SECT. 5. On the Structure of Speech. Ι The few hints contained in the beginning of the book concerning Interpretation relating to the ftructure of fpeech, have been left out in treatifes of logic, as belonging rather to grammar; yet I apprehend this is a rich field of philofophical fpeculation. Language being the express image of human thought, the analysis of the one must correspond to that of the other. Nouns adjective and fubftantive, verbs active and paffive, with their various moods, tenfes, and perfons, must be expreffive of a like variety in the modes of thought. Things that are distinguished in · all languages, fuch as fubftance and quality, action and paffion, cause and effect, must be distinguished by the natural powers of the human mind. The philofophy of grammar, and that of the human understanding, are more nearly allied than is commonly imagined. The structure of language was pursued to a confiderable extent, by the ancient commentators upon this book of Ariftotle. Their fpeculations upon this fubject, the t which are neither the leaft ingenious nor least useful part of the Peripatetic philofophy, were neglected for many ages, and lay buried in ancient manuscripts, or in books little known, till they were lately brought to light by the learned Mr Harris in his Hermes. The definitions given by Ariftotle, of a noun, of a verb, and of fpeech, will hardly bear examination. It is easy in practice to diftinguifh the various parts of fpeech; but very difficult, if at all poffible, to give accurate definitions of them. He obferves juftly, that befides' that kind of fpeech called a propofition, which is always either true or falfe, there are other kinds which are neither true nor false; fuch as, a prayer, or wish;^ to we which we may add, a question, a command, a promise, a contract, and many others. Thefe Ariftotle pronounces to have nothing to do with his fubject, and remits them to oratory, or poetry; and fo they have remained banished from the regions of philofophy to this day: yet I apprehend, that an analysis of fuch speeches, and of the operations of mind which they exprefs, would be of real use, and perhaps would would discover how imperfect an enume ration, the logicians have given of the powers of human understanding, when they reduce them to fimple apprehenfion, judgement, and reasoning. SECT. 6. On Propofitions. Mathematicians use the word propofition in a larger fenfe than logicians. A problem is called a propofition in mathematics, but in logic it is not a propofition: it is one of those speeches which are not enunciative, and which Ariftotle remits to oratory or poetry. A propofition, according to Aristotle, is a speech wherein one thing is affirmed or denied of another. Hence it is easy to distinguish the thing affirmed or denied, which is called the predicate, from the thing of which it is affirmed or denied, which is called the subject; and these two are called the terms of the propofition. Hence likewise it appears, that propofitions are either affirmative or negative; and this is called their quality. All affirmative propofitions have the fame quality, fo likewife have all negative; but an affirmative and a negative are contrary in their quality. When the fubject of a propofition is a general term, the predicate is affirmed or denied, either of the whole, or of a part. Hence propofitions are diftinguished into univerfal and particular. All men are mortal, is an univerfal propofition; Some men are learned, is a particular; and this is called the quantity of the propofition. All univerfal propofitions agree in quantity, as alfo all particular: but an univerfal and a particular are faid to differ in quantity. A propofition is called indefinite, when there is no mark either of univerfality or particularity annexed to the fubject: thus, Man is of few days, is an indefinite propofition; but it must be understood either as univerfal or as particular, and therefore is not a third fpecies, but by interpretation is brought under one of the other two. There are alfo fingular propofitions, which have not a general term but an individual for their fubject; as, Alexander was a great conqueror. These are confidered by logicians as univerfal, becaufe, the fubject being indivifible, the predicate is affirmed or denied of the whole, and not of a part only. Thus all propofitions, with regard to quality, are either affirmative or negative; and with regard to quantity, are univerfal or particular; and taking in both quantity and quality, they are univerfal affirmatives, or univerfal negatives, or particular affirmatives, or particular negatives. Thefe four kinds, after the days of Ariftotle, came to be named by the names of the four firft vowels, A, E, I, O, according to the following diftich: Afferit A, negat E, fed univerfaliter ambæ ; When the young logician is thus far inftructed in the nature of propofitions, he is apt to think there is no difficulty in analyfing any propofition, and fhewing its fubject and predicate, its quantity and quality; and indeed, unless he can do this, he will be unable to apply the rules of logic to ufe. Yet he will find, there are fome difficulties in this analyfis, which are overlooked by Ariftotle altogether; and although they are fometimes. touched, they are not removed by his followers. For, 1. There are propositions in which it is difficult to find a fubject and VOL, III, X X a |