Or if it were duly presented, when due, to the acceptor, and he promised payment. (82)

Telling an accommodation acceptor that he shall not be troubled about the bill, will not discharge him, though the party knew him to be an accommodation acceptor only, if such party held for value. (83)

But a neglect to call upon an acceptor, or an indulgence to any of the other parties, though for

(82) Kerrison v. Cooke, 3. Campb.362. Indorsee against acceptor. Defence, that it was an accommodation acceptance to accommodate the drawer, that plaintiff knew it, and that on the bill's becoming due, plaintiff gave time to the drawer without the concurrence of defendant; and Laxton v. Peat was cited as in point: when the bill was due it was presented to defendant, and he promised payment; per Gibbs J. "Grave doubts have been entertained of Laxton v. Peat, and this case may be distinguished from it; here payment is demanded of defendant, and he promises payment. I think the giving time under these circumstances to the drawer did not discharge the acceptor." Verdict for plaintiff.

Sed vide Adams v. Gregg― the next case.

(89) Adams v. Gregg, 2 Stark. 531. Defendant accepted a bill to accommodate Holmes, and plaintiff knew it; Holmes paid it to plaintiff for an old debt; when it became due defendant could not pay it, and one Jones gave plaintiff the amount, on a stipulation that he should, if necessary, stand in plaintiff's situation. Defendant asked Jones to give up the bill, which he refused, but he said defendant should not be troubled about it. Jones afterwards sued defendant in plaintiff's name; defendant insisted she was discharged. Abbott C. J. seemed to think she would have been, had Jones given time to the drawer, or disabled himself for a moment from suing him;. but he thought Jones's declaration that defendant should not be troubled, no discharge, and plaintiff had a verdict.

ever so long a time, shall (84) not be considered as a waiver.

If the holder of a bill agree not to sue the acceptor, upon his making an affidavit that the acceptance is a forgery, he will be (85) precluded from

(84) Dingwall v. Dunster, Dougl. 235. 247. Dunster lent Wheate his acceptance, which became due 13th December, 1774; it was then in the hands of Dingwall, but he finding that Wheate was the real debtor, wrote to his attorney in February and November, 1775, for payment, received interest upon the bill from Wheate, and suffered several years to elapse without calling on Dunster; on 13th of February, 1775, Dunster wrote to thank Dingwall for not proceeding against him, and said he had been informed by a person Dingwall had sent, that Wheate had taken up the bill; but Dingwall took no notice of this letter: he aftewards sued Dunster, for whom the jury found; but upon a rule to shew cause why there should not be a new trial, the whole court held there was nothing in the plaintiff's conduct to discharge Dunster; that it meant nothing more than an indulgence to him and that he would try to recover from the drawer if he could; but by Lord Mansfield, no use had been made of the defendant's letter; probably the fact did not warrant him in asserting that a person the plaintiff sent had told him Wheate had taken up the bill; had the plaintiff by any thing in his conduct, confirmed him in such a belief, it might have altered the case.

Anderson v. Cleveland, 13 East's Rep. 430. n. In an action by an indorsee against the acceptor of a bill, no demand was proved till three months after the bill was due, and when the drawer had become insolvent. But by Lord Mansfield, the acceptor of a bill, or maker of a note, always remains liable. The acceptance is proof of having assets in his hands, and he ought never to part with them, unless he be sure that the bill is paid by the drawer.

(85) Stevens v. Thacker, Peake, N. P. C. 187. The plaintiff, who was indorsee of a bill, presented it to the defendant, as acceptor, for payment. The defendant said the acceptance was

suing him, if such affidavit be made and sworn, though it be false.

a forgery, and offered to make an affidavit that he had never accepted the bill. The plaintiff at first agreed not to sue him, if he would make such affidavit; but being afterwards convinced that the defendant had accepted the bill, refused to receive the affidavit, and brought this action. The affidavit had been engrossed, but not sworn. It was urged, that the plaintiff could not recede from his agreement. But Lord Kenyon said, that had the affidavit been sworn, he should have held that the defendant had discharged himself from this action, though such affidavit had been false. But not having been sworn, the defendant was still liable, unless he could prove the acceptance a forgery. Verdict for the plaintiff.

CAP. VII.

SECT. 1. Presentment, obligation to make, p. 172. where, p. 173.

within what Hours, p. 180,

for Acceptance, p. 182.

-for Payment, p. 186.

when, p. 186.

of Bills, &c. payable on Demand, p. 187. → of Bills, &c. entitled to Grace, &c. p. 197

200.

where the Time is computed by the Old Style, p. 201 to 203.

or by the Usance, p. 208.

if excused by Bankruptcy, or other Incapacity of Drawee or Maker, p. 204.

2. Notice of Non-acceptance, p. 205.

p. 206.

Payee

of partial or conditional Acceptance,

from whom, p, 206 to 208.

Protest, p. 209.

at what Time, p. 217.

at what Time to be given, p. 219.

in what Manner, p. 224.

to whom necessary

or Indorsor, p. 231,

-to Acceptor

--

Drawer of Bill

or Maker, p. 252.

by part

Notice, want of. when excused

Payment or Promise, p. 234.

want of Effects in the Drawee's hands, p. 237.

or other cause, p. 243.

THE HE receipt of a bill or note implies an undertaking from the receiver to (1) every party to the

bill or note who would be entitled to bring an action on paying it, to (2) present in proper time the one, where necessary, for acceptance, and each for payment, to (3) allow no extra time for payment, and to give (4) notice without delay to such person of a failure in the attempt to procure a proper acceptance or payment; and a (5) de. fault in any of these respects will discharge such person from all responsibility on account of a nonacceptance or non-payment, and unless (6) the bill or note were on an improper stamp, make it (7) operate as a satisfaction of any debt or demand for which it was given.

(2) Vide post, p. 182 to 186.

(3) Vide Tindal v. Brown, post, p. 207. note (74). (4) Vide post p. 205 to 243.

(5) Vide post, p. 205 to 243. Syderbottom v. Smith, Str. 649.

In an action against the indorser of a note, Eyre, C. J. of the Common Pleas, directed the jury to find for the defendant, because the plaintiff had not proved diligence to get the money from the maker; being of the old opinion that the indorser only warrants upon default of the maker.

Gee v. Brown, Str. 792. The holder of an inland bill gave the acceptor time, by intervals, from 14th of May, when the bill became due, to 7th of June, and then sued the drawer; but there being no notice to him, Eyre C. J. held the loss ought to fall on the plaintiff.

(6) See Wilson v. Visar, ante, p. 62.

(7) By 3 and 4 Ann. c. 9. § 7. It is enacted, that if any person doth accept any such bill of exchange, for and in satisfaction of any former debt, or sum of money formerly due unto him, the same shall be accounted and esteemed a full and