PART I. CAP. I. SEC. II. measure of damages is the pecuniary loss to the family from the death. Compensation may be given in this way, not only for an actual pecuniary loss, but even for the extinction of a reasonable expectation of pecuniary advantage, whether to be derived in money, or in the shape of maintenance, education, and social comfort, procurable by money, and which the family, but for the death of the injured person, might probably have enjoyed. But it has been held that the jury cannot take into consideration the funeral expenses or mourning, or the mental suffering occasioned to the family. (9 & 10 Vict. c. 93; Broom Com. 689-691; Wms. Ex. 710711; Ad. Torts, 254, 267; Rosc. 534; Chit. Con. 453-4; Pym v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 2 Best & Sm. 759; 4 Best & Sm. 369; Senior v. Ward, 1 Ell. & Ell. 385; Dickenson v. North Eastern Ry. Co., 2 Hurl. & Colt. 735.) 41. If there is no executor or administrator of the deceased person, or if, within six calendar months after the death of such person, no action is brought by or in the name of the executor or administrator, then it may be brought by or in the name of all or any of the persons, and will be for the benefit of the same persons, for whose benefit such action would have been if it had been brought by or in the name of the executor or administrator. (27 & 28 Vict. c. 95, s. 1.) 42. If the deceased person received in his lifetime compensation for the injury, no fresh action can be brought for it after his death. (Read v. Great Eastern Ry. Co., L. R. 3 Q. B. 555.) 43. Where a passenger on a railway is injured by an accident, and after an interval dies in consequence thereof, his personal representative may recover the damage to his personal estate arising in his lifetime from medical expenses and loss occasioned by his inability to attend to business. (Bradshaw v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry. Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 189.) 44. PART I. SEC. II. 18 CAP. II. CHAPTER II. OF CORPORAL LIBERTY. PART I. EVERY adult has an inherent right of personal liberty, which consists in the power of locomotion without restraint other than by the due course of law. (1 Ste. Com. 145.) 45. Corporal liberty defined. How violated. Definition of wrongful or sonment. This right may be violated by wrongful, usually termed false, imprisonment, or by wrongful, usually termed malicious, arrest. 46. Wrongful or false imprisonment is a tresfalse impri- pass committed by arresting and detaining a person without legal grounds, or without legal warrant duly executed, whether such detention be in a prison or in a private house, or in the street or elsewhere. (Ad. Torts, 4th ed. 575; Broom Com. 696; 3 Ste. Com. 471-2; Selw. 919.) 47. consists. In what it To constitute imprisonment, it is not necessary that the person said to be imprisoned. should be under any physical restraint or confinement. Any restraint on the free power of locomotion in a lawful direction, though it be only by a show of force or even by mere show of authority, constitutes imprisonment. (Ad. Torts, 4th ed. 575.) 48. his PART I. CAP. II. a justice of the peace to arrest. If a justice of the peace sees a felony or Authority of other breach of the peace committed in presence, he may personally apprehend the offender or command any other person to apprehend him; but if the offence is committed in his absence, he must issue his warrant in writing to apprehend the offender. (Broom Com. 705; 1 Burn, 272.) 49. constable may arrest warrant. Except in cases specified in certain enact- Where a ments, a constable may not arrest a person, without without warrant, merely on suspicion of his having committed a misdemeanour. But if a constable has reasonable cause to suspect that a person has committed a felony, or if one man makes a reasonable charge of felony against another and requires a constable to arrest him, the constable may detain him. until he can be brought before a magistrate; and the constable will be secure, though it turn out that no felony was committed. (Ad. Torts, 4th ed. 576-8, 603; Davis's Co. Court, 4th ed. 711; Broom Com. 700, 702 ; 1 Burn, 273; Selw. 936; infra, par. 53-65.) 50. A constable may ex officio arrest a person who in his presence is a breaker of the PART I. Where a private person may out warrant. peace, or has committed or threatens to commit any other offence, and keep him until he can bring him before a magistrate. (Ad. Torts, 4th ed. 580; 1 Burn, 274; Selw. 938.) But it has been held that an imprisonment cannot be justified on the ground that the plaintiff unlawfully entered the defendant's house, and made a great noise and disturbance therein (without the allegation of a breach of the peace), and would not depart when requested. (Ad. Torts, 4th ed. 604.) 51. There are a number of offences mentioned in the statutes relating to the metropolis, for which a person may be arrested by the police without warrant. (Ad. Torts, 4th ed. 583-4.) 52. As a general rule, a private person may arrest with- not, without warrant, arrest another for a misdemeanour, except to prevent the continuance or the threatened renewal of a breach of the peace. (Ad. Torts, 4th ed. 578; Broom Com. 697.) 53. Any bystander is authorised, and indeed bound, to arrest an affrayer, and deliver him. over to a peace officer, to be carried before a magistrate, in order that he may be compelled to find sureties for keeping the peace. But a private individual may not do this |