they have occafion'd: But fuppofing fuch fymbolical Representations might be occafionally ufed; is it not, for the Reasons already given, incumbent on the Parties concern'd, to appoint, alter, and vary them as Occafion requires?

19

B. IF God has delegated to the Clergy a Power to confecrate Perfons and Things; can any, whether Prince or People, dispense with this Power, and fubftitute Things unconfecrated?

A. As God alone is abfolutely holy, fo Men may be faid to be more or lefs holy, according. as they imitate him; and as this Holiness confifts in a good and pious Difpofition of Mind; so Mens Actions are no otherwise holy, but as they flow from, and are Signs of this holy Difpofition. Inanimate Things can only be faid to have a relative Holiness, as made Ufe of in Actions, by which Men express that holy Difpofition of Mind; and can last no longer than they are thus employ'd. What Holiness, either real or relative, wou'd the Ark now have? tho' it once had such a legal Holiness, that more than fifty thou1 Sam. 6. 19. fand Reapers were deftroy'd for peeping into it. Nay, Per

fons who want all real Holiness, may yet have a relative Holiness, as Minifters employ'd by the Congregation about holy Things; but this can be no more than a derivative Holiness, and can last no longer than the holy Action they are about; and belongs equally to thofe from whom 'tis deriv'd. Thus all the relative Holinefs which concerns publick Worship, whether as to Perfons, Places, or Things, must be deriv'd from, the Congregation; and nothing fure, can be more abfurd, than to imagine the Clergy, by any Form of Words, can bestow any permanent Holiness, whether real or relative, on Timber, Stone, &c. And therefore, the Method us'd by Archbishop

Laud

Laud, in confecrating of a Church, was generally cry'd out on as profane, and tending to justify thofe Confecrations us'd in the Greek and Latin Churches; whereby they cheat the People of immenfe Sums. But 'tis no Wonder, if they, who claim this Power in Relation to inanimate Things, fhou'd pretend to convey to Men, tho' ever so wicked, a real inherent, nay, indelible holy Character; tho' wherein That confifts, they themselves can't tell. But,

WHAT the Priests aim at, by this Cant, is to make People believe their Prayers are of greater Efficacy than Those of the unfanctify'd Laity; very well.knowing, that if the People were fo weak as to believe it, they wou'd be thought neceffary on all Occafions; especially to Perfons on their Death-beds. What Advantages they have made by being then thought thus neceffary, none can be ignorant of. I do not wonder, that fo loofe an Hanguer as St. Chryfoftom hou'd fay, The Prayers of the People, which are weak in themselves, laying hold on the more prevailing Prayers of the Priests, may, by them, be convey'd to Heaven. But I admire, that the judicious Bifhop Potter, the King's Profeffor of Divinity at Oxford, fhou'd maintain the fame verum, p. 250. Pofition, and think to fupport it by this Father's Authority: But this is modeft in Comparison, of what Hicks, Brett, and Others of that Stamp, affign to Priests; in fuppofing they have such transcendent Privileges by Virtue of their indelible Chracter, that they can blefs, or curse authoritatively; nay, that their very Prayers to God himself are authoritative Prayers.

B. THO' fome have had too little Regard for Natural Religion, as being too ftubborn to yield to any selfish Views; yet that will not justify you for levelling your

Ar

Of Church Go

Arguments against the divine Omnipotency. Are we not God's Creatures; and may not our Creator give us what arbitrary Commands he pleases?

A. NOT to repeat what I have faid already, I fhall Tell us only ask you, Why may not God deceive us? one Thing, and act, the contrary? Is not his Power abfolute ? And his Will, who can refift? Wou'd you reply, that God, as he is infinitely good and happy, can have no Motive to deceive us? And that he cou'd do whatever he thought fit for the Good of his Creatures, without having Recourse to such mean Shifts? And will not this Reafon equally hinder him from burthening us with arbitrary Commands? Is not one as much as the other, inconfiftent with his Wifdom and Goodncfs, by which his Power is always directed? And of the Two, it fhou'd feem lefs abfurd, that God might deceive People for their Good, than impofe arbitrary Things on them for their Hurt; by annexing fevere Penalties on NonObfervance.

B. MAY not God give us arbitrary Commands to try our Obedience ?

A. A Man, who knows not the Hearts of Others, nor foresees how they will act, may think it prudent to try People in Things of little, or no Moment, before he trusts them in greater; but God, who foreknows what Men will do on all Occafions, can need no fuch Trial. If earthly Kings, who may be deceiv'd, and for the moft Part are so, wou'd be justly esteem'd Tyrants, if they require Things of their Subjects merely to try their Obedience; how can we think This of the Omniscient, infinitely Glorious King of Kings? Tho' was a Trial neceffary, moral and immoral Things wou'd be the most proper Subjects for it; be

caufe

cause we can't practife one, or refrain from the other, without fubduing our Lufts and Paffions: But what fpeculative Articles will not an ill Man profefs? Or what indifferent Things will he not practise, to be indulg'd in any one darling Vice?

AND now don't You think we may justly conclude, that whatsoever God requires of us to believe, or practise, is purely for our Good; and confequently, that no Belief, or Practice, which does not contribute to that Good, can come from God; and therefore, as long as we adhere to what Reason reveals to us concerning the Goodness of God, by admitting every Thing into Religion which makes for the Good of Man, and nothing that does not, we can't mistake our Duty either to God, or Man.

AND therefore, I fhall conclude this Head with a Quotation from a noble Author, "To believe, that "To believe, that every Characteriss Vol. 2. p. 11: Thing is govern'd, order'd, or regulated for the beft, by

a defigning Principle, or Mind, neceffarily good and per manent, is to be a perfect THEIST.

"To believe no one fupreme defigning Principle, or

Mind, but rather two, three, or more, (tho' in their Nature good) is to be a POLYTHEIST.

"To believe the governing Mind, or Minds, not abso"lutely and neceffarily good, nor confin'd to what is best, "but capable of acting according to meer Will or Fancy, "is to be a DÆMONIST.

That They, who, to magnify Revelation, weaken the Force of the Religion of Reafon and Nature, strike at all Religion; and that there can't be Two Independent Rules for the Government of human

Actions.

B.

N

N my Opinion, You lay too great Strefs on fallible Reason, and too little on infallible Revelation: And, therefore, I must needs fay, your Arguing wholly from Reason wou'd make fome of lefs Candor than myfelf, take you for an arrant Free-Thinker.

A. WHATEVER is true by Reason, can never be false by Revelation; and if God can't be deceiv'd himself, or be willing to deceive Men, the Light he hath given to diftinguish between religious Truth and Falfhood, cannot, if duly attended to, deceive them, in Things of fo great

Moment.

THEY, who do not allow Reason to judge in Matters of Opinion, or Speculation, are guilty of as great Abfurdity as the Papifts; who will not allow the Senfes to be

Judges