seem that the protest (89) may be formally drawn up at any future period, provided that, in the event of a suit, it be drawn up before the commencement of such suit.

A protest for (90) non-acceptance of an inland bill may be made in like manner as for non-acceptance of a Foreign bill; but a protest for (91) non-payment of an inland bill cannot be made until the day after such bill has become due.

(89) Chaters y. Bell, 4 Esp. N. P. C. 48. In an action by an indorsee against an indorser of a foreign bill, it appeared that the bill became due on the 24th of April, when payment was demanded and refused, and the bill noted for non-payment. Regular notice of the dishonour was given to the defendant, but he refused payment because there was no protest. On 14th of May, the protest was formally drawn up, and this action was afterwards brought. Lord Kenyon said, "He was of opinion, that if the bill was regularly presented and noted at the time, the protest might be made at any future period." A verdict was found for the plaintiff, but the point was reserved: and on the case coming on to be tried again on a venire facias de novo before Lord Ellenborough, his lordship expressed his concurrence with the opinion of Lord Kenyon. See the preceding note.

Mr. Selwyn, in his abridgment of the Law of Nisi Prius, 379. says, That a case was reserved in Chaters v. Bell, for the opinion of the court, and that the court, after argument, conceiving the question to be of great importance, directed it to be turned into a special verdict; but that the sum in dispute being small, and the parties unwilling to incur the expence of a special verdict, the recommendation of the court was not attended to, and the case was not mentioned again.

(90) See 3 & 4 Ann. c. 9. § 4. ante, p. 210. n. (80).

(91) See 9 & 10 W. 3. c. 17. § 1. ante, p. 211. n. (81). which enables persons to make such protests "after the expiration of three days" after the bill has become due.

A notice the day the bill or note becomes due, is not too soon; for though payment may still be made within the day, non-payment on presentment is a dishonour. (92)

To such of the parties as reside in the place where the presentment was made, the notice must be given at the farthest, by the expiration of the (93) day following the failure; to those who reside elsewhere, by (94) the post of that or the next post day.

(92) Burridge v. Manners, 3 Campb. 193. Indorsee of note against payee; the note was presented the forenoon of the day it became due, when payment was refused, and in the afternoon of that day plaintiff sent notice of its dishonour to defendant; it was urged that this notice was too soon, because the maker had the whole day to pay the note; but Lord Ellenborough thought it a sufficient notice, for as soon as the maker refused payment the note was dishonoured. The plaintiff had a verdict.

(93) Tindal v. Brown, ante, p. 207. note (74). Muilman y. D'Eguino, ante, p. 184. note (31).

Smith v. Mullet, 2 Campb. N. P. C. 208. In an action against an indorser of a bill, the only question was, whether the plaintiff had given due notice of its dishonour to one Aylett, his immediate indorser. All the parties resided in London: the bill became due and was dishonoured on the 19th of May, a Saturday. The holder (who had received it from the plaintiff) gave notice to the plaintiff on the Monday; and Plaintiff sent potice to Aylett on Tuesday, by the twopenny post, but so late that it did not reach Aylett till Wednesday. Lord Ellenborough said, he thought there could be no rule more convenient than that where all the parties resided in London each should have a day to give notice; here a day had been lost. He therefore nonsuited the plaintiff.

(94) Malynes, B. 3. c. 6. § 1. 1st ed. p. 265. Mar, 2d ed.

Each party has a day for giving notice. (95) And he will be entitled to the whole day, though the post by which he is to send it, goes out within the day. (95)

Therefore, where the notice is to be sent by the post, it will be sufficient if it is sent by the post of the following day. (95)

Where a party receives notice on a Sunday, he is in the same situation as if it did not reach him till the Monday; he is not bound to pay it any attention till the Monday; (95)

And has the whole of Monday for the purpose. (95)

