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ved than that fyftem, for wrangling and difputing without end. He indeed in a manner, profeffes this to be his aim, in his books De Sophifticis elenchis.

Some ages hence, when the goodly fabric of the Romish spiritual power fhall be laid low in the duft, and fcarce, a veftige remain, it will among antiquaries be a curious enquiry, What was the nature and extent of a tyranny, more oppreffive to the minds of men, than the tyranny of ancient Rome was to their perfon's? During every step of the enquiry, pofterity will rejoice. over mental liberty, no lefs precious in their eyes than perfonal liberty. The defpotifm of Aristotle with refpect to the faculty of reafon, was no lefs complete, than that of the Bishop of Rome with refpect to religion; and it has now become a proper fubject of curiofity, to enquire into the nature and extent of that defpotism, from which men are at last fet happily free. One cannot perufe the following fheets, without fympathetic pain for the weakness of man with refpect to his nobleft faculty, but that pain will redouble his fatisfaction, in now being left free to the dictates of reafon and common fenfe.

In my reveries, I have more than once compared Ariftotle's logics to a bubble made of foapwater for amufing children; a beautiful figure with fplendid colours; fair on the outfide, empty within, It has for more than two thousand years been the hard fate of Ariftotle's, followers, Ixion like, to embrace a cloud for a goddefs. But this is more than fufficient for a preface and I had almost forgot, that I am detaining my readers from better entertainment, in liftening to Dr. Reid.

A Brief

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born in an age when the philofophical spirit in Greece had long flourished, and was in its greatest vigour; brought up in the court of Macedon, where his father was the King's phyfician; twenty years a favourite scholar of Plato, and tutor to Alexander the Great; who both honoured him with his friendship, and fupplied him with every thing neceffary for the profecution of his enquiries.

Thefe advantages he improved by indefatigable ftudy, and immenfe reading. He was the first we know, fays Strabo, who compofed a library. And in this the Egyptian and Pergamenian kings, copied his example. As to his genius, it would be difrefpectful to mankind, not to allow an uncommon fhare to à man who governed the opinions of the most enlightened part of the fpecies near two thousand years.

If his talents had been laid out folely for the dif covery of truth, and the good of mankind, his laurels would have remained for ever fresh; but he feems to have had a greater paffion for fame than for truth, and to have wanted rather to be admired as the prince of philofophers, than to be ufeful: fo that it is dubious whether there be in his character molt of the philofopher, or of the fophift. The opinion of Lord Bacon is not without probability, That his ambition was as boundless as that of his royal pupil, the one afpiring at univerfal monarchy over the bodies, and fortunes of men, the other over their opinions. If this was the cafe, it cannot be faid, that the philofopher purfned his aim with lefs induftry, lefs ability, or lefs fuccefs, than the hero.

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His writings carry too evident marks, of that philofophical pride, vanity, and envy, which have often fullied the character of the learned. He determines boldly things above all human knowledge; and enters upon the most difficult queftions, as his pupil entered on a battle, with full affurance of fuccefs. He delivers his decifions oracularly, and without any fear of mistake. Rather than confefs his ignorance, he hides it under hard words and ambiguous expreffions, of which his interpreters can make what pleases them. There is even reafon to fufpect, that he wrote often with affected obfcurity, either that the air of mystery might procure greater veneration, or that his books might be understood only by the adepts who had been initiated in his philofophy.

His conduct towards the writers that went before him has been much cenfured. After the manner of the Ottoman princes, fays Lord Verulam, he thought his throne could not be fecure unlefs he killed all his brethren. Ludovicus Vives charges him with detracting from all philofophers, that he might derive that glory to himself, of which he robbed them. He rarely quotes an author but with a view to cenfure, and is not very fair in reprefenting the opinions which he cenfures.

The faults we have mentioned, are fuch as might be expected in a man, who had the daring ambition to be tranfmitted to all future ages, as the prince of philofophers, as one who had carried every branch of humän knowledge to its utmoft limit; and who was not very fcrupulous about the means he took to obtain his end.

