CAP. II. after the affray is over, unless the affrayers PART I. remain, and there is reasonable ground for apprehending a renewal of the disturbance. If the affrayers disperse, they may not be pursued, or given or taken into custody. (Ad. Torts, 4th ed. 580; Broom Com. 697; 1 Burn, 276; Selw. 938.) 54. Anyone is justified, and indeed bound, to arrest a person who in his presence has committed or attempted to commit a felony or inflicted a dangerous wound, or to prevent a person from committing a felony, or to assist an officer demanding his help for the taking of a felon or the suppression of an affray. (1 Burn, 275; Selw. 938.) 55. A person found committing an offence against the Act relating to Malicious Injuries to Property, may be apprehended without a warrant, if taken in the very act, by any peace officer, or the occupier or landlord of the property injured, or his servant, or any person authorised by him, and taken before some neighbouring magistrate. (24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, s. 61; Ad. Torts, 4th ed. 579.) 56. Anyone found committing an indictable offence between 9 p.m. and 6 a.m. may be apprehended by any private individual, and conveyed by him, or delivered to some peace PART I. officer to be conveyed before a magistrate. CAP. II. (Ad. Torts, 4th ed. 580; 14 & 15 Vict. c. 19, s. 11.) 57. Any person disturbing Divine Service may be apprehended by a constable or churchwarden, and taken before a magistrate. (Ad. Torts, 4th ed. 582; 23 & 24 Vict. c. 32, ss. 2, 3.) 58. Anyone found committing an offence on or with respect to property under the Metropolitan Police Act may be arrested by the owner of the property, or by his servant, or any person authorised by him, and may be detained until he can be delivered into the custody of a constable. But the offender must be arrested in the very act, and not afterwards, however recently. (Ad. Torts, 3rd ed. 561; 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, ss. 63, 66.) 59. Anyone found committing an offence against the Larceny Consolidation Act may be apprehended by any person without warrant, and taken before a magistrate. And a person to whom property is offered to be sold, pawned, or delivered, if he has reasonable cause to suspect that any offence against the Act has been committed with respect to such property, may, and ought to apprehend the party offering the same and take him CAP. II. before a magistrate. And in certain other PART I cases, a pawnbroker may arrest a person, and hand him over to a policeman. (24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 103; 35 & 36 Vict. c. 93, s. 34; Ad. Torts, 4th ed. 578.) 60. Powers of arrest are also given by the Vagrant Acts (5 Geo. IV. c. 83, &c.); the Merchant Shipping Act (25 & 26 Vict. c. 63, s. 37); by Railway Acts (Ad. Torts, 4th ed. 582-4), and by the Pawnbrokers Act (35 & 36 Vict. c. 93). 61. Except in such special cases as these, in order to justify a private individual in causing the arrest of another without a warrant, he must prove the commission of a felony, and the existence of reasonable and probable cause for fairly suspecting that the plaintiff either committed it or was implicated in it. (Ad. Torts, 4th ed. 578; Broom Com. 699, 700; Selw. 937; 1 Burn, 275; Perryman v. Lister, L. R. 3 Ex. (Ex. Ch.) 197.) 62. A private individual who, except in such special cases and without such legally sufficient grounds, directs a police officer to take a person into custody without a magistrate's warrant, thereby renders himself liable to an action for false imprisonment, in which, if it is successful, heavy damages are usually given. But when a person is arrested under PART I. How far a person is a warrant, the person making the charge will be safe unless he acted maliciously and without reasonable and probable cause. (Broom Com. 701; 1 Burn, 277; Perryman v. Lister, L. R. 3 Ex. (Ex. Ch.) 197.) 63. The question of reasonable and probable cause is to be decided by the judge, as if it were a question of law, on facts found by the jury. (Ad. Torts, 4th ed. 603; Lister v. Perryman, L. R. 4 H. L. 521, 535, 538–9. And see infra, par. 126-138.) 64. A corporation is responsible for a wrongful imprisonment by one of its servants, if within the scope of his authoriry. (See Ad. Torts, 4th ed. 596-7.) 65. A person is not responsible for orders or responsible decrees of judges or justices before whom he sonment or has laid a complaint bonâ fide. But every for impri arrest by a judge, magistrate, or police officer. private unofficial person, not acting in the authorised execution of legal process, is responsible in damages for a wrongful imprisonment ordered, directed, or authorized by him, or for a wrongful imprisonment ratified. and adopted by him, though effected or ordered by his servant or agent, without his authority, but for his use or benefit. If, however, a man givesi nformation bonâ fide, or makes a charge bonâ fide against another to a police constable, but leaves the constable CAP. II. to make inquiry into the circumstances, and PART I act as he may think fit in the matter, he will not be responsible. If a person signs the charge sheet, that is primâ facie evidence that he ordered and directed the arrest, but the presumption arising from that act may be rebutted. (Ad. Torts, 4th ed. 594–7, 605– 6. See remarks of Willes, J., in Austin, app., Dowling, resp., L. R. 5 C. P. 538-9.) 66. to constables by enactment. By certain statutes, actions cannot be Protection brought against police officers and others for and others anything done (as they supposed) in pursuance or execution of those statutes, or by virtue of their offices, except in the same county, and within a specified time, and after a certain notice in writing of the cause of action; nor can the plaintiff obtain judgment after tender of sufficient amends before action, or payment of a sufficient sum after action brought and before issue joined. These enactments were intended only for the protection of persons who had some grounds, however mistaken, for supposing they were acting according to the law; and therefore persons who had no ground whatever for supposing they were authorised by these statutes are not entitled to the protection of notice, &c. To entitle them merely to this sort and degree of protection (as distin C |