which is humbly fubmitted to the public, a judge from which there lies no appeal. It is fubmitted in three views. The first is, Whether an army, modelled as above, would not fecure us against the boldest invader; the next, Whether fuch an army be as dangerous to liberty, as an army in its prefent form; and the laft, Whether it would not be a school of industry and moderation to our people.

With refpect to the first, we fhould, after a few years, have not only an army of fixty thousand well-difciplined troops, but the command of another army, equally numerous and equally well difciplined. It is true, that troops inured to war have. an advantage over troops that have not the fame experience: but with affurance it may be pronounced impracticable, to land at once in Britain an army that can ftand against 100,000 British foldiers well difciplined, fighting, even the first time, for their country, and for their wives and children.

A war with France raises a panic on every flight threatening of an invasion. The fecurity afforded by the proposed plan, would enable us to act offenfively

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at sea, instead of being reduced to keep our fhips at home for guarding our coafts. Would Britain any longer be ob liged to fupport her continental connections? No fooner does an European prince augment his army or improve military discipline, than his neighbours, taking fright, muft do the fame. May not one hope, that by the plan propofed, or by fome fuch, Britain would be relieved from jealoufy and folicitude about its neighbours?

With refpect to the second view, having long enjoy'd the fweets of a free government under a fucceffion of mild princes, we begin to forget that our liberties ever were in danger. But droufy fecurity is of all conditions the most dangerous; because the state may be overwhelmed before we even dream of danger. Suppofe only, that a British King, accomplished in the art of war and beloved by his foldiers, heads his own troops in a war with France; and after more than one fuccessful campaign, gives peace to his enemy, on terms advantageous to his people: what fecurity have we for our liberties, when he returns with a victorious army, devoted

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devoted to his will? I am talking of a standing army in its prefent form. Troops modelled as above would not be fo obfequious: a number of the prime nobility and gentry ferving without pay, who could be under no temptation to enflave themselves and their country, would prove a firm barrier against the ambitious views of fuch a prince. And even fuppofing that army to be totally corrupted, the prince could have little hope of fuccefs against the nation, fupported by a veteran army, that might be relied on as champions for their country.

And as to the laft view mentioned, the plan propofed would promote industry and virtue, not only among the foldiers, but among the working people in general. To avoid hard labour and fevere difcipline in the army, men would be fober and induftrious at home; and fuch untractable spirits as cannot be reached by the mild laws of a free government, would be effectually tamed by military law. At the fame time, as fobriety and innocence are conftant attendants upon induftry, the manners of our people would be much purified; a circumftance of infinite importance to BriVOL. III. G

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tain. The falutary influence of the plan, would reach perfons in a higher fphere. A young gentleman, whipt at school, or falling behind at college, contracts an averfion to ftudy; and flies to the army, where he is kept in countenance by numbers, idle and ignorant like himself. How many young men are thus daily ruined, who, but for the temptation of idlenefs. and gaiety in the army, would have become useful fubjects! In the plan under confideration, the officers who ferve for pay would be fo few in number, and their profpect of advancement fo clear, that it would require much intereft to be admitted into the army. None would be admitted but thofe who have been regularly educated in every branch of military knowledge; and idle boys would be remitted to their ftudies.

Here is difplay'd an agreeable scene with relation to induftry.

Suppofing the whole threefcore thoufand men to be abfolutely idle; yet, by doubling the induAtry of those who remain, I affirm, that the fum of induftry would be much greater than before. And the fcene becomes enchanting, when we confider, that thefe threefcore

threefcore thoufand men, would not only be of all the most industrious, but be terns of industry to others.

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Upon conclufion of a foreign war, we fuffer grievously by disbanded foldiers, who must plunder or ftarve. The prefent plan is an effectual remedy: men accuftomed to hard labour under ftrict difcipline, can never be in want of bread: they will be fought for every where, even at higher than ordinary wages; and they will prove excellent mafters for training the peasants to hard labour.

A man indulges emulation more freely in behalf of his friend or his country, than of himself: emulation in the latter cafe is felfifh; in the former, is focial. Doth not that give us reafon to hope, that the feparating military officers into different claffes will excite a laudable emulation, prompting individuals to exert themselves on every occafion for the honour of their clafs? Nor will fuch emulation, a virtuous paffion, be any obftruction to private friendship between members of different claffes. May it not be expected, that young officers of birth and fortune, zealous to qualify themfelves at their own