tention of doing right or wrong; and accordingly, whatever be the event, a man is praised for an action well intended, and condemned for an action ill intended.

But what if a man intending a certain wrong happen by accident to do a wrong he did not intend; as, for example, intending to rob a warren by fhooting the rabbits, he accidentally wounds a child unfeen behind a bufh? The delinquent ought to be punished for intending to rob; and he is alfo fubjected to repair the hurt done to the child: but he cannot be punished for the accidental wound; because our nature regulates punishment by the intention, and not by the event *.

A

During the infancy of nations, pecuniary compofitions for crimes were univerfal; and during that long period, very little weight was laid upon intention. This proceeded from the cloudinefs and obscurity of moral perceptions among barbarians, making no diftinction between reparation and pecuniary punishment. Where a man does mifchief intentionally, or is verfans in illicito, as expreffed in the Roman law, he is juftly bound to repair all the harm that enfues, however accidentally; and from the resemblance of pecuniary punishment to reparafion, the rule was childishly extended to punish

ment.

A crime against any primary virtue is attended with severe and never-failing punifhment, more efficacious than any that have been invented to enforce municipal laws: on the other hand, the preferving

ment. But this rule, fo little confiftent with moral principles, could not long fubfift after pecuniary compofitions gave place to corporal punishment; and accordingly, among civilized nations, the law of nature is restored, which prohibits punishment for any mifchief that is not intentional. The English must be excepted, who, remarkably, tenacious of their original laws and cuftoms, preferve in force, even as to capital punishment, the above-mentioned rule that obtained among barbarians, when pecuniary compofitions were in vigour. The following paffage is from Hales (Pleas of the Crown, chap. 39.) "Regularly he that voluntarily and knowingly in"tends hurt to the perfon of a man, as for example "to beat him, tho' he intend not death, yet if "death enfues, it excufeth not from the guilt of "murder, or manflaughter at leaft, as the circum"ftances of the cafe happen." And Fofter, in his Crown law, teaches the fame doctrine, never once fufpecting in it the least deviation from moral principles. "A shooteth at the poultry of B, and by "accident killeth a man: if his intention was to "steal the poultry, which must be collected from "circumstances, it will be murder by reafon of "that felonious intent; but if it was done wanton"ly, and without that intention, it will be barely "manslaughter." (p. 259)

primary

primary virtues inviolate, is attended with little merit. The fecondary virtues are directly oppofite: the neglecting them is not attended with any punishment; but the practice of them is attended with illuftrious rewards. Offices of undeserved kindnefs, returns of good for ill, generous toils, and fufferings for our friends or for our, country, are attended with confcioufnefs of felf-merit, and with univerfal praise and admiration; the highest rewards a generous mind is fufceptible of.

03

From what is faid, the following obfervation will occur: The pain of tranfgreffing juftice, fidelity, or any duty, is much greater than the pleasure of performing; but the pain of neglecting a generous action, or any secondary virtue, is as nothing compared with the pleasure of performing. Among the vices oppofite to the primary virtues, the moft ftriking moral deformity is found; among the fecondary virtues, the most striking moral beauty.

3

VOL. IV.

I

SECT.

SECT. VI.

Laws refpecting Reparation.

THE principle of reparation is made a branch of the moral fyftem for accomplishing two ends: which are, to reprefs wrongs that are not criminal, and to make up the lofs fuftained by wrongs of whatever kind. With refpect to the former, reparation is a fpecies of punishment: with refpect to the latter, it is an act of justice. Thefe ends will be better understood, after ascertaining the nature and foundation of reparation; to which the following divifion of actions is neceffary. First, actions that we are bound to perform. Second, actions that we perform in prosecution of a right or privilege. Third, indifferent actions, defcribed above. Actions of the first kind fubject not a man to reparation, whatever damage enfues; because it is his duty to perform them, and it would be inconfift

ent

ent with morality that a man should be fubjected to reparation for doing his duty. The laws of reparation that concern ac tions of the fecond kind, are more complex. The focial state, highly beneficial by affording opportunity for mutual good offices, is attended with fome inconveniencies; as where a perfon happens to be in a fituation of neceffarily harming others by exercising a right or privilege. If the forefight of harming another restrain me not from exercifing my right, the interest of that other is made fubfervient to mine: on the other hand, if fuch forefight restrain me from exercifing my right, my intereft is made fubfervient to his. What doth the moral sense provide in that case? To preserve as far as poffible an equality among perfons born free and by nature equal in rank, the moral fenfe dictates a rule, no lefs beautiful than falutary; which is, That the exercising a right will not justify me for doing direct mifchief; but will justify me, tho' I foresee that mischief may poffibly happen. The first branch of the rule refolves into a propofition established above, That no interest of mine, not even life itself, will authorise