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Inhabitants in its vicinity to an early trial of strength. They are at best but Custom Houses, and in a hostile view must probably fall by Blockade at the commencement of War, if not by slight siege of the neighbouring Militia. On the Contrary, Quebec and its dependencies, being too formidable to be insulted by any separate State, must unite the whole force of the Confederacy for its attack, and of course give room for those temperate discussions which the Magnitude of the attempt shall inculcate as well as require.

In respect to the Frontier of Lake Champlain it has been particularly brought to notice by Lord Dorchester's communication to you of Captain Mann, the Engineer's observations on the boundary line.

It does not appear, Sir, that should this line be extended to the wishes and recommendations there delineated, that it would afford any real strength to the frontier, excepting it should be the determination to maintain a naval superiority on Lake Champlain for the purposes of offence. Such an extension of the boundary, would in fact invalidate its strength at present, and probably in future, throughout that period that must intervene in the progress of Settlement, from the Original State of the Soil to that Point of improvement, where the wealth and numbers of the Inhabitants shall contribute, actively, by the strength derived from these sources to the general benefit, in the same degree as the uncultivated Deserts had contributed to its security; "Woods and Swamps," as Captain Mann has justly expressed himself, in their natural state "are far from being despicable Barriers."

By the Grants which the Government of Lower Canada have made on the St. Francis and Yamaska Rivers, that Country will be speedily located.

It should appear that the Settlements forming on these Lands, which at their commencement seem to take root rather from the United States than Canada (and which during the late War were considered as Barriers) may weaken the Frontier for some time, whatever advantage they may procure to the owners.

Should the boundary be enlarged, its extension would appear to injure Vermont; already overflowing and settling up to the present line, rather than strengthen Canada.-Circumstances and relative force must determine on any Post to be occupied and fortified to the Southward of the St. Lawrence to its frontier, nothing less than an Army equal in numbers to the force in both Provinces could possibly advance in safety without any adequate utility or general protection.

It is true should the Canadians act with spirit and Loyalty such an Army might be perfectly safe; but then it would be useless; as it would not be expedient to penetrate to Vermont or leave Quebec to a second and more formidable attempt from the Chaudiere and St. Johns, the Yamaska or St. Francis; all practicable routs for desultory and collateral, if combined, possibly for permanent and solid operations.

In the late unhappy American War, whatever injury the Possession of New York in the estimation of some Military Men of the first Authority, might occasion. the general progress of His Majesty's Arms, it is to that Position, Great Britain is indebted for the preservation of her present Provinces.

The Hudsons River, being now open, Seamen, Shipwrights, and every species of Preparation, necessary to obtain the Command of the Lakes, can be instantly. brought into Action, with manifest Advantages in point of time, and in number, to what these Provinces can collect to oppose them; but all attempts of the United States to possess themselves of the River St. Lawrence will be abortive even by treachery, should the small craft on that River be properly arranged and registered to be destroyed or used as exigencies may demand; and should one or two Frigates. constantly winter at Quebec. And this latter Force appears to me to be necessary

at all times, to furnish any Armament that may be requisite on the Lakes of Upper Canada.

Having, Sir, offered these brief Observations on the defence of Lower Canada from Quebec to Montreal; I beg to say that on Cursorily passing Richelieu, soon after my arrival in Canada, I was so forcibly struck with its position, that I immediately examined it, upon enquiry I was much gratified to find that Major Holland, the Engineer, had been directed by General Murray to take a plan of this most important and Military Citadel of the St. Lawrence and to form a project for fortifying it, which I beg leave to enclose.

In respect to Upper Canada, from Montreal to Oswegatchie, the St. Lawrence, its formidable Rapids, its unsettled frontier, and the Loyal Inhabitants on its Northern banks render its passage impracticable-Above Oswegatchie, the navigation for Shipping begins; and Fort Levy', now abandoned may in some future day again become an object of considerable importance; being Situated on an Island and therefore being Capable of being protected by a Combination of Naval and Land Force.

The State of New York has sold the Lands on the Southern Shore. The Indians, it is apprehended, will not permit them to be settled nor can it be allowed by Great Britain with Safety, but this partial contest, it is probable, will interest that State in President Washington's general plan of suppressing the Indian Nations, in particular as the Lands between the River Oswegatchie and Canada Creek, and the other Streams which fall into the Mohawk River, tho' formerly delineated in the Maps, as inaccessible, are now known to be very proper for settlement; from Oswegatchie to Oswego, is therefore in many respects the most important part of the Boundary proposed by His Majesty's Ministers as the main Object of the interference of Great Britain for its arrangement; from Point Levy to Kingston there are no other means of defence than the Advantages resulting from Naval Superiority, force and prior settlement. Its strength may be said in a great degree to depend upon the Possession of Lake Ontario.

