But a licence for a partnership will continue in force for issuing notes under the same firm till the 10th of October inclusive, after its date, notwithstanding an alteration in the partnership. (32)

Re-issuable notes must not have the date printed thereon under a penalty of 50l. (33)

payment of or as a security for the sum therein expressed, knowing the same to be re-issued contrary to the intent and meaning of this act, he, she, or they shall, for every such note, bill, draft, or order, forfeit the sum of twenty pounds."

(32) By 55 Geo. 3. c. 184. s. 28., "Where any such licence as aforesaid shall be granted to any persons in partnership, the same shall continue in force for the issuing of promissory notes duly stamped, under the name, style, or firm therein specified, until the tenth day of October inclusive, following the date thereof, notwithstanding any alteration in the partnership."

(33) By 55 Geo. 3. c. 184. s. 18., "It shall not be lawful for any banker or bankers, or other person or persons, to issue any promissory note for the payment of money to the bearer on demand, liable to any of the duties imposed by this act, with the date printed thereon; and if any banker or bankers, or other person or persons, shall issue or cause to be issued any such promissory note with the date printed therein, he or they shall for every such promissory note so issued, forfeit the sum of fifty pounds,"

CAP. IV.

SECT. 1. Of the Alteration of Bills or Notes. 2. At what Time, p. 93.

3. Onus of Proof in Case of Alteration, p. 95.

If a bill or note is altered in a material part (though by consent of all parties) after it has once issued, it requires (1) a new stamp;

Unless such alteration is to correct a mistake, and merely to make the bill what it was originally intended to have been, for in such case a new stamp is not necessary. (2)

(1) Wilson v. Justice, 1796. A bill of nine months after date was, by consent of all parties, a fortnight after it had been delivered to the payee, altered to ten months after date. Lord Kenyon held a new stamp necessary, and nonsuited the plaintiff.

Bowman v. Nicoll, 5 Term Rep. 537. A bill dated 2d September, and payable twenty-one days after date, was, by consent of the acceptor, altered to fifty-one days after date : on 30th September it was with the like consent, and whilst it remained in the drawer's hands, restored to twenty-one days, but the date was altered to September 14th. Lord Kenyon nonsuited, and the court held the nonsuit right.

(2) Kershaw v. Cox, 3 Esp. N. P. C. 246. In an action on a bill, it appeared that the defendant, who was the payee, had indorsed. the bill to one K., by whom it was passed to the plaintiffs; that they, on discovering that the words, "or order," had been omitted, returned it the day after it was drawn, and the drawer, with the consent of the defendant, then inserted those words. Le Blanc, J. held that no new stamp was necessary; that this

Where an alteration will vacate a bill or note, it will have that effect, though it is made by a mere stranger. (3)

And such alteration not only makes a new stamp necessary, but vacates the bill or note, (independently of the stamp laws) except as between the parties consenting to such alteration.

was not a new instrument, as in Bowman v. Nicholl, but merely a correction of a mistake, and in furtherance of the original intention of the parties; and the plaintiffs had a verdict. A new trial was afterwards moved for, but the court refused a rule. See 10 East. Rep. 437.

Jacob v. Hart, 2 Stark. 45. In an action on a bill drawn by A. on B., payable to C. or order, B. discovered, when it was in C.'s hands, that by mistake the date was March instead of April, and C. altered it. Some time after B. had accepted it, C. added on the bill, payable at Mr. J.'s, St. Mary Axe; that was the proper place. Lord Ellenborough held both alterations immaterial, and the plaintiff had a verdict.

(3) Master v. Miller, 4 Term Rep. 320. 2 H. Bl. 141. In an action by indorsees against the acceptor of a bill, payable three months after date, to Wilkinson and Cooke, the declaration had one count upon the bill as dated the 20th March, and another as dated the 26th March. The jury found a special verdict, stating that the bill was drawn and dated the 26th March; that it was accepted; and that afterwards, and whilst it remained in the hands of Wilkinson and Cooke, the date was altered from the 26th to the 20th March, without the defendant's knowledge, and by some person unknown to the jury, That after such alteration it was endorsed for a valuable consideration by Wilkinson and Cooke to the plaintiffs. After two arguments, Lord Kenyon, Ashhurst, and Grose, Js. held, that the alteration, though by a stranger, vacated the bill; Buller, J. differed; but on error, the whole court was so clear that it was vacated, that they would not hear a second argument, and judgment for the defendant was affirmed. See Henfree v. Bromley, 6 East. Rep. 309.

