maxims, feemingly in oppofition, have natural limits that prevent their encroaching one upon the other. There is a certain degree of attention and circumfpection that men generally bestow upon affairs, proportioned to their importance: if that degree were not fufficient to defend against a claim of reparation, individuals would be too much cramped in action; which would be a great discouragement to activity if a lefs degree were sufficient, there would be too great fcope for rafh or remifs conduct; which would prove the bane of fociety. Thefe limits, which evidently tend to the good of fociety, are adjusted by the moral fenfe; which dictates, as laid down in the fection of Reparation, that the man who acts with forefight of the probability of mischief, or acts rafhly and uncautiously without fuch forefight, ought to be liable for consequences; but that the man who acts cautioufly, without foreseeing or suspecting any mischief, ought not to be liable for confequences.

In the fame fection it is laid do wn, that the moral fense requires from every man, not his own degree of vigilance and at

tention,

tention, which may be very fmall, but that which belongs to the common nature of the fpecies. The final caufe of that regulation will appear upon considering, that were reparation to depend upon perfonal circumstances, there would be a neceffity of enquiring into the character of individuals, their education, their manner of living, and the extent of their underftanding; which would render judges arbitrary, and fuch law-fuits inextricable. But by affuming the common nature of the fpecies as a standard, by which every man in confcience judges of his own actions, law-fuits about reparation are rendered eafy and expeditious.

SECT. VIII.

Liberty and Neceffity confidered with respect to Morality.

Having in the foregoing sections ascer

tained the reality of a moral sense, with its sentiments of approbation and dif

approbation,

approbation, praise and blame; the purpose of the prefent fection is, to fhew, that these fentiments are confiftent with the laws that govern the actions of man as a rational being, In order to which, it is first necessary to explain thefe laws; for there has been much controversy about them, especially among divines of the Arminian and Calvinift fects.

Human actions, as laid down in the first fection, are of three kinds: one, where we act by instinct, without any view to confequences; one, where we act by will in order to produce fome effect; and one, where we act against will. With respect to the first, the agent acts blindly, without deliberation or choice; and the external act follows neceffarily from the instinctive impulse *. Voluntary

* A stonechatter makes its neft on the ground or near it; and the young, as foon as they can fhift for themselves, leave the neft inftinctively. An egg of that bird was laid in a fwallow's neft, fixed to the roof of a church. The fwallow fed all the young equally, without diftinction. The young ftonechatter left the neft at the usual time before it could fly; and falling to the ground, it was taken up

dead.

Voluntary actions done with a view to an end, are in a very different condition: into these, defire and will, enter: defire to accomplish the end goes first; the will to act in order to accomplish the end is next; and the external act follows of course. Defire confidered as what influences the will, is termed a motive. Thus, hearing that friend is in the hands of robbers, my I burn with defire to free him: defire influences my will to arm my fervants, and to fly to his relief. Actions done against will come in afterward.

But what is it that raises defire? The anfwer is ready: it is the profpect of attaining fome agreeable end, or of avoiding one that is difagreeable. enquired, What makes an

And if it be object agree

able or disagreeable; the answer is equally ready, that our nature makes it fo.

dead. Here is inftinct in purity, exerting itself blindly without regard to variation of circumstances. The fame is obfervable in our dunghill-fowl. They feed on worms, corn, and other feeds dropt on the ground. In order to difcover their food, nature has provided them with an inftinct to fcrape with the foot; and the inftinct is fo regularly exercifed, that they scrape even when they are fet upon a heap of corn.

Certain

Certain visible objects are agreeable, certain founds, and certain fmells: other objects of thefe fenfes are difagreeable. But there we must top; for we are far from being fo intimately acquainted with our own nature as to affign the caufes. Thefe hints are fufficient for my prefent purpole: if one be curious to know more, the theory of defire, and of agreeableness and difagreeablenefs, will be found in Elements of Criticifim (a).

With respect to inftinctive actions, not perfon, I prefume, thinks that there is any freedom: an infant applies to the nipple, and a bird builds a neft, no lefs neceffarily than a stone falls to the ground. With respect to voluntary actions, done in order to produce fome effect, the neceflity is the fame, tho' lefs apparent at first view. The external action is determined by the will: the will is determined by defire: and defire by what is agreeable or difagreeable. Here is a chain of caufes and effects, not one link of which is arbitrary, or under command of the agent: he cannot will but according to his defire: he cannot defire

(a) Chap. 2.

VOL. IV.

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bus