ing, or doing, or fuffering. These are the predicaments or categories. The firft four are largely treated of in four chapters; the others are flightly paffed over, as fufficiently clear of themselves. As a fpecimen, I fhall give a fummary of what he fays on the category of fubftance.

Substances are either primary, to wit, individual fubftances, or fecondary, to wit, the genera and fpecies of fubftances. Primary fubftances neither are in a fubject, nor can be predicated of a fubject; but all other things that exift, either in primary fubftances, or may be predicated of them. For whatever can be predicated of that which is in a fubject, may also be predicated of the fubject itself. Primary fubftances are more fubftances than the secondary, and of the fecondary, the fpecies is more a fubftance than the genus. If there were no primary, there could be no fecondary fubftances.

The properties of fubftance are these : 1. No fubftance is capable of intenfion or remiflion. 2. No fubftance can be in any other thing as its fubject of inhefi.on. 3. No fubftance has a contrary; for one fubftance cannot be contrary to another; nor can there be contrariety between a fubftance and that which is no fubftance. 4 The moft, remarkable property of fubtance, is, that one and the fame fubftance may, by fome change in itfelf, become the fubject of things that are contrary. Thus, the fame body may be at one time hot, at another cold.

Let this ferve as a specimen of Aristotle's manner of treating the categories. After them, we have fome chapters, which the fchoolmen call poftprædicamenta; wherein, first, the four kinds of oppofition of terms are explained; to wit, relative, privative, of contrariety, and of contradiction. This is repeated of all fyftems of logic. Laft of all we have diftinctions of the four Greek words which answer to the Latin ones, prius, fimul, motus, and habere.

SECT.

SECT. 4. Of the book concerning Interpretation.

We are to confider, fays Ariftotle, what a noun is, what a verb, what affirmation, what negation, what fpeech. Words are the figns of what paffeth in the mind; writing is the fign of words. The figns both of writing and of words are different in different nations, but the operations of mind fignified by them are the fame. There are fome operations of thought which are neither true nor falfe. These are expreffed by nouns or verbs fingly, and without compofition.

A noun is a found which by compact fignifies something without refpect to time, and of which no part has fignification by itself. The cries of beasts may have a natural fignification, but they are not nouns. We give that name only to founds which have their fignification by compact. The cafes of a noun, as the genitive, dative, are not nouns. Non homo is not a noun, but, for diftinction's fake, may be called a nomen infi

nitum.

A verb fignifies fomething by compact with relation to time. Thus, valet is a verb; but valetudo is a noun, because its fignification has no relation to time. It is only the present tense of the indicative that is properly called a verb; the other tenfes and moods are variations of the verb. Non valet may be called a verbum infinitum.

Speech is found fignificant by compact, of which fome part is alfo fignificant. And it is either enunciative, or not enunciative. Enunciative speech is that which affirms or denies. As to fpeech which is not enunciative, fuch as a prayer or wish, the confideration of it belongs to oratory, or poetry. Every enunciative fpeech must have a verb, or fome variation of a verb. Affirmation is the enunciation of one thing concerning another. Negation is the enunciation of one thing from another. Contradiction is an affirmation and negation that are oppofite. This is a fummary of the firft fix chapters.

The feventh and eighth treat of the various kinds of enunciations or propofitions, univerfal, particular, in

definite,

definite, and fingular; and of the various kinds of oppofition in propofitions, and the axioms concerning them. These things are repeated in every system of logic. In the ninth chapter he endeavours to prove, by a long metaphyfical reafoning, that propofitions refpecting future contingencies are not, determinately, either true or false; and that if they were, it would follow, that all things happen neceffarily, and could not have been otherwife than they are. The remaining chapters contain many minute obfervations concerning the equipollency of propofitions both pure and modal..

T

CHA P. II.

REMARK S..

SECT. I. On the Five Predicables.

HE writers on logic have borrowed their materials almost entirely from Ariftotle's Organon, and Porphyry's Introduction. The Organon however was not wrote by Ariftotle as one work. It comprehends various tracts, wrote without the view of making them parts of one whole, and afterwards thrown together by his editors under one name on account of their affinity. Many of his books that are loft would have made a part of the Organon, if they had been faved.

