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exquifite torture: the difcovery he makes is in the highest degree involuntary.

Man is by his nature an accountable being, anfwerable for his conduct to God and man. In doing any action that wears a double face, he is prompted by his nature to explain the fame to his relations, his friends, his acquaintance; and above all, to those who have authority over him. He hopes for praise for every right action, and dreads blame for every one that is wrong. But for what fort of actions does he hold himself accountable? Not furely for an instinctive action, which is done blindly, without intention and without will: neither for an involuntary action, because it is extorted from him reluctantly, and contrary to his defire; and leatt of all, for actions done without confcioufnefs. What only remain are voluntary actions proceeding from defire, which are done as we fay wittingly and willingly: for thefe we must account, if at all accountable; and for these every man in conscience holds himself bound to account.

Further upon voluntary actions. To intend and to will, though commonly held fynonymous, fignify different acts of the

mind. Intention refpects the effect: Will refpects the action that is exerted for producing the effect. It is my Intention, for example, to relieve my friend from diftrefs: upon feeing him, it is my Will to give him a fum for his relief: the external act of giving follows; and my friend is relieved, which is the effect intended. But these internal acts are always united: I cannot will the means, without intending the effect; and I cannot intend the effect, without willing the means.

Some effects of voluntary action follow neceffarily: A wound is an effect that neceffarily follows the ftabbing a perfon with a dagger: death is a neceffary effect of throwing one down from the battlements. of a high tower. Some effects are probable only: I labour in order to provide for my family; fight for my country to rescue it from oppreffors; take phyfic for my health. In fuch cafes, the event intended does not neceffarily nor always follow.

A man, when he wills to act, muft intend the neceffary effect: a perfon who ftabs, certainly intends to wound. But where the effect is probable only, one may VOL. IV.

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act without intending the effect that follows: a stone thrown by me at random into the market-place, may happen to wound a man without my intending it. One acts by instinct, without either will or intention: voluntary actions that neceffarily produce their effect, imply intention: voluntary actions, when the effect is probable only, are fometimes intended, fometimes not.

Human actions are diftinguished from each other by certain qualities, termed right and wrong. But as these make the corner-ftone of morality, they are referved to the following section.

SECT. II.

Divifion of Human Actions into Right, Wrong, and Indifferent.

THE qualities of right and wrong in voluntary actions, are univerfally acknowledged as the foundation of morality; and yet philofophers have been strangely perplexed about them. The hi

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story of their various opinions, would fignify little but to darken the fubject: the reader will have more fatisfaction in feeing these qualities explained, without entering at all into controversy.

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No person is ignorant of primary and fecondary qualities, a distinction much infifted on by philofophers. Primary qualities, fuch as figure, cohesion, weight, are permanent qualities, that exist in a Sefubject whether perceived or not. condary qualities, fuch as colour, tafte, fmell, depend on the percipient as much as on the fubject, being nothing when not perceived. Beauty and ugliness are qualities of the latter fort: they have no existence but when perceived; and, like all other secondary qualities, they are perceived intuitively; having no dependence on reason nor on judgement, more than colour has, or smell, or taste (a).

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The qualities of right and wrong in voluntary actions, are fecondary, like beauty and ugliness and the other secondary qualities mentioned. Like them, they are objects of intuitive perception, and depend not in any degree on reafon. No argu

(a) Elements of Criticism, vol. 1. p. 207. edit. 5.

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ment is requifite to prove, that to rescue an innocent babe from the jaws of a wolf, to feed the hungry, to clothe the naked, are right actions: they are perceived to be fo intuitively. As little is an argument requifite to prove, that murder, deceit, perjury, are wrong actions; they are perceived to be fo intuitively. The Deity has bestow'd on man, different faculties for different purposes. Truth and falfehood are investigated by the reafoning faculty, Beauty and uglinefs are objects of a fenfe, known by the name of tafte. Right and wrong are objects of a fenfe termed the moral fenfe or confcience. And fuppofing thefe qualities to be hid from our perception, in vain would we try to discover them by any argument or process of reafoning: the attempt would be abfurd; no lefs fo than an attempt to discover by reafoning colour, or tafte, or fmell *.

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*Every perception myft proceed from fome faculty or power of perception, termed fenfe. The moral fenfe, by which we perceive the qualities of right and wrong, may be confidered either as a branch of the fenfe of feeing, by which we perceive the actions to which thefe qualities belong, or as a

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