nefs of the Roman legions were vinegar fo potent, it would of all liquors be the most in request. Exercise without intermiffion, during peace as well as during war, produced the falutary effect; which every prince will find, who is difpofed to copy the Roman difcipline. The Marefchal gueffes better with respect to to a horse. Difcourfing of cavalry, he obferves, that a horse becomes hardy and healthful by conftant exercife, and that a young horfe is unable to bear fatigue; for which reafon he declares against young horfes for. the fervice of an army.

That the military branch of the British government is fufceptible of improvements, all the world will admit. To improve it, I have contributed my mite

tigue was continual and unremitting, while the life of our fol "diers is a perpetual transition from fevere labour to extreme "indolence, a life the most ruinous of all others. I must here "recite the account which the Roman authors give of the edu"cation of their foldiers. They were continually habituated to "the military pace, which was, to march in five hours twenty, " and fometimes twenty-five miles. In these marches each fol"dier carried fixty pounds weight. They were accustomed to "run and leap in arms; and in their military exercises, their: "fwords, javelins, and arrows, were of twice the ordinary "weight. These exercises were continual, which fo ftrength"ened the conftitution of the men, that they were always in "health. We fee no remarks in the Roman authors, that their "armies, in the variety of climates where they made war, ever "perished by disease; whilft now-a-days it is not unusual, that an army, without ever coming to an engagement, dwindles away by disease in one day."

* Rei militaris periti, plus quotidiana armorum exercitia ad fanitatem militum putaverunt prodeffe, quam medicos. Ex quo intelligitur quanto ftudiofius armorum artem docendus fit femper exercitus, cum ei laboris confuetudo et in caftris fanitatem, et in conflictu poffit præftare victoriam. Vegetius, De re militari, lib. 3. cap 2.- [In Englifb thus: "Our mafters of the art-military were of opinion, that daily exercife in arms con"tributed more to the health of the troops, than the skill of the phyfician: from which we may judge, what care should be "taken, to habituate the foldiers to the exercife of arms, to "which they owe both their health in the camp, and their vic"tory in the field.")The fame author obferves, that the Romans in his time had become so inactive, as to leave off the fortifying their camps.

VOL. III.

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which is humbly fubmitted to the public, a judge from whom there lies no appeal. It is fubmitted in three views. The first is, Whether an army, modelled as above, would not fécure us against the boldest invader, the next, Whether fuch an army be as dangerous to liberty, as an army in its prefent form; and the laft, Whether it would not be a fchool of induftry and mo deration to our people.

With refpect to the firft, we fhould, after a few years, have not only an army of fixty-thoufand welldifciplined troops, but the command of another army, equally numerous, and equally well difciplined. It is true, that troops inured to war have an advantage over troops that have not the fame experience: but with affurance it may be pronounced impracticable, to land at, once in Britain an army that can ftand against 100,000 British foldiers well difciplined, fighting even, their first battle, for their country, and for their wives and children.

A war with France raifes a panic, on every flight. threatening of an invafion. The fecurity afforded by a propofed plan, would enable us to act offenfively at fea, instead of being reduced to keep our fhips at home, for guarding our coafts. Would Britain any longer be obliged to fupport her continental connections? No. fooner, does an European prince augment his army, or improve military difcipline than his neighbours, taking, fright, muft do the faine. May not one hope, that by the plan propofed, or fome fuch, Britain would be relieved from jealoufy and folicitude about its neighbours?

With refpect to the fecond view, having long enjoyed the fweets of a free government, under a fucceffion of mild princes, we begin to forget, that our liberties ever were in danger. But droufy fecurity is of all conditions the most dangerous; because the ftate may be overwhelmed before we ever dream of danger. Suppose only,, that a British King, accomplished in the art of war, and beloved by his foldiers, heads his own troops in a war with France; and after more than one fuccefsful campaign, gives peace to his enemy, on terms advantageous to his people: what fecurity have

we

we for our liberties, when he returns with a victorious army, devoted to his will? I am talking of a standing army in its prefent form. Troops modelled as above will not be fo obfequious: a number of the prime nobility and gentry serving without pay, who can be under no temptation to enflave themselves and their country, will prove a firm barrier against the ambitious views of fuch a prince. And even fuppofing that army to be totally corrupted, the prince can have little hope of fuccefs against the nation fupported by another army, compofed of men, who, having completed their military fervice, may be relied on as champions for their

country.

