properly, and immediately, their existence, their end, their caufe, their effect, and various relations which they bear to other things. These, and perhaps many more, are predicables in the ftrict fenfe of the word, no less than the five which have been fo long famous.

Although Porphyry, and all fubfequent writers, make the predicables to be, in number, five; yet Aristotle himself, in the beginning of the Topics, reduces them to four; and demonftrates, that they can be no more. We shall give his demonstration when we come to the Topics; and fhall only here obferve, that as Burgerfdick juftifies the fivefold divifion, by reftraining the meaning of the word predicable; fo Ariftotle juftifies the fourfold divifion, by enlarging the meaning of the words property and accident.

After all, I apprehend, that this ancient divifion of predicables, with all its imperfections, will bear a comparison with those which have been substituted in its tead by the most celebrated modern philofophers..

Locke, in his Eflay on the Human Understanding, having laid it down as a principle, That all our knowledge confifts in perceiving certain agreements and difagreements berween our idaas, reduces these agreements and disagreements to four heads: to wit, 1. Identity and Diversity; 2. Relation; 3 Coexistence; 4. Real Éxistence (a). Here are four predicables given as a complete enumeration, and yet not one of the ancient predicables is included in the number..

The author of the Treatife of Human Nature, proceeding on the fame principle, That all our knowledge is only a perception of the relations of our ideas, fays, "That it may perhaps be esteemed an endless task, to "enumerate all thofe qualities which admit of comparifon, and by which the ideas of philofophical relation are produced; but if we diligently confider them, we fhall find, that without difficulty they may be comprised under feven general heads: 1. Refem"blance; 2. Identity; 3. Relations of Space and "Time 4. Relations of Quantity and Number; 5.

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Degrees of Quality; 6. Contrariety; 7. Caufation (b)." Here again are feven predicables given as a complete

(a) Book 4. chap. 1. (b) Vol. 1. p. 33. and 125.

complete enumeration, wherein all the predicables of the ancients, as well as two of Locke's, are left out.

The ancients in their divifion attended only to categorical propofitions which have one subject and one predicate; and of these, only to fuch as have a general term for their fubject. The moderns, by their definition of knowledge, have been led to attend only to relative propofitions, which exprefs a relation between two fubjects, and thofe fubjects they fuppofe to be always ideas.

SECT. 2. On the Ten Categories, and on Divifions in general.

The intention of the categories or predicaments is, to mufter every object of human apprehension under ten heads for the categories are given as a complete enumeration of every thing which can be expreffed without compofition and future. that is, of every thing which can be either the fubject or the predicate of a propofition. So that as every foldier belongs to fome company, and every company to fome regiment; in like manner every thing that can be the object of human thought, has its place in one or other of the ten categories ; and by dividing and fubdivid ing properly the feveral categories, all the notions that enter into the human mind may be mustered in rank and file, like an army in the day of battle.

The perfection of the divifion of categories into ten heads, has been strenuously defended by the followers of Ariftotle, as well as that of the five predicables. They are indeed of kin to each other. They breathe the fame fpirit, and probably had the fame origin. By the one we are taught to marshal every term that can enter into a propofition, either as fubject or predicate; and by the other, we are taught all the poffible relations which the fubject can have to the predicate. Thus, the whole furniture of the human mind is prefented to us at one view, and contracted as it were, into a nuthell. To attempt, in fo early a period, a methodical delineation of the vaft region of human knowledge, actual and poffible, and to point out the limits of every district,

district, was indeed magnanimous in a high degree, and deferves our admiration, while we lament that the human powers are unequal to fo bold a flight.

A regular diftribution of things under proper claffes or heads, is without doubt, a great help both to memory and judgment. And as the philofopher's province includes all things human and divine that can be objects of enquiry, he is naturally led to attempt fome general divifion, like that of the categories. And the invention of a divifion of this kind, which the fpecu lative part of mankind acquiefced in for two thousand years, marks a fuperiority of genius in the inventer, whoever he was. Nor does it appear, that the general divifions which, fince the decline of the Peripatetic philofophy, have been substituted in place of the ten categories, are more perfect.

Locke has reduced all things to three categories; to wit, fubftances, modes, and relations. In this divifion, time, space, and number, three great objects of human thought, are omitted.

