OF THE

HISTORY OF MAN,

BOOK III.

Progrefs of SCIENCE S.

MORANTHEM

PREFACE.

ORALITY, theology, and the art of reasoning, are three great branches of a learned education and are justly held to be fo, because they are our only fure guides in paffing through the intricate paths of life. They are indeed not effential to those termed men of the world; the most profound philofopher makes but an infipid figure in fashionable company; would be fomewhat ridiculous at a court-ball, and an abfolute abfurdity among the gamesters at Arthur's, or jockeys at Newmarket. But, thefe cogent objections notwithftanding, I venture to pronounce fuch studies to be not altogether unfuitable to a gentleman. Man is a creature full of curiofity; and to gratify that appetite, many roam through the world, fubmitting to heat and cold, nay to hunger and thirst, without a figh. Could indeed that troublefome guest be expelled, we might hug ourfelves in ignorance; and, like true men of the world, undervalue knowledge, that can neither procure money, nor a new fenfual pleafure. But, alas! the expulfion is not in the power of every one; and those who have not that power, will probably think it not amifs, to employ their curiofity upon ftudies that make them good members of fociety, and endear them to every perfon of virtue.

And were we even men of the world in fuch perfection, as to regard nothing but our own intereft; yet does not ignorance lay us open to the crafty and defigning? and does not the art of reafoning guard many an honeft man from being misled by fubtle fophifins? With

respect

refpect to right and wrong, not even paffion is more dangerous than error. And as to religion, better it were to settle in a conviction that there is no God, than to be in a state of wavering and fluctuation; fometimes indulging every loose defire, as if we were not accountable beings and fometimes yielding to fuperftitious fears, as if there were no god but the devil. To a well-difpofed mind, the existence of a fupreme benevolent Deity, appears highly probable and if happily the study of theology lead us to a conviction that there really is fuch a being; the conviction will be a fource of conftant enjoyment, which I boldly fet above the titillating pleafures of external fenfe. Poffibly there may be lefs prefent amusement in abstract ftudies, than in newspapers, in party-pamphlets, or in Hoyle upon Whift: but let us for a moment anticipate futurity, and imagine that we are reviewing paft tranfactions,-how pleafant the retrofpect of those who have maintained the dignity of their nature, and employed their talents to the best purposes!

Contradictory opinions that have influence on practice, will be regretted by every person of a found heart; and as erroneous opinions are commonly the refult of imperfect education, I would gladly hope, that a remédy is not altogether out of reach. At the revival of arts and fciences, the fearned languages were our fole ftudy, because in them were locked up all the treasures of useful knowledge. This ftudy has long ago ceafed to be the chief object of education; and yet the original plan is handed down to us with very little variation. Wishing to contribute to a more perfect fyftem of education, I prefent to the public the following ketches. The books that have been published upon morality, theology, and the art of reafoning, are not eminent either for fimplicity, or for clear ideas. To introduce these into the fubjects mentioned, is my aim with what fuccefs, is chearfully fubmitted to the judgment of others. The hiftorical part, hitherto much neglected, is neceffary as a branch of my general plan; and I am hopeful, that befide inftruction, it will contribute to recreation, which, in abstract studies, is no lefs neceffary than pleasant.

SKETCH

E

VERY affirmation whatever be the subject, is termed a propofition.

Truth and error are qualities of propofitions. A propofition that fays a thing is what it is in reality, is termed a true propofition. A propofition that fays a thing is what it is not in reality, is termed an erroneous propofition.

Our knowledge of of what is agreeable and difagreeable in objects is derived from the fenfe of beauty, handled in Elements of Criticifin. Our knowledge of right and wrong in actions, is derived from the moral fenfe, 'to be handled in the fketch immediately following.Our knowledge of truth and error is derived from variNous fources.

