partners, is a satisfaction as to all; and if a person is a partner in two firms, satisfaction as to one firm is (32) so as to both. What would baf óne firm will bar the other, and it will make no difference though one common partner is, in fact, ignorant of the circumstances which constitute the satisfaction.

Thus if one house receive funds from the drawer to take up a bill, and misapply them, no other house to which any member of the first house belongs can sue the drawer;

Or if he stands in the place of the drawer, the acceptor. (32)

In an action upon a bill or note, the plaintiff is in general entitled to recover the money payable thereby, with (33) interest, and (34) all incidental

(32) Jacaud and Gordon v. French and others, 12 East's Rep. 317. Jacaud was in partnership with Blair in Ireland, and with Gordon here. Jacaud and Gordon had a bill drawn by Farrell and Co. on defendants, and Farrell and Co. had supplied Jacaud and Blair with funds to pay this bill: Blair misapplied those funds, and on an action on the bill by Jacaud and Gordon, the defence was, that the misapplication by Blair was a misapplication by Jacaud also, and that after being guilty in one house of disappointing payment by misapplying the payment-fund, he could not endeavour to enforce payment in another and in case the court was of that opinion, and the postea was awarded to the defendants.

(33) D. Mar. 2d ed. 13. Blaney v. Bradley, Blackst. 761. By the court. "Interest is due on all bills of exchange and notes of hand payable at a day certain, or after demand, if payable on demand." See also Bunb. 129. 2 Term Rep. 58.

(34) Vide Mar. 2 ed. 13. In Simmonds v. Parminter, ante, p. 262. note (1), the plaintiff recovered interest, exchange and

expences occasioned by non-acceptance or nonpayment.

The interest is, in general, to be computed from the time the bill or note would regularly have been payable, and it is, in general, to be carried down to the time when final judgment may be signed. (35)

Thus, upon a bill or note payable on presentment, interest (36) must be computed from the presentment.

But if a bill or note payable at a given time after `date be for a specified sum, "bearing interest," interest shall be computed from the date. (37)

re-exchange; and in Auriolv. Thomas, (post, p. 284. n. 45.) 10s. per pagoda in lieu of interest, exchange, and all other charges.

(35) Robinson v. Bland, Burr. 1077. In an action upon a bill of exchange, and for money lent, a case was reserved, and the court was of opinion that the plaintiff could not recover upon the bill, but that he might for the money lent; but they took time to consider, with a view to settle the future practice, to what time the interest upon money lent should be computed, and afterwards determined that it should be computed to the time of giving judgment.

(36) Blaney v. Bradley, ante p. 278. note (33). Cotton v. Horsemanden, Pract. Reg. 357. The court held, that in actions upon promissory notes, payable on demand, interest should be given from the time of the demand proved; but in this case, where it appeared upon the face of the note to be for money lent, interest should be given from the date of the note. 9 Mod. 138. By the court, interest upon a bill of exchange commences from demand made.

(37) Kennerly v. Nash, 1 Stark. 452. Action on bill at four months after date for 25l. 4s. bearing interest; and per Lord Ellenborough, these words entitle plaintiff to interest from the date of the bill; without them, he would have been entitled to it from the time it became due,

It has, indeed, been held (38), that if a party, entitled to notice of the dishonour of a bill or note, offer to pay it within a reasonable time after the notice is given, he is not liable for interest from the time of the dishonour: but perhaps there might be risque in acting upon that decision.

Where all that is due is tendered, and the holder has mislaid the bill or note, so that he cannot give it up, and payment is, on that account, postponed, the interest shall be computed up to the time of such tender only. (39)

The language of 3 & 4 Ann seems to imply, that

Hopper v. Richmond, 1 Stark. 507. By the terms of a note defendant undertook to pay legal interest on demand: Lord Ellenborough held, that must mean from the date of the note.