The three treatises of which we have given a brief account, are unconnected with each other, and with those that follow. And although the first was undoubtedly compiled by Porphyry, and the two laft probably by Ariftotle, yet I confider them as the venerable remains of a philofophy more ancient than Aristotle.Archytas of Tarentum, an eminent mathematician and philofopher of the Pythagorean school, is faid to have wrote upon the ten categories. And the five predicables probably had their origin in the fame fchool. Ariftotle, though abundantly careful to do juftice to himfelf, does not claim the invention of either. And Porphyry, without afcribing the latter to Ariftotle, profeffes only to deliver the doctrine of the ancients, and chiefly of the Peripatetics, concerning them.

The

Book III. The writers on logic have divided that fcience into three parts; the first treating of fimple apprehension, and of terms; the fecond, of judgment, and of propofitions; and the third, of reafoning, and of fyllo gifms. The materials of the firft part are taken from Porphyry's Introduction, and the Categories; and thofe of the fecond from the book of Interpretation.

A predicable, according to the grammatical form of the word, might feem to fignify, whatever may be predicated, that is, affirmed or denied, of fome fubject. And in this fenfe every predicate would be a predicable. But the logicians give a different meaning to the word. They divide propofitions into certain claffes, ac-cording to the relation which the predicate of the propofition bears to the fubject. The first clafs is that wherein the predicate is the genus of the subject; as when we fay," This is a triangle, Jupiter is a planet.. In the fecond clafs, the predicate is a fpecies of the fubject; as when we fay, This triangle is right angled. A third class is when the predicate is the fpecific difference of the fubject; as when we fay, Every triangle has three fides and three angles. A fourth when the predicate is a property of the subject; as when we fay, The angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles. And a fifth clafs is when the predicate is fomething accidental to the fubject; as when we fay, This triangle is neatly drazon.

i

Each of thefe claffes comprehends a great variety of propofitions having different fubjects, and different pre-dicates; but in each clafs the relation between the

,

pre

dicate and the fubject is the fame. Now it is to this -relation that logicians have given the name of a predi-cable. Hence it is, that although the number of predicates be infinite, yet the number of predicables can sbe no greater than that of the different relations which may be in propofitions between the predicate and the fubject. And if all propofitions belong to one or other of the five claffes above mentioned, there can be but -five predicables, to wit, genus, fpecies, differentia, proprium, and accidens. These might, with more propriety perhaps, have been called the five classes of predi

cates;

"cate

but ufe has determined them to be called the five predicables.

It may also be obferved, that as fome objects of thought are individuals, fuch as, Julius Cæfar, the city Rome; fo others are common to many individuals, as good, great, virtuous, vicious. Of this laft kind are all things expreffed by adjectives. Things common to many individuals were by the ancients called univerfals. All predicates are univerfals, for they all have the nature of adjectives; and, on the other hand, all univerfals may be predicates. On this account univerfals may be divided into the fame claffes as predicates. and as the five claffes of predicates above mentioned "have been called the five predicables, fo by the fame kind of phrafeology they have been called the five univerfals; although they may more properly be called the five claffes of universals.

The doctrine of the five univerfals or predicables makes an effential part of every fyftem of logic, and has been handed down without any change to this day. "The very name of predicables fhews, that the author of this divifion, whoever he was, intended it as a compléte enumeration of all the kinds of things that can be affirmed of any fubject; and fo it has always been understood. So that it is implied in this divifion, that all that can be affirmed of any thing whatsoever, is either the genus of the thing, or its Species, or its specific difference, or fome property or accident belonging to it.

Burgerfdick, a very acute writer in logic, feems to have been aware, that ftrong objections might be made to the five predicables, confidered as a complete enu.meration; but unwilling to allow any imperfection in this ancient divifion, he endeavours to reftrain the meaning of the word predicable, so as to obviate objections. Thofe things only, fays he, are to be accounted predicables, which may be affirmed of many individuals, truly, properly, and immediately. The confequence of putting fuch limitations upon the word predicable is, that in many propofitions, perhaps in moft, the predicate is not a predicable. But admitting all his limilations, the enumeration will ftill be very in ́complete; for of many things we may affirm, truly,

properly,