The Harbour and Post at Kingston is too extensive to be defended by the whole force of both Canadas.

It is at evident risk, that it continues to be a Naval Arsenal, and no other reason can at present be given for it but that a few storehouses are erected there.— It is frozen in the Winter to the opposite shore.

Its being burnt is the least evil that may be expected. The People of the States may possibly seize and possess it, and turn it to as much detriment to Upper Canada as Chambly was in the late War.

The Bay of Quinte is a populous and flourishing settlement of Loyalists; and from hence any resources both in Men and provisions must be deduced, that shall be wanted for the more exposed parts of this Province.-From hence to the Harbour of York or Toronto, the Northern Shore of Lake Ontario is scarcely begun to be settled. York is the most important and defensible situation in Upper Canada, or that I have seen in North America.

I have, Sir, formerly entered into a detail of the advantages of this Arsenal of Lake Ontario. An interval of Indian Land of six and Thirty Miles divides this settlement from Burlington Bay, where that of Niagara commences. Its communication with Lake Huron is very easy, in five or six days and will in all respects be of essential importance. The Settlement of Niagara is the Bulwark of Upper Canada, and the preservation of the Lands on the opposite side of the River, of

1 Fort Lévis, on Isle Royale, above the Galops Rapids.

which Mr. Morris, it is said, has purchased the pre-emption but which as yet the Indians have not sold, as a boundary is of the utmost consequence.

The Fortress of Niagara is not defensible with its present fortifications or Garrison, or if reinforced to double its numbers against the formidable attack which may be combined.-I do not mention Oswego, as it must fall whenever attacked by Siege or Military Blockade.

In case of offensive Operations commencing from this Province Oswego is a Post of the utmost Consequence.

The general policy that has guided the present Government in the grant of Settlements is not to extend new and frontier, but to encourage People to fill up the old ones, in particular Niagara and Kingston.

It has therefore made no new Grants below Fort Erie. It being advisable to Garrison Long Point the Harbour and Arsenal of that Lake before the settlements shall be extended thither.

The principal settlements of Detroit are without the boundary Line, every means has been used that could be devised, without expence, to encourage the Inhabitants to remove to the British side of the Treaty Line, and to increase the settlements on the River Thames, Dundas Street, the Road proposed from Burlington Bay to the River Thames, half of which is compleated, will connect by an internal Communication the Detroit and settlement of Niagara, and it is intended to be extended northerly to York by the Troops, and in progress of time by the respective settlers to Kingston and Montreal.

The occupying York Harbour, Long Point and Matchadash or Gloucester Bay on Lake Huron with Block Houses, as I have proposed together with the extension of the same system if necessary for the security of the Rivers of Niagara, Detroit, and the Thames is strictly a defensive system, necessary for the protection of Magazines and naval arsenals, and to prevent any enemy from occupying them.

South from the Bay of Quinte there is no harbour capable of holding vessels that draw two feet Water except York from thence to Niagara the Waters are equally low; and in the dry season of the Lake from Niagara to Oswego including that River there is not three feet and even in the Spring these Ports are frequently Barred by the Northerly Winds.

Long Point is similarly circumstanced with respect to Lake Erie, there is no Port but this, and the Grand River from Fort Erie to the Detroit River and the south shores of this Lake are similar to those of Ontario, from the Straits of St. Clair to Matchadash or Gloucester Bay, and from thence to the Straits of St. Mary there is no other harbour than Matchadash Bay.

These Sea Ports might in the first instance be perfectly defended by those Block Houses I have transmitted an estimate of if successively executed. They might in a short space be garrisoned when necessary by that species of Militia or Castle Guard to be formed from the disbanded soldiers of the Queens Rangers, agreeably to that Arrangement by which His Majesty's Ministers were induced to raise that Corps, looking forward most wisely to the principle of rendering a part of the Standing Army every day less necessary in Upper Canada. And I cannot but observe to you, that with proper provisions and attention to the detail, which at a seasonable opportunity I shall do myself the honor to transmit to you, I have no doubt but that such Soldiers as by their Industry may be desirous and deserving of their discharges in this Country will be glad to be enrolled in such Militia, and for their discharge to pay all the expences of enlistment, Passage and maintenance of a Recruit from Great Britain.

These Posts, affording means for reciprocal communication possess striking

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advantages, in respect to offensive operations. I can admit of no doubt in their very appearance. The preparations for Offensive War, should there even be no probability of carrying them into effect, would be more formidable, and competent for protection of the Province than any scattered line of impotent defence in which the enemy would have nothing to do but decide by lottery of which part of the Province he should first take possession.

