an action against A: for tho' the mis"chief was done against the will of A,

66

yet fince it was his fault to bring a wild "horfe into a frequented place where "mifchief might enfue, he must answer "for the confequences." Gaius feems to carry this rule ftill farther, holding in general, that if a horfe, by the weakness or unfkilfulness of the rider, break away and do mischief, the rider is liable (a). But Gaius probably had in his eye a frequented place, where the mischief might have been foreseen. Thus in general, a man is made liable for the mischief occafioned by his voluntary deed, tho' the immediate act that occafioned the mischief be involuntary.

SECT.

VII.

Final Caufes of the foregoing Laws of Nature.

Several final caufes have been already

mentioned, which could not conveni

(a) 1. 8. §. 1. ad leg. Aquil.

ently

ently be referved for the prefent fection, being neceffary for explaining the fubjects to which they relate; the final cause for inftance of erecting a standard of morals upon the common fenfe of mankind. I proceed now to what have not been mentioned, or but flightly mentioned.

The final cause that prefents itself first to view, respects man confidered as an accountable being. The fenfe of being accountable, is one of our most vigilant guards against the filent attacks of vice. When a temptation moves me it immediately occurs, What will the world fay? I imagine my friends expoftulating, my enemies reviling-it would be in vain to diffemble-my fpirits fink-the temptation vanishes. 2dly, Praife and blame, efpecially from thofe we regard, are strong incentives to virtue: but if we were not accountable for our conduct, praife and blame would feldom be well directed; for how fhall a man's intentions be known, without calling him to account? And praise or blame, frequently ill-directed, would lose their influence. 3dly, This branch of our nature, is the corner-ftone

of

of the criminal law. Did not a man think hirnfelf accountable to all the world, and to his judge in a peculiar manner, it would be natural for him to think, that the justest sentence pronounced against him, is oppreffion, not justice. 4thly, It promotes fociety. If we were not accountable beings, thofe connected by blood, or by country, would be no less fhy and reserved, than if they were utter ftrangers to each other.

The final cause that next occurs, being fimple and obvious, is mentioned only that it may not seem to have been overlooked. All right actions are agreeable, all wrong actions, difagreeable. This is a wife appointment of Providence. We meet with fo many temptations against duty, that it is not always eafy to persevere in the right path: would we persevere, were duty difagreeable? And were acts of pure benevolence disagreeable, they would be rare, however worthy of praise.

Another final caufe refpects duty, in contradistinction to pure benevolence. All the moral laws are founded on intuitive perception; and are fo fimple and plain, as to be perfectly apprehended by the most ignorant.

ignorant. Were they in any degree complex or obfcure, they would be perverted by felfishness and prejudice. No conviction inferior to what is afforded by intui tive perception, could produce in mankind a common fenfe in moral duties. Reafon would afford no general conviction; because that faculty is diftributed in portions fo unequal, as to bar all hopes from it of uniformity either in practice or in opinion. We are taught befide by woful experience, that reafon even the most convincing, has no commanding influence over the greater part of men. Reason, it is true, aided by experience, fupports morality; by convincing us, that we cannot be happy if we abandon duty for any other intereft. But conviction feldom weighs much against imperious paffion; to control which the vigorous and commanding principle of duty is requifite, directed by the fhining light of intuition.

A propofition laid down above, appears a fort of mystery in the moral system, That tho' evidently all moral duties are contrived for promoting the general good, yet that a choice is not permitted among different goods, or between good and ill; VOL. IV. L

but

but that we are ftrictly tied down to perform or forbear certain particular acts, without regard to confequences; or, in other words, that we must not do wrong, whatever good it may produce. The final cause I am about to unfold, will clear this mystery, and fet the beauty of the moral fyftem in a confpicuous light. I begin with obferving, that as the general good of mankind, or even of the fociety we live in, refults from many and various circumstances intricately combined; it is far above the capacity of man, to judge in every inflance what particular action will tend the moft to that end. The authorifing therefore a man to trace out his duty by weighing endless circumstances good and ill, would open a wide door to partiality and paffion, and often lead him unwittingly to prefer the preponderating ill, under a falfe appearance of being the greater good. At that rate, the opinions of men about right and wrong, would be as various as their faces; which, as obferved above, would totally unhinge fociety. It is better ordered by Providence even for the general good, that, avoiding complex and obscure objects, we are directed