We ought, however, to do him the juftice to obferve, that although the pride and vanity of the fophift appear too much in his writings in abftract philofophy, yet in natural hiftory the fidelity of his narration feems to be equal to his induftry; and he always diftinguifhes between what he knew and what he had by report. And even in abftract philofophy, it would be unfair to impute to Ariftotle all the faults, all the obfcurities, and all the contradictions that are to be found in his writings. The greatest part, and perhaps the best part, of his writings is loft. There is reafon to doubt whether

whether some of those we ascribe to him be really his; and whether what are his be not much vitiated and interpolated. These fufpicions are juftified by the fate of Ariftotle's writings, which is judiciously related, from the best authorities, in Bayle's dictionary, under the article Tyrannion, to which I refer.

His books in logic which remain, are, 1. One book of the Categories. 2. One of Interpretation. 3. Firft Analytics, two books. 4. Laft Analytics, two books. 5. Topics, eight books. 6. Of Sophifms, one book. Diogenes Laertius mentions many others that are loft. Those I have mentioned have commonly been publifhed together, under the name Ariftotle's Organon, or his Logic; and for many ages, Porphyry's Introduction to the Categories has been prefixed to them.

SECT. 2. Of Porphyry's Introduction.

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In this Introduction, which is addreffed to Chryfoarius, the author obferves, That in order to understand Ariftotle's doctrine concerning the categories, it is neceffary to know what a genus is, what a species, what Specific difference, what a property, and what an accident; that the knowledge of thefe is also very useful in definition, in divifion, and even in demonftration therefore he propofes, in this little tract, to deliver fhortly and fimply the doctrines of the ancients, and chiefly of the Peripatetics, concerning these five predicables; avoiding the more intricate queftions concerning them; fuch as, Whether genera and fpecies do really exift in nature? or, Whether they are only conceptions of the human mind? If they exift in nature, Whether they are corporeal or incorporeal? and, Whether they are inherent in the objects of fense, or difjointed from them? Thefe, he says, are very difficult queftions, and require accurate difcuffion; but that he is not to meddle with them.

After this preface, he explains very minutely each of the five words above mentioned, divides and fubdivides each of them, and then purfúes all the agreements and differences between one and another through fixteen chapters.

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SECT.

SECT. 3. Of the Categories.

The book begins with an explication of what is meant by univocal words, what by equivocal, and what by denominative. Then it is obferved, that what we fay is either fimple, without compofition or ftructure, as man, horfe; or it has compofition and structure, as a man fights, the horse runs. Next comes a distinction between a fubject of predication; that is, a fubject of which any thing is affirmed or denied, and a fubject of inhefion. These things are faid to be inherent in a fubject, which although they are not part of a fubject, cannot poffibly exift without it, as figure in the thing figured. Of things that are, fays Ariftotle, fome may be predicated of a fubject, but are in no subject; as, man may be predicated of James or John, but it is not in any fubject. Some again are in a fubject, but can be predicated of no fubject. Thus, my knowledge in grammar is in me as its fubject, but it can be predicated of no fubject; because it is an individual thing. Some are both in a fubject, and may be predicated of a fubject, as fcience; which is in the mind as its fubject, and may be predicated of geometry. Laftly, Some things can neither be in a fubject, nor be predicated of any fubject. Such are all individual fubftances, which cannot be predicated, because they are individuals; and cannot be in a fubject, because they are fubftances. After fome other fubtilties about predicates and fubjects, we come to the categories themselves; the things above mentioned being called by the schoolmen the anteprædicamenta. It may be obferved, however, that notwithstanding the diftinction now explained, the being in a fubject, and the being predicated truly of a fubject, are in the Analytics ufed as fynonymous phrafes; and this variation of ftyle has led fome perfons to think that the Categories were not wrote by Aristotle.

Things which may be expreffed without compofition or ftructure, are, fays the author, reducible to the following heads. They are either fubftance, or quartity, or quality, or relatives, or place, or time, or hav

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