that the death of either party shall dissolve the contract. (Farrow v Wilson, L. R. 4 C. P. 744.) 1068.

PART III.
CAP. I.

TIT. III.

bility of an

for the acts

Where a mischief arises, not from an act Responsiordered to be done, but from the improper employer mode of doing it, the person who ordered the or negli act to be done without ordering it to be done

in an improper way, may be responsible, even where the relation of master and servant did not exist between him and the person who actually did the work. So that where a person employs a contractor to do a work, such person may be liable for the consequences of the improper mode in which the workmen of the contractor do the work, as well as the contractor himself. But, in general, the person who was the proximate cause of the damage is the only person responsible, unless he did it when acting within the scope of his employment as the servant of another; and then the latter is responsible. So that a contractor and his servant are responsible, and, in general, not the person who employed the contractor. And hence where the contractor employed a subcontractor, the sub-contractor is responsible for the injury caused by his own servants, and the contractor himself is not responsible. (a) As to purchases by servants, see infra, par. 1115.

gence of tho person employed (a).

TIT. III.

CAP. I.

PART III. (Butler v. Hunter, 7 Hurl. & Norm. 826; Blake v. Thirst, 2 Hurl. & Colt. 20; Picard v. Smith, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 470; Hole v. Sittingbourne Ry., 6 Hurl. & Norm. 488; Gray v. Pullen, 5 Best & Sm. (Ex. Ch.) 970; Searle v. Laverick, L. R. 9 Q. B. 122; Taylor v. Greenhalgh, L. R. 9 Q. B. 487; Ad. Torts, 4th ed. 413, 414; Lord Bolingbroke v. Local Board of Swindon New Town, L. R. 9 C. P. 575; Bower v. Peate, L. R. 1 Q. B. D. 321; Smith & Co. v. West Derby Local Board, L. R. 3 C. P. D. 423.) 1069.

Where, however, one person lends or hires his servant to another person for a particular employment, so as to be under the orders and control of the latter, the servant, for anything done in that employment, must be deemed the servant of the person to whom he is so lent or hired, although he remains in other respects the servant of the person who so lent or let him out to hire. (Rourke v. White Moss Colliery Co., L. R. 2 C. P. D. (Ap.) 205.) 1070.

A person is answerable for the wrongful acts, or negligence, or unskilfulness of his domestic servants, and of those whom the law denominates his servants (as being selected and appointed by him to do any work, although not in his immediate employ or

under his superintendence), if such acts,
negligence, or unskilfulness occurred strictly
in doing that which they were employed
to do, or in acting within the general
scope of their authority, as his servants.
And the servant is also himself liable
for any injury he may have caused a third
person. But where the injury, whether it was
done wilfully or otherwise, was not done by
the servant of a particular master strictly in
doing that which he was employed to do, or
in acting within the general scope of his
authority, as the servant of such master, re-
dress can only be had from him, unless the
master knew the servant to be of such a
character that such an injury would not be
unlikely to happen. Thus, the master is
responsible for injury caused by his servant
in riding or driving, unless the servant can-
not be regarded as having caused the injury
when acting under his master's orders, but
in pursuing his own wrongful devices. The
owner of a carriage let out to hire is
sible for his driver, unless the injury happens
in consequence of the latter being required
by the hirer to do some unusual or improper
thing. (Broom Com. 669, 670, 672, 676, 685 ;
Sm. Mast. and Serv. 183, 185, 188, 190, 191,
193; 2 Ste. Com. 245-8; Ad. Torts, 21, 22,

respon

PART III.

TIT. III.

CAP. I.

PART III. 241-2, 324-5; Rosc. 518; Seymour v. Green

TIT. III.

CAP. I.

wood, 6 Hurl. & Norm. 359; 7 Hurl. & Norm. 355; Dalyel v. Tyrer, Ell. Bl. & Ell. 899; Williams v. Jones, 3 Hurl. & Colt. 256, 602; Murphey v. Carelli, 3 Hurl. & Colt. 462; Limpus v. London General Omnibus Co., 1 Hurl. & Colt. 526; North v. Smith, 10 C. B. (N. S.) 572; Poulton v. London & S. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 2 Q. B. 534; Edwards v. London & N. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 5 C. P. 445; Walker v. South Eastern Ry. Co., and Smith v. Same, L. R. 5 C. P. 640; Murray v. Currie, L. R. 6 C. P. 24; Allen v. London & S. W. Ry. Co., L. R. 6 Q. B. 65; Tebbutt v. Bristol & Exeter Ry. Co., L. R. 6 Q. B. 73; Moore v. Metropolitan Ry. Co., L. R. 8 Q. B. 36; Bayley v. Manchester, &c., Ry. Co., L. R. 7 C. P. 415; (Ex. Ch.) 8 C. P. 148; Burns v. Poulson, L. R. 8 C. P. 563; Lord Bolingbroke v. Local Board of Swindon New Town, L. R. 9 C. P. 575; Rourke v. White Moss Colliery Co., L. R. 2 C. P. D. (Ap.) 205; Whiteley v. Pepper, L. R. 2 Q. B. D. 276.) And a cab proprietor is liable for an accident occasioned by a driver who has paid a certain sum for the use of the cab. (Venables v. Smith, L. R. 2 Q. B. D. 279.) 1071.

Where a servant left his horse and cart

(Whatman
But, on the

unattended, to go home to his dinner, at
the time allowed him for his dinner, though
told he was not to go home to his dinner,
and the horse, which he had placed before
his house, ran away and did damage, the
servant was deemed to have been guilty of
negligence when acting within the general
scope of his employment, which was to
have charge of the horse and cart, and the
master was held to be liable.
v. Pearson, L. R. 3 C. P. 422.)
other hand, where a carman, carter, or coach-
man does an injury in driving where he had
no business to be driving, it has been held
that the master is not liable, because the
servant is not doing what he has been em-
ployed to do, or acting in the course of his
employment, but the contrary. (Storey v.
Ashton, L. R. 4 Q. B. 476; Rayner v. Mitchell,
L. R. 2 C. P. D. 357.) 1072.

Some judges have laid it down as a rule simply that whenever a master intrusts to his servant a horse or carriage or anything which may readily be made an implement of mischief, the master will be responsible for the negligent management thereof. But a qualification to this effect is generally added-" so long as the servant is using it, or dealing with it, in the ordinary course of his em

PART III.

TIT. III.

CAP. I.