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a procefs of reasoning. This is one of the means by which the Deity, the primary caufe, is made known to us, as mentioned above. Reason, in tracing causes from known effects, produces different degrees of conviction. It fouetimes produces certainty, as in proving the existence of the Deity; which on that account is handled above, under the head of knowledge. For the most part it produces belief only, which, according to the ftrength of the reafoning, fometimes approaches to certainty, and fometimes is fo weak as barely to turn the fcale on the fide of probability. Take the following examples of different degrees of belief founded on probable reafoning. When Inigo Jones flourished, and was the only architect of note in England, let it be fuppofed that his model of the Palace of Whitehall had been presented to a stranger, without mentioning the author. The ftranger, in the first place would have been intuitively certain, that this was the work of fome being intelligent and fkilful. Secondly, He would have had a conviction approaching to certainty, that the operator was a man. And, thirdly, He would have had a conviction that the man was Inigo Jones; but lefs firm than the former. Let us next fuppofe another English architect little inferior in tation to Jones: the ftranger would still have pronounced in favour of the latter; but his belief would have been in the lowest degree.

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When we inveftigate the caufes of certain effects, the reasoning is often founded upon the known nature of man. In the high country, for example, between Edinburgh and Glasgow, the people lay their coals at the end of their houfes, without. any fence to fecure them from theft: whence it is rationally inferred, that coals are there in plenty. In the weft of Scotland, the corn-ftacks are covered with great care and nicety : whence it is inferred, that the ciimate is rainy. centia is the capital town of Biscay; and the only town in Newfoundland bears the fame name; from which circumftance it is conjectured, that the Bifcayners were the furft Europeans who made a fettlement in that if

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Analogical

Analogical reafoning, founded upon the uniformity of nature, is frequently employed in the investigation of facts; and we infer, that facts of which we are uncertain, must resemble those of the fame kind that are known. The bulk of the reafonings in natural philofophy are of that kind. Take the following examples. We learn from experience, that proceeding from the humbleft vegetable to man, there are numberlefs claffes of beings rifing one above another, by differences scarce perceptible, and leaving no where a fingle gap or interval; and from conviction of the uniformity of nature, we infer, that the line is not broken off here, but is carried on in the other worlds, till it end in the Deity. I proceed to another example. Every man is confcious of a felf-motive power in himself, and from the uniformity of nature, we infer the fame power in every one of our own fpecies. The argument here from analogy carries great weight, because we entertain no doubt of the uniformity of nature with refpect to beings of our own kind. We apply the fame argument to other animals, though their resemblance to man appears not fo certain, as that of one man to another. But why not alfo apply the fame argument to infer a felf-motive power in matter? When we see matter in motion without an external mover, we naturally infer, that, like us, it moves itfelf. Another example is borrowed from Maupertuis. "As there is no known

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fpace of the earth covered with water fo large as the "Terra Australis incognita, we may reasonably infer, "that fo great a part of the earth is not altogether "fea, but that there must be fome proportion of land.” The uniformity of nature with refpect to the intermixture of fea and land, is an argument that affords but a very flender degree of conviction. The following argument of the fame kind, though it cannot be much relied on, feems however better founded. "The inha

"bitants of the northern hemifphere, have, in arts " and sciences, excelled fuch of the fouthern as we "have any knowledge of: and therefore, if inhabi"tants be found in the Terra Australis incognita, we ought not to expect among them many arts, nor much cultivation."

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After a fatiguing inveftigation of numberless particulars which divide and fcatter the thought, it may not be unpleasant to bring all under one view by a fuccinct recapitulation.

We have two means for discovering truth, and acquiring knowledge, viz. intuition and reafoning. By intuition we discover fubjects, and their attributes, paffions, internal action, and in fhort every thing that is matter of fact. By intuition we alfo discover several relations. There are fome facts, and many relations, that cannot be discovered by a fingle act of intuition, but require feveral fuch acts linked together in a chain of reasoning.

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Knowledge acquired by intuition, includes for the moft part certainty in fome inftances it includes probability only. Knowledge acquired by reafoning, frequently includes certainty; but more frequently iucludes probability only.

