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And I do not find, that the logician's have made

any

additions to it when taken in this view; although they have given some other fallacies that are incident to fyllogisms of the hypothetical kind, particularly the fallacy of an incomplete enumeration in disjunctive fyllogifins and dilemmas.

The different species of sophisms above mentioned are not so precisely defined by Aristotle, or by subsequent logicians; buc that they allow of great latitude in the ap plication; and it is often dubious under what particular species a sophistical lyllogism ought to be classed. We even find the same example brought under one fpecies by one author, and under another species by another. Nay, what is more frange, Aristotle himself employs a long chapter in proving by a particular induction, that all the seven may be brought under that which we have called mistaking the question, and which is commonly called ignoratio elenchi. And indeed the proof of this is easy, without that laborious detail which Aristotle uses for the purpose : for if you lop off from the conclusion of a sophistical fyllogisin all what is nct fup*

ported

3 E 2

;

. B. ll. sorted by the premises, the conclusion, in that case, will always be found different from that which ought to have been proved; and so it falls under the ignoratio elenchi.

It was probably Aristotle's aim, to reduce all the possible variety of sophisms, as he had attempted to do of just fyllogifms, to certain definite fpecies : but he seems to be sensible that he had falleni fhört in this last attempt. When a genus is properly divided into its species, the fpecies should not only, when taken together, exhaust the whole genus ; but every species should have its own precinct fo accurately defined, that one fhall not encroach upon another, , And when an individual can be said to belong to two or three different species, the division is im-,} perfect ; yet this is the case of Aristotle's division of the sophisms, by his own acknowledgement. It ought not therefore to be taken for a division strictly logical. It may rather be compared to the several fpecies or forms of action invented in law for the redrefs of wrongs. , wrong there is

is a remedy in law, by one action or another : but sometimes a man

may

ei

DO

For every

5:

may

take his choice among several different actions. So every sophistical fyllogism may, by a little art, be brought under one or other of the species mentioned by AriItotle, and very often you may

take

your choice of two or three.

Besides the enumeration of the various kinds of sophisms, there are many other things in this treatise concerning the art of managing a fyllogistical dispute with an antagonist. And indeed, if the passion for this kind of litigation, which reigned for so many ages, should ever again lift up its head, we may predict, that the Organon of Aristotle will then become a fashionable study: for it contains such admirable materials and documents for this art, that it may be said to have brought it to a science,

The conclusion of this treatise ought not to be overlooked: it manifestly relates, not to the present treatise only, but also to the whole analytics and topics of the author. I shall therefore give the subítance of it. " Of those who

may

be called inventers, “ some have made important additions to

things long before begun, and carried

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B. II on through a course of ages; others " have given a sinalt beginning to things “ which, in fucceeding times, will be

brought to greater perfection. The be

ginning of a thing, though small, is the “ chief part of it, and requires the great“ eft degree of invention ; for it is easy

to make additions to inventions once “ begun. Now with regard to the dia"lectical art, there was not fomething

done, and something remaining to be " done. There was absolutely nothing “ done: for those who professed the art “ of disputation, had only a set of ora“ tions composed, and of arguments, and

of captious questions, which might suit

many occasions. These their scholars “ foon learned, and fitted to the occasion. “.This was not to teach you the art, but

to furnish you with the materials pro“ duced by the art: as if a man profes

sing to teach you the art of making “ fhoes, fhould bring you a parcel of “ shoes of various sizes and shapes, from " which you may provide those who want. 4. This

may

have its use; but it is not to “ teach the art of making shoes, And indeed, with regard to rhetorical de

“ clamation,

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" clamation, there are many precepts “ handed down from ancient times; but

" with regard to the construction of fyllogisms, not one.

“ We have therefore employed much “ time and labour upon this fubject; and “ if our fyftem appear to you not to be s in the number of thofe things, which, s being before carried a certain length,

were left to be perfected ; we hope for your favourable acceptance cof what is

done, and your indulgence in what is ** left imperfect.”

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