Sect. 3.-The transfer of a bill or note may be made either before the expiration of the time limited for its payment, or, unless (44) the sum payable thereby be under five pounds, (45) afterwards.

But a man who takes a bill after it is due, takes it subject to all the objections and equities to which it was liable in the hands of the person from whom he takes it. (46)

(44) Vide 17 Geo. 3. c. 30. § 1. ante, p. 9.

(45) Dehers v. Harriott, 1 Show. 163. A bill was indorsed to the plaintiff after it was due, and he had judgment without any objection on this ground,

Mutford v. Walcott, Lord Raym. 575. Holt C. J. said, he remembered a case where a bill was negotiated after the day of payment, and he had all the eminent merchants in London with him at his chambers, and they all held it to be very common, and usual, and a very good practice.

(46) Taylor v. Mather, B. R. E, 27 Geo. 3. 8 Term Rep. 83 n. Indorsee of a note against the maker. It appeared to have been indorsed after it was due, and there were many circumstances which led the court and jury to conclude it had been unfairly obtained, upon which the jury found for the defendant. A new trial was refused upon the merits, and per Buller J. "It has never been determined that a bill or note is not negotiable after it is due, but if there are any circumstances of fraud in the transaction, and it is indorsed to the plaintiff after it is due, I have always left it to the jury upon the slightest circumstance to presume that the indorsee was acquainted with the fraud." The rest of the court concurred in this opinion.

Brown v. Davies, 3 Term Rep. 80. Davies drew a note payable to Sandall or order; Sandall indorsed it to Taddy, and he had it presented, and noted for non-payment. Davies then paid the money to Sandall, and he took up the note from Taddy, but instead of returning the note to Davies, indorsed it to Brown.

And if such person were agent only, to receive the money for his principal, the person to whom he passes it will be accountable to the principal for whatever he receives thereon, whether it be money,

Or a new bill. (47)

Brown thereupon sued Davies, and on Davies's offering to prove these facts, Lord Kenyon thought they would not amount to a defence, unless it could be proved that Brown knew them when he took the note, and he rejected the evidence; but upon a rule nisi for a new trial, and cause shewn, Lord Kenyon said, he thought there ought to be further enquiry; it did not strike him at the trial that the note had been noted before Brown took it, and that that circumstance ought to have awakened Brown's suspicion. Ashhurst and Buller Js. thought that the party taking a note after it was due, was to be considered as taking it on the credit of the person from whom he received it, and that whatever would be a defence against the giver would be a defence against the receiver; upon which Lord Kenyon said, he agreed with that, if the note appeared on the face of it to have been dishonoured, or if knowledge could be brought home to the indorsee that it had been so; but otherwise he was not prepared to go that length. Grose J. said, if collusion could be proved between the defendant and Sandall, the defendant would not be entitled to insist on the objection; but as the case then stood he thought there ought to be a new trial. Rule absolute.

(47) Lee v. Zagury, 8 Taunt. 114. Sebag had a bill accepted by defendant, over due; he sent it to White, that White's correspondent might get the amount for Sebag: White's correspondent indorsed it to Vidal for a debt he owed Vidal, and Vidal not being able to obtain the money, got a new bill from defendant for the amount, and indorsed it to plaintiffs as his agents. Sebag gave defendant notice not to pay this bill, and an action being brought thereon, the defence was, that plaintiffs were mere agents for Vidal, and that as Vidal took the first bill after it was due, he stood in the place of White; and as White would

And an order from the principal to prohibit payment of such new bill, will be a bar to any action at the suit of the person to whom the first bill was passed. (48)

It has been held however, that a man who takes a bill after it is due, will stand in the same situation as if he had taken it before, if he held it for value before it was due, and it is re-delivered to him for the same value afterwards; (48)

As if a banker's customer deposits a bill with him for value before it is due, gets it from him again before it is due, and again deposits it with him for value after it is dishonoured. (48)

have been accountable to Sebag for whatever he received in respect of the first bill, Vidal was equally so accountable; and then the second bill was, as against Vidal, the property of Sebag, and Sebag's prohibition to defendant not to pay the second bill, was an answer to the action upon it. Gibbs C. J. was of this opinion, and left it to the jury whether plaintiffs were not mere agents to Vidal, and whether the second bill was not the property of Sebag. The jury found for defendants; and on rule nisi to enter verdict for plaintiffs, the other judges agreed with Gibbs C. J. and rule discharged.

