furely by the laws of mechanism, which are far from being adequate to fuch operations. They are effects of an internal power, bestow'd on man for preserving life. The power is exerted uniformly, and without interruption, independent of will, and without consciousness. ! Man is a being fufceptible of pleasure and pain: these generate defire to attain what is agreeable, and to fhun what is disagreeable; and he is poffeffed of other powers which enable him to gratify his defires. One power, termed inflinct, is exerted indeed with confcioufnefs; but without will, and confequently without defiring or intending to produce any effect. Brute animals act for the most part by inftinct: hunger prompts them to eat, and cold to take fhelter; knowingly indeed, but without exerting any act of will, and without forefight of what will happen. Infants of the human fpecies are, like brutes, governed by inftinct: they apply to the nipple, without knowing that fucking will fatisfy their hunger; and they weep when pained, without any view of relief. But men commonly are governed by defire and intention. In the progrefs from infancy to maturity, the mind opens to objects without end, agreeable and difagreeable, which raife in us a defire to attain the former and avoid the latter. The will is influenced by defire; and the actions thus performed are termed voluntary. But to have an accurate conception of human nature, it is neceffary to be more particular. To incline, to intend, to confent, to refolve, to will, are acts of the mind preparatory to external action. These feveral acts are well understood, tho' they cannot be defined, being perfectly fimple. As every act implies a power to act, the acts mentioned must be the effects of mental powers. The mind cannot determine without having a power to determine, nor will without having a power to will. Inftinctive actions are exerted without any previous defire or motive, and without any previous act of will. Actions influenced by defire or motives are very different. In fuch actions, will is effential to connect the defire or motive with the external act. A man who defires or is moved to perform an external act in view, must have a power to determine himself: that power is termed will; and the deter mination mination is an act of will. With respect to external acts influenced by defire, we cannot even move a finger, without a previous act of will directing that motion. We are very fenfible of this determination or act of will, when we deliberate upon motives that tend to different ends. The mind for fome time is fufpended, deliberates, and at last determines according to the strongest motive. But there must also be a determination where there is but a fingle motive, though not fo perceptible. Being called to dinner when hungry, I inftantly obey the call. I cannot go tó dinner without firft determining to rife from my feat. And it is this determination that intitles it to be called a voluntary act, as much as where the determination is the refult of the moft anxious deliberation. Some effects require a train of actions; walking, reading, finging. Where thefe actions are uniform, as in walking, or nearly fo, as in playing on a mufical instrument, an act of will is only neceffary at the commencement: the train proceeds. by habit without any new act of will. The body is antecedently adjusted to the uniform progress; and is disturbed if any thing unexpected happen: in walking, for example, a man feels a fhock if he happen to tread on ground higher or lower than his body was prepared for. The power thus acquired by habit of acting without will, is an illuftrious branch of our na ture; for upon it depend all the arts, both the fine and the ufeful. To play on the violin, requires wonderful fwiftness of fingers, every motion of which in a learner is preceded by an act of will: and yet by habit folely, an artist moves his fingers with no less accuracy than celerity. Let the most handy perfon try for the first time to knit a stocking: every motion of the needle demands the ftrictest attention; and yet a girl of nine or ten will move the needle fo fwiftly as almoft to escape the eye, without once looking on her work. If every motion in the arts required a new act of will, they would remain in infancy for ever; and what would man be in that cafe? In the foregoing inftances, we are conscious of the external operation without being conscious of a caufe. But there are various internal operations of which we have no confcioufnefs; and yet that they have existed is made known by their effects. effects. Often have I gone to bed with a confufed notion of what I was ftudying; and have awaked in the morning completely mafter of the fubject. I have heard a new tune of which I carried away but an imperfect conception. A week or perhaps a fortnight after, the tune has occurred to me in perfection; recollecting with difficulty where I heard it. Such things have happened to me frequently, and probably alfo to others. My mind must have been active in these instances, though I knew nothing of it. There still remains another fpecies of actions, termed involuntary. Strictly speaking, every action influenced by a motive is voluntary, because no fuch action can be done but by an antecedent act of will. But in a less strict fenfe, actions done contrary to defire are termed involuntary; and they have more or lefs of that character according to the strength of the motive. A man to free himself from torture, reveals the fecrets of his party: his confeffion is in a degree involuntary, being extorted from him with great reluctance. But let us fuppofe, that after the firmeft refolution to reveal nothing, his mind is unhinged by exquifite |