And as to the last view mentioned, the plan proposed cannot fail to promote industry and virtue, not only. among the foldiers, but among the working people in general. To avoid hard labour and fevere difcipline in the army, men will be fober and induftrious at home and fuch untractable fpirits as cannot be reached by the mild laws of a free government, will be effectually tamed by military law. At the fame time, as fobriety and innocence are conftant attendants upon industry, the manners of our people would be much purified; a circumftance of infinite importance to Britain. The falutary influence of the plan would reach perfons in a high fphere. A young gentleman, whipt at fchool, or falling behind at college, contracts an averfion to books; and flies to the army, where he is kept in countenance by numbers, idle and ignorant like himself. How many young men are thus daily ruined, who, but for the temptation of idlenefs and gaiety in the army, would have become useful fubjects! In the plan under confideration, the officers who ferve for pay would be fo few in number, and their profpect of advancement fo clear, that it would require much intereft to be admitted into the army. None would be admitted but those who had been regularly educated in every branch of military knowledge; and idle boys would be remitted to their studies.

Here is difplayed an agreeable scene with relation to induftry. Suppofing the whole threefcore thousand men to be abfolutely idle; yet, by doubling the industry of

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thofe who remain, I affirm, that the fum of industry would be much greater than before. And the fcene becomes enchanting, when we confider, that these threefcore thousand men, would not only be of all the most industrious, but be patterns of industry to 0thers.

Upon conclufion of a foreign war, we fuffer grievously by disbanded foldiers, who must plunder or ftarve. The prefent plan is an effectual remedy: men accuftcmed to hard labour under strict difcipline, can never be in want of bread: they will be fought for every where, even at higher than ordinary wages; and they will prove excellent masters for training the peasants to hard labour.

A man indulges emulation more freely in behalf of his friends or his country, than of himself the latter is felfish; the former proceeds from a focial principle. In that view, have we not reafon to hope, that the separating military officers into different claffes, will excite a laudable emulation, prompting individuals to exert themselves on every occafion, for the honour of their corps? Nor will fuch emulation, a virtuous paffion, be any obftruction to private friendship between members of different claffes. On the contrary, may it not be expected, that young officers of birth and fortune, zealous to qualify themfelves, at their own expence, for ferving their country, will cling for instruction to officers of experience, who have no inheritance but perfonal merit? Both find their account in that connection: men of rank become adepts in military affairs, a valuable branch of education for them; and officers who serve for pay, acquire friends at court, who will embrace every opportunity of testifying their gratitude.

The advantages mentioned are great and extenfive; and yet are not the only advantages. Will it be thought extravagant to hope, that the propofed plan would form a better fyftem of education for young men of fortune, than hitherto has been known in Britain? Before pronouncing fentence against me let the following confideration be duly weighed. Our youth go abroad to see the world in the literal fenfe; for to pierce deeper

deeper than eye-fight, cannot be expected of boys.They refort to gay courts, where they find nothing for imitation but pomp, luxury, diffembled virtues, and real vices: fuch fcenes make a deep impreffion on young men of a warm imagination. Our plan would be an antidote to fuch poisonous education. Suppofing eighteen to be the earliest time for the army, here is an object held up to our youth of fortune, for rousing their ambition: they will endeavour to make a figure, and emulation will animate them to excel: fuppofing a young man to have no ambition, fhame alone will push him on. To acquire the military art, to discipline their men, to direct the execution of public works, and to conduct other military operations, would occupy their whole time, and banish idlenefs. A young gentleman, thus guarded against the inticing vices and fauntering follies of youth, must be fadly deficient in genius, if, during his seven years fervice, reading and reflection have been totally neglected by him. Hoping better things from our youth of fortune, I take for granted, that during their fervice they have made fome progrefs, not only in military knowledge, but in morals, and in the fine arts, fo as at the age of twentyfive to be qualified for profiting, inftead of being undone, by feeing the world *

Further, young men of birth and fortune, acquire indeed the fmoothnefs and fuppleness of a court, with refpect to their fuperiors; but the conftraint of fuch manners, makes their temper break out against inferiors, where there is no constraint. Infolence of rank is not fo vifible in Britain, as in countries of lefs freedom; but it is fufficiently visible to require correction. To that end, no method promises more fuccefs than military fervice ; as command and obedience alternate

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* Whether hereditary nobility may not be neceffary in a monarchical government, to fupport the King, against the multitude, I take not on me to pronounce: but this I pronounce with affurance, that fuch a conftitution is unhappy with refpect to education; and appears to admit no remedy, if it be not that above mentioned, or fome fuch. In fact, a few of thofe who received their education while they were the eldelt fons of Peers, have been duly qualified to manage affairs..