them in Council next summer. We are now going to Council Among our Selves Whether we shall meet them or not. how the matter will End I Cant Tell. this I will assure you that I shall give you the Earliest information of the Business. The reports from the Westward are that those Tribes that are for the old Line upon the Advancing of the American Army retreated from the Glaize and soon after sent an Embassy to the American General which would not be noticed unless the Whole Confederacy should send one." a True Extract of Sir, FROM EDMUND RANDOLPH TO GEORGE HAMMOND. PHILADELPHIA, February 21st. 1794. From a review of your letter to my predecessor, on the 22d day of November, 1793, it appears that you had not then received such definite instructions relative to his communication of the 29th of May, 1792, as would enable you immediately to renew the discussion upon the subject of it. Suspended as this negociation had been for so long a time, I have it in charge from the President of the United States, to repeat the enquiry whether any instructions have yet been received by you for pursuing those discussions? Permit me to hope for the honour of a reply at as early a moment as may be convenient. I have the honour to be, &c. P. S. I thank you for the communication of his Britannic Majesty's declaration which I have just received. The Minister Plenipotentiary of Great Britain. (Printed in the Gazette of the United States, Philadelphia, 28 February, 1794.) Sir, FROM GEORGE HAMMOND TO EDMUND RANDOLPH. PHILADELPHIA, 21st. February, 1794. In answer to the enquiry contained in your letter of this date, I have the honour of informing you that I have not yet received the definite instructions that, as I have before assured, I expect on the subject of the discussion to which you allude. The Secretary of State. I have the honour to be, &c. GEO. HAMMOND. (Printed in the Gazette of the United States, Philadelphia 28 February, 1794.) Sir: FROM J. G. SIMCOE TO HENRY DUNDAS. YORK, Feby 23rd, 1794. I feel it a duty to state to you such general Military observations as have been the result of my serious attention & personal observation in both Canadas. I do not wish that this report should be considered by you in a Public Light, but I can have no objection that it should become such, if you think it expedient, being prepared to elucidate & Support every military principle therein laid down for your Consideration. I have the honor to be with the highest Respect, To The Rt. Honble. Henry Dundas, &c., &c. Endorsed:-York, 23rd February, 1794. Lt. Govr. Simcoe. R. 10th June. Ansd. J. G. SIMCOE. Sir: FROM J. G. SIMCOE TO HENRY DUNDAS. YORK, UPPER CANADA, Feby 23rd, 1794. I think it necessary as I forward to you a duplicate of my dispatch (No. 20) of the 16th of Decemr. to offer at this critical period such reasons as present themselves to my judgment for stating that "no Military Necessity" in a general View, can render the withdrawing of the Troops from this Colony proper or justifiable; and tho' Lord Dorchester in a late communication of the 27th of January says "when circumstances permit I shall order part of the Troops from the Upper Posts down this Way, but the State of that Country is such that for the present I shall not weaken the force on the Treaty Line in any respect" yet as far as his former Recommendation ought to have authority, It would effectually disable me in case of hostilities from those exertions which my duty to His Majesty would otherwise lead me to, for the safety of the Colony entrusted to my charge; anxious therefore on the one hand not to incur The censure of a breach of subordination; and on the other being determined not to abandon the Province to a merciless enemy without my best endeavours for its Protection, I am persuaded I shall meet with your Approbation in more fully detailing the Ideas which I have maturely adopted for the strengthening and preserving His Majesty's Dominions in the two Canadas; trusting at the least, that they may be useful whenever His Majesty's Ministers shall find it seasonable to adjust upon system the relative force of these important Provinces. The River St. Lawrence is the important feature of the Province of Lower Canada; the facilities of it counteract an ungenial climate and render it populous, as the excellency of its Lands on its banks will amply reward the industry of its Inhabitants when in the process of time this principle shall be awakened by the Influence of British Freedom in its present possessors. The Land between the North Bank of this River and the Mountains is very narrow and intersected by numerous Streams. As a Military Barrier, the St. Lawrence secures the northern shore (with common precautions) from all probable insult: while the settlements on the Southern, comparatively weaken it: but the greatest security it possesses as a British Colony, is the Access it affords for Ships of War to Montreal. It