There can be no advance from Lower Canada into the United States without the permission of Vermont, whose Militia in 1781 Sir Frederick Haldimand considered "as very formidable Enemies better provided than the continental Troops and in their principles more determined." They then amounted to 7,000 and are now at least double that Number.

Upper Canada from the Mississippi to the Hudson may co-operate with any invasion that shall take place on the Coast of the Atlantic. Such an invasion of Ten Thousand British Troops, I am of opinion, would probably overturn the heterogeneous Confederacy. And in such an invasion, any system of defensive or naval War, I firmly believe must ultimately terminate, tho' it may not be deemed prudent, practicable, or popular, at the commencement of Hostilities.

Upper Canada holds the sources of those Rivers which form the great Bays and Sea Ports of the United States, And this very circumstance in the course of time will give to this Country a tremendous ascendancy over the subjacent States.

In the mean time being divided from the United States by the Lakes, The Rivers and the uncultivated Lands of the Indians, such Population as shall flow into it from the States will be gradual and unconnected, so far as not to endanger the settlement by too great an accession of People of different Political Opinions and Principles from His Majesty's Subjects and to this point agreeably to your Opinion, this Government, Sir, as far as possible will pay unremitting attention.

I have thus offered to you as concisely as possible the sketch of those reasons which determine my opinion that there can be "no Military necessity" for withdrawing the whole King's Troops from this Province. In case of an Indian War or one with the United States at least I shall remain in this Opinion till some arrangement totally different from what at present exists shall be determined upon by the Commander in Chief.

In submitting these Ideas to your Consideration I do it with the firm persuasion that at the first seasonable opportunity His Majesty's Ministers will form some general system adequate to existing circumstances, and calculated to protect this great Country in its Infant Establishment and gradually build it up with that solidity and permanency that may display its many advantages and render it a most important Part of the British Empire.

Such a system, comprehensive, regular and inalterable in its design is most necessary, for the national Advantage; to guide those who are entrusted with its execution, invariably to pursue the great outline of their duty; to enable them uniformly to overcome or obviate all difficulties, and mould every partial advantage to a general end.

At present every Military arrangement in Upper Canada is an effect from a Cause which has long ceased to operate, or at best which but partially exists, and has a direct tendency in many instances to cramp those exertions which circumstances require to be instantaneous, both to protect the King's Subjects, to encrease the National Strength and to display those decisive advantages which This Colony possesses over the Subjects of the United States.

The system I have offered from time to time to your consideration while it aims in its Establishment at great and permanent Objects, will effect temporary

ones of no mean consideration. The drawing by degrees our Troops from the Barrier Forts and preparing new stations must eminently conciliate the People of the United States; who will be convinced that a sense of National Honor, not Mercantile advantage has occasioned them not to be evacuated. The Indians too, will consider our withdrawing our Troops, if it shall ever suddenly take place, to national apprehensions.

This is an object of most serious importance to this Colony, and can only be prevented by our preoccupying other advantageous situations.

I have the honor to be with the greatest Respect,

Sir, Your most obedient and
very Humble Servant.

The Right Honorable Henry Dundas, &c., &c., &c.
Endorsed:-York 23rd Feby. 1794. Lt. Govr. Simcoe..
R. 10th June. Ansd.

J. G. SIMCOE.

(One Inclosure.)

No. 18.

Sir,

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FROM LORD DORCHESTER TO HENRY DUNDAS.

QUEBEC, 24 February, 1794.

Lieutenant Colonel England's Letter contains the last information I have received from Detroit, and shews the broken condition of the Indian Confederacy; the Causes of which are attributed to a defection of the Six Nations; which I think no more than might have been expected.

By the Intelligence which accompanies his Letter it appears that General Wayne intends to march to Detroit, this is the more probable as it corresponds with what has been carrying forward on other parts of the Frontier.

The proceedings of the People of the States on the side of Lake Champlain, and more particularly on Caldwell's Manor, point out clearly what we must submit to, were Mr. Wayne suffered to advance: these circumstances admitting of no further delay, it became necessary immediately to send such additional Orders & Instructions to Colonel Simcoe for the Defence of the Upper Country as appeared best suited to its present Condition.

What resources may be derived from the Militia of the Country I have not yet learned. Detroit is able to send out a considerable Force upon any sudden emergency; but being chiefly on the Extra provincial side, that part of the Militia would soon undergo the same Fate as the Militia on Caldwell's Manor, be new organized and turned against the King if Mr. Wayne were suffered to approach.

I have informed Mr. Hammond of the hostile appearances manifested in all parts by our Neighbours, and have sent him a Copy of my Answer to a Message from the Indians of the Upper Country.

My instructions to Major General Ogilvie, concerning the Evacuation of the Island St. Peter, will shew what appears to me expedient on the occasion.

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