(38) Walker v. Barnes, 5 Taunt. 240. A bill for 10%., due 11th June, was presented for payment on that day, and dishonoured. On the 12th notice was sent by letter to the drawer, and early on the 13th he tendered the 10.; the 107. was not accepted, and on an action against the drawer, it was urged for the plaintiff, that the tender was insufficient, for that defendant ought to have tendered the interest from the 11th to the 13th; but on the point being reserved, the court held it sufficient, if the drawer, within a reasonable time after the notice, tendered the principal without the interest; and judgment was given for the defendant.

Note, the interest would have been under three farthings, one fifteenth part of ten pence. But quære, whether nonpayment by the drawee was not a breach of the drawer's contract, and whether the holder was not entitled to interest for not receiving on the 11th what defendant undertook he should receive on that day. It may be observed, however, in support of this decision, that the constant form in assumpsit against a drawer or indorser, makes him promise only for the amount of the money mentioned in the bill. It is silent as to interest. It is, however, silent also as to expences,

a neglect to procure a protest upon any inland bill for the payment of 201. upon which a protest might have been made (39), would preclude the holder from recovering such interest or expences from any person entitled to notice of the non-acceptance or non-payment; but the contrary is now settled. (40)

Whether it would preclude the holder of a coalnote given under 3 G. 2. c. 26. § 7. is not decided. A jury is not bound to give interest upon a bill or note, and where the bill or note has lain dormant for many years without any claim being made upon it, they may properly refuse it. (40*)

And for any time that it has been in the hands. of an alien enemy interest ought not to be allowed, because during that time payment of the principal would have been illegal. (40*)

(39) See 3 & 4 Anne, c. 9. § 5. ante, p. 216. note (86). (40) See Windle v. Andrews, ante, p. 215. n. 85. (40*) Du Belloix v. Lord Waterpark, Hilary, 1822. Payee against maker on note for 800l. of 27th December, 1787, payable six months after date. The cause was tried in 1821; there was no evidence of any claim upon the note from the time it was made, and for many years of the intermediate time plaintiff had been an alien enemy: the jury asked if they were bound to give interest, and Abbot C. J. told them that was for their consideration; and they gave none. A motion was made to increase the verdict by adding the interest, or for a new trial, but the court was clear that the question of interest was within the province of the jury; that it was in the nature of damages for the non-payment of the debt, that they were to say whether there should be any and what damages on that account, and that in this instance there was no ground for saying they had not exercised their discretion rightly. Abbot C. J. added,

The only incidental expence in the case of the person who made the presentment is the charge of the notice and protest; in the case of any antecedent party, that of the return of the bill or note must be added.

Upon a foreign bill the (41) re-exchange forms a part of the expence of the return, and let the bill be returned through ever so many hands, the (41)drawer is liable for the re-exchange upon each return.

And the (42) drawer is liable for the re-exchange

that during the time the plaintiff was an alien enemy, it would have been illegal to have paid him the debt, and that for that interval therefore damages could not legally have been given; the rule was refused.

(41) Mellish v. Simeon, 2 H. Blackst. 378. A bill was drawn in London upon Paris, and negotiated through Holland; before it became due the French government prohibited the payment of any bill drawn in England, in consequence of which it was dishonoured, and sent back through the different hands by which it had before been negotiated, to London; the reexchange between Paris and Holland, raised the bill from 603/. 19s. 10d. to 905l. 13s. 9d., and the re-exchange between Holland and London to 91371. 4s. 3d., which the plaintiff (the payee) paid; and upon an action by him against the drawer, Eyre, C. J. left it to the jury, whether the defendant was liable for the re-exchange occasioned by returning the bill through Holland, and they found that he was. An application was made for a new trial upon the ground that the defendant was not liable for the re-exchange, because there was no default in him, the payment being prohibited by the government of France; but the court held it immaterial why the bill was not paid, that as it was not paid, he was liable to all the consequences, of which the re-exchange was one, and the rule was refused. (42) See the preceding note (41). Vide Detastet v. Baring, 11 East's Rep. 265.