Right and wrong, as mentioned above, are qualities of voluntary actions, and of no other kind. An instinctive action may be agreeable, may be disagreeable; but it cannot properly be denominated either right or wrong. An involuntary act is hurtful to the agent, and difagreeable to the fpectator; but it is neither right nor wrong. These qualities alfo depend in no degree on the event. Thus, if to fave my friend from drowning I plunge into a river, the action is right, tho' I happen to come too late. And if I aim a ftroke at a man behind his back, the action is wrong, tho' I happen not to touch him.

The qualities of right and of agreeable, are, infeparable; and fo are the qualities of wrong and of difagreeable. A right action is agreeable, not only in the direct perception, but equally fo in every fubfe

fenfe diftinct from all others. The fenfes by which objects are perceived, are not feparated from each' other by diftinct boundaries: the forting or claffing them, feems to depend more on tafte and fancy, than on nature. I have followed the plan laid down by former writers; which is, to confider the moral fenfe as a fenfe diftinct from others, because it is the cafieft and cleareft manner of conceiving it.

quent

quent recollection. And in both circumftances equally, a wrong action is difagreeable.

Right actions are distinguished by the moral fenfe into two kinds, what ought to be done, and what may be done, or left undone. Wrong actions admit not that distinction: they are all prohibited to be done. To fay that an action ought to bẻ done, means that we are tied or obliged to perform; and to fay that an action ought not to be done, means that we are restrained from doing it. Tho' the neceffity implied in the being tied or obliged, is not phyfical, but only what is com monly termed moral; yet we conceive ourfelves deprived of liberty or freedom, and neceffarily bound to act or to forbear acting, in oppofition to every other motive. The neceffity here described is termed duty. The moral neceffity we are under to forbear harming the innocent, is a proper example: the moral fenfe declares the retraint to be our duty, which no motive whatever will excufe us for tranfgreffing.

The duty of performing or forbearing any action, implies a right in fome perfon to exact performance of that duty; and accordingly,

accordingly, a duty or obligation neceffarily infers a correfponding right. My promise to pay L. 100 to John, confers a right on him to demand performance. The man who commits an injury, violates the right of the person injured; which entitles that person to demand reparation of the wrong.

Duty is twofold; duty to others, and duty to ourselves. With refpect to the former, the doing what we ought to do,) is termed juft: the doing what we ought not to do, and the omitting what we ought to do, are termed unjust. With respect to ourselves, the doing what we ought to do, is termed proper: the doing what we ought not to do, and the omitting what we ought to do, are termed improper. Thus, right, fignifying a quality of certain actions, is a genus; of which juft and proper are fpecies: wrong, fignifying a quality of other actions, is a genus; of which unjust and improper are species.

Right actions left to our free will, to be done or left undone, come next in order. They are, like the former, right when done; but they differ, in not being wrong when left undone. To remit a just debt

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for the fake of a growing family, to yield a fubject in controverfy rather than go to law with a neighbour, generously to return good for ill, are examples of this fpecies. They are univerfally approved as right actions: but as no perfon has a right or title to oblige us to perform fuch actions, the leaving them undone is not a wrong: no perfon is injured by the forbearance. Actions that come under this class, shall be termed arbitrary or difcretionary, for want of a more proper defignation.

So much for right actions, and their divifions. Wrong actions are of two kinds, criminal and culpable. What are done intentionally to produce mischief, are crimi nal: rafh or unguarded actions that produce mifchief without intention, are culpable. The former are reftrained by punishment, to be handled in the 5th section; the latter by reparation, to be handled in the 6th.

The divifions of voluntary actions are not yet exhausted. Some there are that, properly speaking, cannot be denominated either right or wrong. Actions done merely for amusement or pastime, without in

tention

tention to produce good or ill, are of that kind; leaping, for example, running, jumping over a stick, throwing a stone to make circles in the water. Such actions are neither approved nor disapproved: they may be termed indifferent.

There is no caufe for doubting the existence of the moral fenfe, more than for doubting the existence of the fenfe of beauty, of feeing, or of hearing. In fact, the perception of right and wrong as qualities of actions, is no lefs diftinct and clear, than that of beauty, of colour, or of any other quality; and as every perception is an act of fenfe, the fenfe of beauty is not with greater certainty evinced from the perception of beauty, than the moral fenfe is from the perception of right and wrong. We find this fense diftributed among individuals in different degrees of perfection: but there perhaps never exifted any one above the condition of an idiot, who poffeffed it not in fome degree; and were any man entirely deftitute of it, the terms right and wrong would be to him no lefs unintelligible, than the term colour is to one born blind.

VOL. IV.

C

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