When a fophifm of any of thefe kinds is tranflated into another language, or even rendered into unambiguous expreffions in the fame language, the fallacy is evident, and the fyllogifm appears to have four terms. The feven fallacies which are faid not to be in the diction, but in the thing, have their proper names in Greek and in Latin, by which they are diftinguished. Without minding their names, we fhall give a brief account of their nature. 1. The first is, Taking an accidental conjunction of things for a natural or neceffary connection: as, when from an accident we infer a property; when from an example we infer a rule; when from a fingle act we infer a habit. 2. Taking that abfolutely which ought to be taken comparatively, or with a certain limitation. The construction of Tanguage often leads into this fallacy: for in all languages, it is common to ufe abfolute terms to fignify things that carry in them fome fecret comparifon; or to ufe unlimited terms, to fignify what from its nature must be limited. 3. Taking that for the caufe of a thing which is only an occafion, or concomi tant. 4. Eegging the queftion. This is done, when the thing to be proved, or fome thing equivalent, is affumed in the premifes. 5. Miftaking the question. When the conclufion of the fyllogifm is not the thing that ought to be proved, but fomething else that is mistaken for it. 6. When that which is not a confequence is mistaken for a confequence; as if, because all Africans are black, it were taken for granted that all blacks are Africans. 7. The last fallacy lies in propofitions that are complex, and imply two affirmations, whereof one may be true, and the other falfe; fo that whether you grant the propofition, or deny it, you are intangled: as when it is affirmed, that such a man has left off playing the fool. If it be granted, it implies, that he did play the fool formerly. If it be denied, it implies, or feems to imply, that he plays the fool ftill. In this enumeration, we ought, in juftice to Ariftotle, to expect only the fallacies incident to categorical fyllogifins, And And I do not find, that the logicians have made any additions to it when taken in this view; although they have given fome other fallacies that are incident to fyllogifms of the hypothetical kind, particu larly the fallacy of an incomplete enumeration in disjunctive fyllogifins and di lemmas. The different fpecies of fophifms above mentioned are not fo precifely defined by Ariftotle, or by fubfequent logicians, but that they allow of great latitude in the ap→ plication; and it is often dubious under what particular fpecies a fophiftical fyllogifm ought to be claffed. We even find the fame example brought under one fpecies by one author, and under another fpecies by another. Nay, what is more frange, Ariftotle himself employs a long chapter in proving by a particular induction, that all the feven may be brought under that which we have called mistaking the queftion, and which is commonly called ignoratio elenchi. And indeed the proof of this is eafy, without that laborious detail which Ariftotle ufes for the purpose: for if you lop off from the conclufion of a fophiftical fyllogifin all that is not fup3 E 2 ported ported by the premises, the conclufion, in that cafe, will always be found different from that which ought to have been proved; and fo it falls under the ignoratio elenchi. It was probably Ariftotle's aim, to reduce all the poffible variety of fophifms, as he had attempted to do of just fyllogifms, to certain definite fpecies: but he feems to be fenfible that he had fallen fhort in this laft attempt. When a genus is properly divided into its fpecies, the fpecies fhould not only, when taken together, exhauft, the whole genus; but every fpecies fhould have its own precinct fo accurately defined, that one fhall not encroach upon another. And when an individual can be faid to belong to two or three different fpecies, the divifion is imperfect; yet this is the cafe of Aristotle's divifion of the fophifms, by his own acknowledgement. It ought not therefore to be taken for a divifion ftrictly logical. It may rather be compared to the several fpecies or forms of action invented in law for the redrefs of wrongs.y For every wrong there is a remedy in law by one action or another: but fometimes a man to may may take his choice among feveral different actions. So every fophiftical fyllogifm may, by a little art, be brought under one or other of the fpecies mentioned by Aristotle, and very often often you may take your choice of two or three. Befides the enumeration of the various kinds of fophifms, there are many other things in this treatife concerning the art of managing a fyllogiftical difpute with an antagonist. And indeed, if the paffion for this kind of litigation, which reigned for fo many ages, fhould ever again lift up its head, we may predict, that the Organon of Ariftotle will then become a fashionable study: for it contains fuch admirable materials and documents for this art, that it may be faid to have brought it to a science. The conclufion of this treatise ought not to be overlooked: it manifeftly relates, not to the present treatise only, but also to the whole analytics and topics of the author. I shall therefore give the fubftance of it. "Of thofe who may be called inventers, "fome have made important additions to things long before begun, and carried on |