seems therefore, that if Great Britain maintains her naval superiority any attempts of the United States, to conquer this Colony must be impotent and abortive, while she has access to it from the Ocean; to secure this important Point, it appears to be necessary that Quebec should not only always have a competent Garrison but that this Capital should by no means be the sole dependency of the Colony. A Fortification erected at Dechambeau (The Rapids of the Richelieu) Capable of being defended by five or six hundred Men and proportionate Artillery, would force an enemy, supposing the worst that could happen, a second defection of the Inhabitants of Canada from the British Government and their own Interests, to undertake two sieges, such would be the situation of a Fortress to command the Rapids of Richelieu, that no Fleet could pass it; such would be its situation in respect to a Country, subdivided by so many streams, flowing, by rapid Courses of seldom more than six or seven miles, from uncultivated and inaccessible Mountains, into the St. Lawrence, and forming right angles with that River; that no Army could leave it in its rear, if competently garrisoned and supported by a Water force, it must follow therefore that to cut off Great Britain from the succour of her Provinces, both Quebec and this Fortress must be taken in one Winter; but such an event would almost be impracticable, due consideration being had to the inclemency of a Canadian Winter, and the respective Circumstances of the Invaders and defenders. If either of these Fortresses, Quebec or that proposed at Richelieu should hold out, the other would be recovered in the Spring; for it will not be controverted but that a British Army supported by her fleet would soon regain a Country in which she should have such a footing. The fortifying of the access to the St. Lawrence I consider Sir, therefore to be the point in the first seasonable opportunity, worthy of the utmost attention; and it will immediately do away the common opinion that upon "Quebec alone rests the safety of His Majesty's Dominions in North America." As a most important and collateral Object it will prevent the Subjects of the United States bordering upon the Lakes from entertaining the most distant hopes of carrying into execution their claim to pass down the River St. Lawrence, as the natural right of those who possess the Countries bordering on the Waters communicating with the Lakes or the River St. Lawrence; a right the People of Kentucky are now applying and insisting upon in respect to the Mississippi; which those of Vermont on a former occasion expressed to Sir Frederick Haldimand, and to which the Governor of New York seems to allude in his Speech of the 9th of February last.-This natural right, as defined by the Kentuckians, to be "inalienable, by acquiescence, weakness, tyranny, or prescription," not only militates against every law by which Nations have hitherto been joined in Compact, and must be governed, but from the peculiar situation of the American Colonists, if once universally adopted by them, will form a bond of Union in their present infant Condition, which will be more indissoluble in its nature, and more formidable in its effects to the European Nations, who possess Colonies, than any Power it is reasonable to expect they can probably attain to at a more advanced period. Such Petty Posts as St. Johns on the Sorrel (was not the Champlain wisely opened to the St. Lawrence) and Oswego may provoke and irritate or invite the 159 ; but Custom nmencement rary, Quebec parate State, course give ttempt shall arly brought Mann, the ishes and reength to the il superiority of the boundure, throughthe Original 1 numbers of 1 from these Deserts had in has justly Barriers." de on the St. hich at their Canada (and the Frontier > injure Verin strengthen Post to be itier, nothing ould possibly 1 Army might expedient to able attempt Il practicable ent and solid ssion of New ight occasion eat Britain is every species be instantly d in number, of the United rtive even by nd registered two Frigates be necessary Lawrence secure insult: while th greatest security of War to Mont It seems th attempts of the abortive, while s it appears to be Garrison but th Colony. A Fortificat of being defende force an enemy, Inhabitants of C undertake two s Rapids of Riche respect to a Cou seldom more tha into the St. Lav could leave it in it must follow th inces, both Quel event would alm of a Canadian V fenders. If either of 1 out, the other wo that a British A she should have The fortifyi be the point in t and it will imm rests the safety portant and coll bordering upon t execution their c those who posses Lakes or the Riv and insisting upo occasion express New York seems right, as defined tyranny, or pres have hitherto bee situation of the A a bond of Union in its nature, an possess Colonies, to at a more ad Such Petty opened to the St |