Plaintiffs paid into

(95) Bray v. Hadwen, 5 Maule, 68. their Bankers at Launceston a bill on London. On Sunday morning, 17th July, about half after eight, the Launceston bankers received a letter from London announcing its dishonour; Monday evening they put into the post a letter to plaintiffs at Tavistock to give them notice; that post did not leave Launceston till twelve on Tuesday; a post left Launceston for Tavistock at twelve on Monday. Plaintiffs forwarded notice without delay to the person who indorsed the bill to them, and that person immediately forwarded notice to defendant, who was an earlier indorser. Two queries were made; one, whether the Launceston bankers were not bound to have sent notice to plaintiff by Monday's post; and, secondly, whether plaintiff should not have given notice immediately to defendant, and not have left it to the later indorser to give that notice: Graham B. overruled both objections, and verdict for plaintiff: and on motion for new trial, the court held it was now the settled rule that each party was entitled to an entire day for the purpose of giving notice, and that the Launceston bankers therefore were not bound to send their notice by the Monday's post, but had the whole of Monday to put in their letter; and

So if the day on which notice ought thus to be given be a (96) day of public rest, as Christmasday or Good Friday, or a day of (97) similar sanctity according to the religion of the party bound to give notice, the notice need not be given until the following day.

If the holder of a bill or note place it in the hands of his banker, the banker is only bound to

that, as there was no delay in transmitting notice to defendant, he could not protect himself on the ground of want of notice, and rule refused.

Wright v. Shawcross, 2 Barnew. 501. Plaintiff received notice by a letter on a Sunday of the dishonour of a bill; he did not send notice to defendant till Tuesday's post, which set out in the evening; he might have sent it in the evening of Monday by the Monday's post. But on motion for new trial, after verdict for plaintiff, the court held plaintiff was not bound to open the letter till Monday, nor bound to send notice till the Tuesday, and therefore rule refused.

(96) See Smith v. Mullet, ante, p. 219, and Haynes v. Birks, and Scott v. Lifford, post, p. 223. note (98). See also Tassell v. Lewis, ante, p. 198. note (53), and 39 & 40 Geo. 3. c. 42. enacting, that with respect to noting and protesting bills and notes which become due on Good Friday, that day shall be considered like a Sunday or Christmas-day.

(97) Lindo v. Unsworth, 2 Campb. N. P. C. 602. Notice of the dishonour of a bill was sent to the plaintiff in London, on the 8th of October; but he being a Jew, and the 8th of October being the day of the greatest Jewish festival throughout the year, on which all Jews are prohibited from attending to secular affairs, gave no notice by the post of that day to the defendant, who lived at Lancaster, but sent it to him by the post of the 9th. Lord Ellenborough held, that the plaintiff was excused by his religion from giving notice on the 8th; and that the notice sent by the post on the 9th was sufficient. The

give notice of its dishonour to his customer, in like manner as if he were himself the holder, and his customer were the party next entitled to notice. (98)

And the customer has the like time to communicate such notice, as if he had received it from a holder. (98)

And therefore by thus placing a bill or note in a banker's hands, the number of persons from whom notice must pass, is increased by one. (98)

Thus notice sent by a London banker to a London customer, the day after the dishonour, (98) is in time; and if the customer communicate that notice the day following, that (98) will be in time also.

(98) Haynes v. Birks, 3 Bos. and Pull. 599. In an action against the indorser of a bill, it appeared that the bill, which had been indorsed in blank and deposited by the plaintiff in the hands of his bankers, became due on Saturday, October 1st. On that day, at two o'clock, it was presented for payment by the bankers, and payment being refused, it was again presented between nine and ten at night by a notary, and again dishonoured; the bankers sent the bill, and notice, of its dishonour, to the plaintiff on the Monday, and the plaintiff gave notice to the defendant on Tuesday, about noon: the plaintiff lived at Knightsbridge, and the defendant in Tottenham-court-road. The only question was, whether this notice was sufficient. A verdict was found for the plaintiff, with liberty to defendant to move to enter a nonsuit. On motion accordingly, it was urged that the bankers were to be considered as the agents of the plaintiff, and that the defendant was entitled to the same notice as if the bill had remained in the plaintiff's hands: but the court thought that reasonable diligence had been used, and therefore refused a rule. Lord Alvanley, however, said, that