The author of the Treatife of Human Nature has reduced all things to two categories; to wit, ideas, and impreffions: a divifion which is very well adapted to his fyftem; and which puts me in mind of another made by an excellent mathematician in a printed thesis I have feen. In it the author, after a fevere cenfure of the ten categories of the Peripatetics, maintains, that there neither are nor can be more than two categories of things; to wit, data, and quæfita.

There are two ends that may be proposed by fuch-divifions. The faft is, to methodize or digeft in order what a man actually knows. This is neither unimportant nor impracticable; and in proportion to the folidity and accuracy of a man's judgment, his divifions of things which he knows, will be elegant and ufeful. The fame fubject may admit, and even require, various divifions, according to the different points of view from which we contemplate it: nor does it follow, that becaufe one divifion is good, therefore another is naught. To be acquainted with the divifions of the logicians and metaphyficians, without a fuperftitious attachment to them, may be of ufe in dividing,

the

the fame fubjects, or even thofe of a different nature.Thus, Quintilian borrows from the ten categories his divifion of the topics of rhetorical argumentation. Of all methods of arrangement, the most antiphilofophical feems to be the invention of this age; I mean, the arranging the arts and sciences by the letters of the alphabet, in dictionaries and encyclopedies. With thefe authors the categories are, A, B, C, &c.

Another end commonly propofed by fuch divifions, but very rarely attained, is, to exhault the subject divided; fo that nothing that belongs to it fhall be omitted. It is one of the general rules of divifion in all fyftems of logic, That the divifion fhould be adequate to the fubject divided; a good rule, without doubt but very often beyond the reach of human power. To make a perfect divifion, a man must have a perfect comprehenfion of the whole fubject at one view. When our knowledge of the fubject is imperfect, any divifion we can make of it, muft be like the firft fketch of a painter, to be extended, contracted, or mended, as the fubject fhall be found to require. Yet nothing is more common, not only among the ancient, but even among modern philofophers, than to draw from their incomplete divifions, conclufions which fuppofe them to be perfect.

A divifion is a repofitory which the philofopher frames for holding his ware in convenient order. The philofopher maintains, that fuch or fuch a thing is not good ware, because there is no place in his ware-room that fits it. We are apt to yield to this argument in philofophy, but it would appear ridiculous in any other

traffic.

Peter Ramus, who had the fpirit of a reformer in philofophy, and who had a force of genius fufficient to Thake the Ariftotelian fabric in many parts, but infufficient to erect any thing more folid in its place, tried to remedy the imperfection of philofophical divifions, by introducing a new manner of dividing. His divifions always confifted of two members, one of which was contradictory of the other; as if one fhould divide England into Middlefex and what is not Middlesex ? It is evident that these two members comprehend all England:

Book III. gland for the logicians obferve, that a term, along with its contradictory, comprehend all things. In the fame manner, we may divide what is not Middlesex into Kent and what is not Kent. Thus one inay go on by divifions and fubdivifions that are abfolutely complete. This example may ferve to give an idea of the fpirit of Ramean divifions, which were in no small reputation about two hundred years ago.

Ariftotle was not ignorant of this kind of divifion. But he used it only as a touchstone to prove by induction the perfection of fome other divifion, which indeed is the best use that can be made of it; when applied to the common purpose of divifion, it is both inelegant, and burdenfome to the memory; and, after it has put one out of breath by endless fubdivifions, there is ftill a negative term left behind, which shows that you are no nearer the end of your journey than when you began.

Until fome more effectual remedy be found for the imperfection of divifions, I beg leave to propofe one more fimple than that of Ramus. It is this: When you meet with a divifion of any fubject imperfectly comprehended, add to the last member an et cætera. That this et cætera makes the divifion complete, is undeniable and therefore it ought to hold its place as a member, and to be always understood, whether expreffed or not, until clear and pofitive proof be brought, that the divifion is complete without it. And this fame et cætera fhall be the repofitory of all members that fhall in any future time fhew a good and valid right to a property in the subject..

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SECT. 3. On Diftin&ions..

Having faid fo much of logical divifions, we shall next make some remarks upon diftinctions.

Since the philofophy of Ariftotle fell into difrepute, it has been a common topic of wit and raillery, to inveigh against metaphyfical diftinctions. Indeed the abufe of them in the fcholaftic ages, feems to juftify a general prejudice against them: and fhallow thinkers and writers have good reason to be jealous of diftincti

ons,