Our external fenfes are one fource of knowledge: they lay open to us external fubjects, their qualites, their actions, with events produced by thefe actions. The internal fenfes are another fource of knowledge: they lay open to us things paffing in the mind; thinking, for example, deliberating, inclining, refolving, willing, confenting, and other actions; and they allo lay open to us our emotions and paffions. There is a fenfe by which we perceive the truth of many propofitions; fuch as, That every thing which begins to exift, muft have a caufe; That every effect adapted to fome end or purpose, proceeds from a defigning cause; and, That every effect adapted to a good end or pur pofe, proceeds from a defigning and benevolent cause, A multitude of axioms in every fcience, particularly in mathematics, are perceived to be equally true. By a peculiar fenfe, of which afterward, we know that there

is a Deity. By another sense we know, that the external figns of pallion are the fame in all men; that animals of the fame external appearance, are of the fame fpecies; and that animals of the fame fpecies, have the fame properties*. By another sense we see into futurity: we know that the fun will rife to-morrow ; that the earth will perforin its wonted course round the fun that winter and fummer will follow each other in fucceffion; that a stone dropt from the hand will fall to the ground; and a thousand other fuch propofitions.

There are many propofitions, the truth of which is not fo apparent a process of reasoning is necessary, of which afterward.

Human teftimony is another fource of knowledge.So framed are we by nature, as to rely on human teftimony; by which we are informed of beings, attributes, and events, that never came under any of our fenfes.

The knowledge that is derived from the fources mentioned, is of different kinds. In fome cafes, our knowledge includes abfolute certainty, and produces the highest degree of conviction: in other cafes, probability comes in place of certainty, and the conviction is inferior in degree. Knowledge of the latter kind is diftinguished into belief, which concerns facts; and opinion, which concerns relations, and other things' that fall not under the denomination of facts. In contradiftinction to opinion and belief, that fort of knowledge which includes abfolute certainty, and produces the highest degree of conviction, retains its proper name. To explain what is here faid, I enter into particulars.

The fenfe of seeing, with very few exceptions, affords knowledge in its proper fenfe. It is not in our power to doubt of the existence of a perfon we see, touch, and converse with; and when fuch is our constitution, it is a vain attempt to call in question the authority of our sense of seeing, as fome writers pretend to do. No one ever called in question the existence of internal actions and paffions, laid open to us by internal

(a) Book 1, ketch 1.

fense;

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Book III. fense; and there is as little ground for doubting of what we fee. The sense of seeing, it is true, is not always correct through different mediums the fame object is feen differently to a jaundiced eye every thing appears yellow; and to one intoxicated with liquor, two candles fometimes appear four. But we are never left without remedy in fuch a cafe it is the province of the reasoning faculty, to correct every error of that kind.

An objection of fight, when recalled to mind by the power of memory, is termed an idea or fecondary perception. An original perception, as faid above, affords knowledge in its proper fenfe; but a fecondary perception affords belief only. And Nature in this, as in all other inftances, is faithful to truth; for it is evident, that we cannot be fo certain of the existence of an object in its abfence, as when present.

;

With refpect to many abftract propofitions, of which inftances are above given, we have an abfolute certainty and conviction of their truth, derived to us from various fenfes. We can, for example, entertain as little doubt, that every thing which begins to exift, muft have a cause, as that the fun is in the firmament and as little doubt that he will rife to-morrow, as that he is now fet. There are many other propofitions, the truth of which is probable only, not abfolutely certain; as, for example, that things will continue in their ordinary ftate. That natural operations are performed in the simplest manner, is an axiom of natural philofophy: it may be probable, but is far from being certain.

In every one of the inftances given, conviction arifes from a fingle act of perception: for which reason, knowledge

* I have given this propofition a place, because it is affumed as an axiom by all writers on natural philofophy. And yet there appears fome room for doubting, whether the conviction we have of it do not proceed from a bias in our nature, rather than from an original sense. Our tafte for fimplicity, which undoubtedly is natural, renders fimple operations more agreeable than what are complex, and confequently makes them appear more natural.It deferves a moft ferious difcuffion, whether the operations of nature be always carried on with the greateft fimplicity, or whether we be not mistaken by our tafte for fimplicity, to be of that opinion..