That every individual is endued with a fenfe of right and wrong, more or lefs diftinct, will probably be granted; but whether there be among men what may be termed a common fenfe of right and wrong, producing uniformity of opinion as to right and wrong, is not fo evident. There is no abfurdity in fuppofing the opinions of men about right and wrong, to be as various as about beauty and deformity. And that the fuppofition is not deftitute of foundation, we are led to fufpect, upon discovering that in different countries, and even in the fame country at different times, the opinions publicly efpoufed with regard to right and wrong, are extremely various; that among fome nations it was held lawful for a man to fell his children for flaves, and in their infancy to abandon them to wild beafts; that it was held equally lawful to punish children, even capitally, for the crime of their parent; that the murdering an enemy in cold blood, was once a common practice; that human facrifices, impious no less than immoral according to our notions, were of old univerfal; that even in later times, it has been held meritorious,

to inflict cruel torments for the flightest deviations from the religious creed of the plurality; and that among the most enlightened nations, there are at this day confiderable differences with respect to the rules of morality.

These facts tend not to difprove the reality of a common fenfe in morals: they only prove, that the moral fense has not been equally perfect at all times, nor in all countries. This branch of the history of morality, is referved for the second part. To give fome interim fatisfaction, I shall shortly observe, that the favage state is the infancy of man; during which, the more delicate fenfes lie dormant, leaving nations to the authority of custom, of imitation, and of paffion, without any just taste of morals more than of the fine arts. But a nation, like an individual, ripens gradually, and acquires a refined tafte in morals as well as in the fine arts: after which we find great uniformity of opinion about the rules of right and wrong; with few exceptions, but what may proceed from imbecillity, or corrupted education. There may be found, it is true, even in the most enlightened ages, men who

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who have fingular notions in morality, and in many other fubjects; which no more affords an argument against a common fense or standard of right and wrong, than a monster doth against the standard that regulates our external form, or than an exception doth against the truth of a general propofition.

That there is in mankind an uniformity of opinion with refpect to right and wrong, is a matter of fact of which the only infallible evidence is observation and experience: and to that evidence I appeal; entering only a caveat, that, for the rea fon above given, the inquiry be confined to enlightened nations. In the mean time, I take liberty to fuggeft an argument from analogy, That if there be great uniformity among the different tribes of men in feeing and hearing, in pleasure and pain, in judging of truth and error, the fame uniformity ought to be expected with respect to right and wrong. Whatever minute differences there may be to distinguish one perfon from another, yet in the general principles that conftitute our nature, internal and external, there is wonderful uniformity.

This uniformity of fentiment, which may be termed the common fenfe of mankind with respect to right and wrong, is effential to focial beings. Did the moral fentiments of men differ as much as their faces, they would be unfit for fociety: difcord and controverfy would be endless, and major vis would be the only rule of right and wrong.

But fuch uniformity of fentiment, tho' general, is not altogether univerfal: men there are, as above mentioned, who differ from the common fenfe of mankind with respect to various points of morality. What ought to be the conduct of fuch men? ought they to regulate their conduct by that standard, or by their private conviction? There will be occafion afterward to obferve, that we judge of others as we believe they judge of themselves; and that private conviction is the ftandard for rewards and punishments (a). But with refpect to every controverfy about property and pecuniary intereft, and, in general, about every civil right and obligation, the common sense of mankind is to every individual the standard, and not private con→ viction

(a) Sect. 5.

viction or confcience; for proof of which take what follows.

We have an innate sense of a common nature, not only in our own fpecies, but in every fpecies of animals. And that our perception holds true in fact, is verified by experience; for there appears a remarkable uniformity in creatures of the fame kind, and a difformity, no less remarkable, in creatures of different kinds. It is accordingly a fubject of wonder, to find an individual deviating from the common nature of the fpecies, whether in its internal or external structure: a child born with averfion to its mother's milk, is a wonder, no less than if born without a mouth, or with more than one.

Secondly, This fenfe dictates, that the common nature of man in particular, is invariable as well as univerfal; that it will be the fame hereafter as it is at prefent, and as it was in time paft; the fame among all nations, and in all corners of the earth nor are we deceived; because, allowing for flight differences occafioned by culture and other accidental circumstances, the fact corresponds to our perception. Thirdly, We perceive that this common

nature