nature is right and perfect, and that it ought to be a model or standard for every human being. Any remarkable deviation from it in the ftructure of an individual, appears imperfect or irregular; and raifes a painful emotion: a monstrous birth, exciting curiofity in a philosopher, fails not at the fame time to excite averfion in every fpectator.

This fenfe of perfection in the common nature of man, comprehends every branch of his nature, and particularly the common sense of right and wrong; which accordingly is perceived by all to be perfect, having authority over every individual as the ultimate and unerring standard of morals, even in contradiction to private conviction. Thus, a law in our nature binds us to regulate our conduct by that standard and its authority is universally acknowledged; as nothing is more ordinary in every difpute about meum et tuum, than an appeal to common fenfe as the ultimate and unerring standard.

At the fame time, as that standard, through infirmity or prejudice, is not confpicuous to every individual; many are misled into erroneous opinions, by mif

taking a falfe standard for that of nature. And hence a diftinction between a right and a wrong fenfe in morals; a diftinction. which every one underftands, but which, unlefs for the conviction of a moral standard, would have no meaning.

The final caufe of this branch of our Nature is confpicuous. Were there no standard of right and wrong for determi ning endless controverfies about matters of interest, the strong would have recourse to force, the weak to cunning, and fociety would diffolve. Courts of law could af ford no remedy; for without a standard of morals, their decifions would be arbitrary, and of no authority. Happy it is for men to be provided with such a standard it is neceffary in fociety that our actions be uniform with refpect to right and wrong; and in order to uniformity of action, it is neceffary that our perceptions of right and wrong be alfo uniform: to produce fuch uniformity, a ftandard of morals is indifpenfable. Nature has provided us with that standard, which is daily apply'd by courts of law with fuccefs (a).

-(4) See Elements of Criticifm, vol. 2. p. 490 edit. 5.

In reviewing what is faid, it must afford great fatisfaction, to find morality established upon the folid foundations of intuitive perception; which is a fingle mental act complete in itself, having no dependence on any antecedent propofition. The most accurate reafoning affords not equal conviction; for every fort of reafoning, as explained in the sketch immediately foregoing, requires not only felf-evident truths or axioms to found upon, but employs over and above various propofitions to bring out its conclufions. By intuitive perception folely, without reafoning, we acquire knowledge of right and wrong; of what we may do, of what we ought to do, and of what we ought to abstain from and confidering that we have thus greater certainty of moral laws than of any propofition difcoverable by reasoning, man may well be deemed a favourite of Heaven, when he is fo admirably qualified for doing his duty. The moral fenfe or confcience is the voice of God within us; conftantly admonishing us of our duty, and requiring from us no exercise of our faculties but attention merely. The celebrated Locke ventured VOL. IV. what

D

what he thought a bold conjecture, That moral duties are fufceptible of demonftration: how agreeable to him would have been the discovery, that they are founded upon intuitive perception, still more convincing and authoritative!

By one branch of the moral fenfe, we are taught what we ought to do, and what we ought not to do; and by another branch, what we may do, or leave undone. But fociety would be imperfect, if the moral sense stopped here. There is a third branch that makes us accountable for our conduct to our fellow-creatures; and it will be made evident afterward in the third sketch, that we are accountable to our Maker, as well as to our fellow

creatures.

It follows from the standard of right and wrong, that an action is right or wrong, independent of what the agent may think. Thus, when a man, excited by friendship or pity, refcues a heretic from the flames, the action is right, even tho' he think it wrong, from a conviction that heretics ought to be burnt. But we apply a different standard to the agent: a man is approved and held to be inno

cent

cent in doing what he himself thinks right: he is difapproved and held to be guilty in doing what he himself thinks wrong. Thus, to affaffinate an atheist for the fake of religion, is a wrong action; and yet the enthusiast who commits that wrong, may be innocent: and one is guilty, who against confcience eats meat in Lent, tho' the action is not wrong fhort, an action is perceived to be right or wrong, independent of the actor's own opinion: but he is approved or disapproved, held to be innocent or guilty, according to his own opinion.

In

SECT. III.

Laws of Nature refpecting our Moral Conduct in Society.

A

Standard being thus eftablished for regulating our moral conduct in society, we proceed to investigate the laws that refult from it. But first we take under confideration, what other principles D 2

concur