any kind of goods and merchandise, &c., "beginning the adventure upon them from the loading thereof on board the ship, until her arrival and landing of the goods." The insurance was declared to be on 360 bales of cotton. declaration then stated the admission in the policy, that the premiums, &c., mutual promises, &c. The declaration then avers, that the goods were loaded at Bombay, and then (which is not in the usual form), that the plaintiff was "during the voyage" interested in the goods, in the policy mentioned, and so loaded, to a large amount to wit, the amount insured, and that the said assurance was made for his use and on his account. The ship is then stated to have been damaged by perils of the sea, and the goods thereby damaged, and rendered of no use to the plaintiff, &c. To this declaration the eighth plea alleged (which is the only plea we shall refer to at present) "that although the plaintiff acquired an interest in the goods, after the commencement of the voyage, to the amount insured, yet the goods were damaged, (a) 11 M. & W. 296. and diminished in use and value before the plaintiff acquired or had any interest therein, and not after." To this plea there was a general demurrer, which raises the only question on the merits of the case, the others being mere matters of form. We are of opinion that the eighth plea contains no answer to the declaration. The plea admits expressly that the plaintiff had during the voyage an interest in the goods on board, to the amount insured therein; and it admits impliedly (for it does not deny that allegation), that the insurance was made for the use and benefit and on the account of the plaintiff, against any loss in respect of that interest, by any of the perils insured against. This being admitted, the simple question is, whether it is any answer to an action on a policy on goods "lost or not lost," that the interest in them was not acquired until after the loss. We are of opinion that it is not. Such a policy is clearly a contract of indemnity against all past as well as all future losses, sustained by the assured in respect to the interest insured. It operates in just the same way as if the plaintiff having purchased goods indemnity for at sea-the defendants for a premium, had agreed that if the past as well as goods had at the time of the purchase sustained any damage by perils of the sea, they would make it good. The plea therefore is bad in substance. It is no answer to an action on a policy on goods "lost or not lost," that the interest in acquired till them was not after the loss. Such a policy is a contract of These words "at and from," in the policy, are intended "At and from to represent the name of the place at which the ship and the goods which are laden upon her sets out on her voyage, to which she is bound: as, for instance, "at and from Bombay to London." And this, according to the statement of the late Mr. Justice Park, in his valuable treatise (a), "has always been held to be necessary in the policy, at least for upwards of two centuries, and must be so, on account of the (a) Park Ins. 31. |