Probable knowledge, whether founded on intuition or on reafoning, is termed opinion when it concerns relations; and is termed belief when it concerns facts.When knowledge includes certainty, it retains its proper name.

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Reasoning that produces certainty, is termed demonftrative; and is termed probable, when it only produces probability.

Demonftrative reafoning is of two kinds. The first is, where the conclusion is derived from the nature and inherent properties of the fubject: mathematical reafoning is of that kind; and perhaps the only inftance. The fecond is, where the conclufion is derived from fome propofition, of which we are certain by intuition.

Probable reafoning is endless in its varieties; and affords different degrees of conviction, depending on the nature of the fubject upon which it is employed.

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PROGRESS OF REASON.

PROGRESS from infancy to maturity in the mind of man, fimilar to that in his body, has been often mentioned. The external fenfes, being early neceffary for felf-prefervation, arrive quickly at maturity. The internal fenfes are of a flower growth, as well as every other mental power: their maturity would be of little or no ufe while the body is weak, and unfit for action. Reasoning, as observed in the first section, requires two mental powers, viz. the power of invention, and that of perceiving relations. By the former power are difcovered intermediate propofitions, equally related to the fundamental propofition and to the conclufion and that relation is verified by the latter power. Both powers are neceffary to the perfon who frames an argument, or a chain of reafoning: the latter only to the perfon who judges of it. Savages are miferably deficient in both. With refpect to the former, a favage may have a pregnant talent for invention but it will stand him in little ftead without a stock of ideas enabling him to select what may anfwer the purpofe; and what opportunity has a favage to acquire fuch a ftock? With refpect to the latter, he knows little of relations; and how should he know, when both study and practice are neceffary for diftinguishing between relations, and for preventing the being impofed on by the fhadow of a relation inftead of the fubftance? The understanding, at the fame time, among the illiterate, is obfequious to paffion and prepoffeffion; and among them the imagination acts without control, forming conclufions often no better than mere dreams. In fhort, confidering the many causes that mislead from juft reafoning, in days efpecially of ignorance, the erroneous and abfurd opinions that have prevailed in the world, and that continue in fome measure to prevail, are far from being furprifing. Were reafon our only guide in the conduct of life, we should have cause to complain; but our Ma

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ker has provided us with the moral fenfe, a guide little fubject to error in matters of importance. In the fciences, reafon is effential; but in the conduct of life which is our chief concern, reafon may be an useful affistant; but to be our director is not its province.

The national progrefs of reafon has been flower in Europe, than that of any other art. Statuary, painting, architecture, and other fine arts, approach nearer perfection, as well as morality and natural hiftory.Manners, it it true, and every art that appears externally, may in part be acquired by imitation and example: in reafoning there is nothing external to be laid hold of. But there is befide a particular cause that regards Europe, which is the blind deference that for many ages was paid to Ariftotle; who has kept the reasoning faculty in chains more than two thoufand years. In his logics, the plain and fimple mode of reafoning is rejected, that which Nature dictates; and in its ftead is introduced an artificial mode, fhowy but unsubstantial : it is of no ufe in difcovering truth, but nobly contrived for wrangling and difputation. Confidering that reafon for fo many ages has been locked up in the enchanted caftle of fyllogifm, where empty phantoms pafs for realities, the flow progrefs of reafon toward maturity is far from being furprifing. The taking of Conftantinople, ann. 1453, opened a new fcene, which in time relieved the world from the ufurpation of Ariftotle, and restored reason to her privileges. All the knowledge of Europe was centered in Conftantinople; and the learned men of that city, abhorring the Turks and their government, took refuge in Italy. The Greek language was introduced among the western nations of Europe; and the study of Greek and Roman claffics became fashionable. Men, having acquired new ideas, began to think for theinfelves: they exerted their native faculty of reafon the futility of Ariftotle's logics became apparent to the penetrating; and is now apparent to all. Yet fo late as the year 1621, feveral perfons were banished from Paris for contradicting that philofopher, about matter and form, and about the number of the elements. And fhortly after, the parliament

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