DEAR SIR, TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL FORMAN. SKIPPACK ROAD, 15TH MILE STONE, 25 October, 1777. My Letter of the 21st Inst. (which I hope has got safe to your hands) would amply convey to you my Ideas of the Importance of Red Bank, and leaves me little to add on that head, saving, that the more it is considered, the more essential it appears, to use every possible means for its preservation. The late check which the Enemy met with, in attempting to storm the Fort at that place is a most fortunate event; but I am far from conceiving that it will deter them from endeavoring by slower, and more effectual means, to possess themselves of it.— To make themselves perfect masters of the River and the defences of the Cheveaux de Frieze it is essential to them to occupy that spot. It is equally essential to us to disappoint them, by every exertion in our power; I wish therefore, most ardently, to hear of your being in the neighborhood with a respectable body of Militia, as the preservation of these Forts will, in the judgment of most men, rid Phild. of their present guests, and Jersey of the disagreeable Situation of being between two Fires; for it is not to be expected that the Enemy will remain long quiet after having once established themselves in the City-Jersey must then afford them supplies, be ravaged with Impunity from a force constantly kept for protection of the Inhabitantshow burthensome this will be, let the people themselves judge. Colo. Green who commands at Red bank seems to apprehend nothing from a storm, but every thing from an Investiture, as the work is contracted and unprovided with the smallest defence against shells, which would drive them out immediately. A siege therefore must be prevented-and this can not be prevented without the assistance of your Militia—I am too well acquainted with your activity and zeal to add more on this head, and therefore conclude with strong assurances of being Dr. Sir, &c. CIRCULAR TO PULASKI AND COLONELS OF HORSE. SIR, HEADQUARTERS, 25 October, 1777. I am sorry to find that the liberty I granted to the light dragoons of impressing horses near the enemy's lines has been most horribly abused and perverted into a mere plundering scheme. I intended nothing more than that the horses belonging to the disaffected in the neighborhood of the British Army, should be taken for the use of the dismounted dragoons, and expected, that they would be regularly reported to the Quarter Master General, that an account might be kept of the number and the persons from whom they were taken, in order to a future settlement. -Instead of this I am informed that under pretence of the authority derived from me, they go about the country plundering whomsoever they are pleased to denominate tories, and converting what they get to their own private profit and emolument. This is an abuse that cannot be tolerated; and as I find the license allowed them, has been made a sanction for such mischievous practices, I am under the necessity of recalling it altogether. You will therefore immediately make it known to your whole corps, that they are not under any pretence whatever to meddle with the horses or other property of any inhabitant whatever on pain of the severest punishment, for they may be assured as far as it depends upon me that military execution will attend all those who are caught in the like practice hereafter. The more effectually to put it out of their power to elude this prohibition, all the horses in your corps, in the use of the non commissioned officers and privates, not already stamped with the Continental brand are without loss of time to be brought to the Qr. Master General to receive that brand; and henceforth if any of them shall be found with horses that are without it they shall be tried for marauding and disobedience of orders. I am fully confident, you will be equally disposed with me to reprobate and abolish the practice complained of; and will adopt the strictest measures to fulfil the intention of this letter, and prevent its continuance in future. I am, &c. TO MAJOR-GENERAL PUTNAM. HEAD-QUARTERS, 25 October, 1777. I have your favor of the 20th, enclosing a copy of General Burgoyne's capitulation, which was the first authentic intelligence I received of the affair. Indeed I began to grow uneasy and almost to suspect that the first accounts you transmitted to me were premature. As I have not received a single line from General Gates, I do not know what steps he is taking with the army under his command, and therefore cannot advise what is most proper to be done in your quarter. But I should think, if a junction of your forces was formed, part to proceed down upon one side of the river and part upon the other, that Sir Henry Clinton would be obliged to retreat immediately before you; or, if he suffered you to get between him and New York, you perhaps might in its weak state get into the city. I mention this merely as a matter of opinion, taking it for granted you will pursue the most proper and efficacious measure. Whatever be determined upon, I beg it may be constantly communicated to me, as the operations of this army may depend much upon the situation of yours. * I am, dear Sir, &c. may SIR, CALL FOR A COUNCIL OF OFFICERS. HEAD-QUARTERS, 26 October, 1777. You will, very shortly, be called to a council of War, when your sentiments on the following questions will be asked. Ist, Whether it will be prudent in our present circumstances, and strength, to attempt by a General Attack to dislodge the Enemy; and if it is, and we unsuccessful, where we retreat to? 2d, If such an attack should not be thought eligible, what general disposition of the Army had best take place till the weather forces us from the Field? 3d, Where and in what manner, supposing the Enemy to keep possession of Philadelphia, had the Continental Troops best be Cantoned after they can no longer keep the Field? 4th, What measures can be adopted to cover the country near the City, and prevent the Enemy from drawing Supplies therefrom during the Winter? 5th, Will the Office of Inspector General to our Army, for the purpose principally, of establishing one uniform set of Manœuvres, and manual be advisable, as the time of the Adjutant General seems to be totally engaged with other business? 6th, Should Regimental promotion extend only to Captains Inclusively, or that of the Majority? 7th, Will it be consistent with propriety and good policy to allow Soldiers the reward offered to others for apprehending Deserters ? 8th, The Commissaries Complaining of the number, and disproportion of the Rations which are Issued to the Troops, and at the same time of the advanced price of all kinds of Spirits, owing to the Imposition of the Sutlers upon the Soldiery, what regulation, and Remedy can be applied to rectify the one, and prevent the other? I am, Sir, &c.' 1 The Council of War was held on the 29th, and Washington laid before it a general account of the situation, stating the strength of the two armies as follows: That the troops under Sir William Howe present and fit for duty amounted, according to the best intelligence he could obtain, to ten thousand rank and file, stationed at Philadelphia and in its immediate vicinity; and that the force under his command, present and fit for duty, was eight thousand three hundred and thirteen Continental troops, and two thousand seven hundred and seventeen militia. There were, in addition, six hundred and fifty Continental troops at Red Bank and Fort Mifflin, and a detachment of three hundred militia on their way to reinforce those posts. A body of five hundred militia under General Potter was likewise on the other side of the Schuylkill. This was his whole force, and it was likely soon to suffer a diminution of nineteen hundred and eighty-six militia, by the expiration of the term of service for which those from Maryland and Virginia had been engaged. The decision of the Council on the General's questions was: 1. It was not advisable to make an attack upon Philadelphia. 2. The army should take a position to the left of its present station, and the garrisons at Red Bank and Fort Mifflin should be reinforced. 3 and 4. Deferred. It was decided that twenty regiments should be drawn from the northern army. 5. Such an officer was advisable, the manual or regulations to be first agreed upon by the commander-in-chief or a board of officers appointed for that purpose. 6. Promotions should be regimental as high as Captains inclusively. All from that rank, in the line of the State. 7. The reward should be allowed. 8. Deferred. |