Altering the (4) date, or sum, or (4) time for payment; or inserting words, rendering a bill or note (5) negotiable, which was not so originally; or inserting words in a bill or note originally expressed to be for value received generally, stating such value to have been received on a (6) parti

(4) Walton v. Hastings, 4 Campb. 223. 1 Stark. 215. A bill drawn by Brooks in favour of plaintiff was dated 5th July. An agent of plaintiffs presented it for acceptance, and defendant, the drawee, desired to have the date altered to the 10th, which was done accordingly, and then defendant accepted it. Lord Ellenborough held that as the bill was issued before this alteration was made, and was a perfect available instrument, the alteration made a new stamp necessary, and nonsuit.

Outhwaite v. Luntley, 4 Campb. 179. A bill drawn 5th March was indorsed to J. S., who left it for acceptance. The drawees altered the date to 15th March, and then accepted it. In an action on the bill by indorsee against indorser, it was argued that this alteration vacated the bill. Lord Ellenborough was of that opinion, because the bill was a perfect instrument when issued to the indorsee, the alteration might embarrass parties who would expect notice or payment according to the original date, and the alteration made it a new bill, and made a new stamp necessary.

See Wilson v. Justice, and Bowman v. Nicholl, ante, p. 89. and Cardwell v. Martin, infra, p. 94. As to acceptances varying from the tenor of the bill, see Chapter VI.

(5) See Kershaw v. Cox, ante, p. 89. n. (2.) In Knill v. Williams, 10 East's Rep. 437, Le Blanc, J. said, that Kershaw, and Cox could only be supported on the ground that the alteration was merely the correction of a mistake, for the alteration was a very material one.

This was an action

(6) Knill v. Williams, 10 East. Rep. 431. on a note, by which, nine months after date, the defendant promised to pay to the plaintiff, or order, 100l. for value received, for the good-will of the lease and trade of Mr. F. Knill,

cular account, is a material alteration, and makes a new stamp necessary.

But inserting a mere memorandum to say where the bill or note is to be payable, if it give a right direction in that respect, is not. (7)

But altering an acceptance, so as to give an unwarranted place for payment, vacates the acceptance. (8)

deceased. It appeared at the trial before Le Blanc J., at Hereford, that the words in Italics were added, by consent of both parties, on the day after the note had been signed and delivered to the plaintiff, without any new stamp being impressed upon it; upon this the plaintiff was nonsuited, and on a rule nisi to set aside the nonsuit, the whole court held that the alteration was material, and therefore discharged the rule.

(7) Trapp v. Spearman, 3 Esp. N. P. C. 57. In an action on a bill by an indorsee against the acceptor, the defence was, that the bill had been altered, by the insertion of the words, "When due, at the Cross Keys, Black Friars Road." But Lord Kenyon held that the alteration was immaterial, and the plaintiff had a verdict.

Indorsee against

Marson v. Petit, 1 Campb. N. P. C. 82. n. acceptor of a bill; after acceptance, the drawer, without the consent or knowledge of the defendant, wrote under his name, Prescott and Co. Lord Ellenborough held it immaterial.

(8) Tidmarsh v. Grover, 1 Maul. and Sel. 735. Defendant accepted a bill so as to make it payable at Bloxam and Co.'s: Bloxam and Co. failed, and the holder, without defendant's knowledge or consent, struck out their names, and substituted Esdaile and Co.'s. On point reserved whether this alteration vacated the acceptance, the whole court held it did, and plaintiff was nonsuited.

Cowie v. Halsall, 4 Barnew. and Ald. 197. In an action by indorsee of a bill against the acceptor, it appeared that the acceptance was general, and that the drawer, without the defendant's knowledge, added to it "Payable at Mr. B.'s, Chis