(48) Bosanquet v. Dudman, 1 Stark, 1. Clarkson and Co. banked with plaintiffs, and deposited a bill with them as a security for their engagements on behalf. of Clarkson and Co., but before it became due Clarkson and Co. got it back from plaintiffs. After it was dishonoured Clarkson and Co. re-delivered it to plaintiffs, but in the interim Clarkson and Co. bought a ship from the drawer, for whose accommodation defendants had accepted, and agreed to give up this bill in part payment, so that Clarkson and Co. could not have sued upon the bill; but Lord Ellenborough held, that when the bill was returned to plaintiffs they returned to their former right, and were not affected by what Clarkson and Co. had done; and verdict for plaintiffs.

So if a bill or note is returned to an indorser after it becomes due, and he pays the amount, he will be entitled to recover the full amount from the antecedent parties, though some of these parties had lodged securities with the person who held the bill when it became due, and part of the amount had been paid on the sesecurities; (49)

At least if such indorser did not know when he took up the bill, that such securities had been so lodged. (49)

And though a man who takes a bill after it is due, takes it subject to the objections to which it was liable in the hands of the person from whom he took it, he is not subjected to every description of evidence to which that person would be liable; (50) therefore, though the entries in that person's

(49) Buzzard v. Flecknoe, 1 Stark. 333. Plaintiffs indorsed two bills to Lord; Lord held them three months after they fell due, and then called on plaintiffs, who took them up. In the interim Lord had received another bill from the drawer as a collateral security, but plaintiffs did not appear to have known that fact; that bill was afterwards satisfied, and plaintiffs having brought this action against the acceptor, he insisted that the amount of that bill ought to be deducted on the ground that plaintiffs stood in the situation of Lord; but Lord Ellenborough thought otherwise, because plaintiffs' title did not first commence after the bill became due, but was referable to their prior holding; had they been discharged from the bills, they might have stood in the situation of new holders. Verdict for the whole amount.

(50) Collenridge v. Farquharson, 1 Stark. 259. In an action by indorsee against indorser, it appeared that one Powell was holder when the bill became due, and that he had afterwards

books, if made at the time of passing the bill and accompanying that act, might be evidence against him, yet entries which cannot be proved to have been so made, and might have been made afterwards, are not. (50)

And though a bill be indorsed over before the time appointed for its payment, yet if acceptance has been previously refused, the indorsee (51) will

indorsed the bill to plaintiff there being accounts between defendant and Powell, which would have regulated the extent to which Powell could have recovered. Defendant offered in evidence Powell's books, to shew how those accounts stood, and insisted that whatever would have been evidence against Powell would be evidence against plaintiff; but Lord Ellenborough held, that though an entry by Powell at the time and accompanying the act would have been evidence, an entry not accompanying the act and which might have been made afterwards for the very purpose of being used in evidence was not, and the plaintiff had a verdict.

(51) Crossley v. Ham. 13 East. Rep. 498. The defendant for the accommodation of Clark, indorsed two bills drawn by Clark in America, upon Dickinson and Co. in London, for 4501. each, in favour of the defendant, dated 10th of February, 1804, and payable 60 days after sight. These bills were paid over by Clark to Parry, in February, 1804. The defendant, Parry and Clark, then, and until after the 14th of April, 1808, resided in America. On the 1st of March, Parry indorsed and remitted the bills to his agents in London, with directions to make a payment to the plaintiff, to whom he then, and still, was indebted. On the 26th of April, the bills were presented for acceptance, dishonoured, and protested for non-acceptance; and notice thereof was given to the defendant. The plaintiff having been advised of the remittance by a letter from Parry, dated on the 12th of April, applied to Parry's agents for 450l.; and on the 6th of June they delivered one of the bills to the plaintiff, apprising him of its dishonour, and that therefore he took the