CAP. II. PART I. guished from justification), it is not necessary that they should have had reasonable and probable, or even reasonable grounds only, so long as there was not merely a vague supposition that they were acting lawfully, but some fact on which a belief could be based that they were acting within the law. The question for the jury, or if there is no jury, for the judge, is whether the defendant honestly believed in the existence of a state of things, whether reasonably or not, which, if it had existed, would have justified him in doing what he did. If he did so believe, then he was entitled to notice of action. (Ad. Torts, 4th ed. 586-594; Chamberlain v. King, L. R. 6 C. P. 474; Leete v. Hart, L. R. 3 C. P. 322.) 67. Arrest of a person about to leave England to avoid a demand. Where the plaintiff in any action in the Supreme Court in which, if brought before the commencement of the stat. 32 & 33 Vict. c. 62, the defendant would have been liable to arrest, proves at any time before final judgment by evidence on oath, to the satisfaction of a judge of such Court, that the plaintiff has good cause of action against the defendant to the amount of fifty pounds or upwards, and that there is probable cause for believing that the defendant is about to quit England unless he CAP. II. be apprehended, and that the absence of the PART I. defendant from England will materially prejudice the plaintiff in the prosecution of his action, such judge may in the prescribed manner order such defendant to be arrested and imprisoned for a period not exceeding six months, unless and until he has sooner given the prescribed security, not exceeding the amount claimed in the action, that he will not go out of England without the leave of the Court. 68. Where the action is for a penalty or sum in the nature of a penalty, other than a penalty in respect of any contract, it shall not be necessary to prove that the absence of the defendant from England will materially prejudice the plaintiff in the prosecution of his action, and the security given (instead of being that the defendant will not go out of England) shall be to the effect that any sum recovered against the defendant in the action shall be paid, or that the defendant shall be rendered to prison. (32 & 33 Vict. c. 62, s. 6.) 69. person of unsound mind. Any individual is authorised to confine Confining a a person of unsound mind, who appears likely to do harm to himself or to any other person. (Ad. Torts, 3rd ed. 562.) 70. The Court never interferes with the dis- Amount of damages for CAP. II. false imprisonment. PART I cretion of the jury as to the amount of damages for an assault and false imprisonment, unless they are grossly excessive, or clearly founded on a mistaken or improper view of the matter. Any circumstances of aggravation on the one hand, and any circumstances of extenuation, not pleadable as a defence, on the other hand, ought to be taken into account, to increase or lessen the damages. (Ad. Torts, 4th ed. 607-8; Mayne, 263.) 71, CHAPTER III. OF SECURITY TO CHARACTER AND REPUTATION. CAP. III. Two kinds ONE of the most precious rights concerning PART I the person, is that of security to character and reputation. This may be injuriously of defamaaffected by defamation, which is of two kinds; namely, libel and oral slander. 72. tion. SECTION I Of Libel or Written Slander. Libel is a slander in writing, or in print, SEC. I. or by pictorial or other representation. Libel (Wharton; Starkie on Libel, Introd.; Selw. 1049.) 73. defined. in effect of written slander. Libel is deemed a greater injury than oral Distinction slander, inasmuch as oral slander is sudden verbal and and fleeting, whereas libel is deliberate, permanent, and in general propagated farther. Hence, a vague imputation of dishonesty, if oral, is not actionable, unless the imputation had reference to the business of the person CAP. III. SEC. I. PART I. defamed, and had the effect of damaging him in it. But such an imputation, if published in writing or in print, even without reference to his business, and without proof of any evil resulting from it, is actionable. (Ad. Torts, Publication. What printed or 576; Selw. 1049.) 74. A person libelled will not be entitled to an action, unless the libel be published. But parting with a libellous print or writing in order that it may become known, or the making a libel known to any third person, amounts to a publication. (Broom Com. 719, 729, 730; Selw. 1062.) 75. All written or printed publications which written pub- tend to prejudice the private character or libellous. credit of another, or to render a person ridi lications are culous or contemptible, or to cause him to be hated, feared, or avoided, or to injure him in his business, are libellous; and an action for damages is maintainable against the writer and publisher, unless the publication is a privileged communication, or the libeller can prove the truth of the libel. (Ad. Torts, 578-9; Broom Com. 718, 719; 3 Ste. Com. 465-8; Selw. 1049; Walker v. Brogden, 19 C. B. (N. S.) 165.) 76. It has been held that a charge of ingratitude is libellous, even though the facts upon which it is founded are stated, but do |