applied to the common purpose of divifion, it is both inelegant, and burdenfome to the memory; and, after it has put one out of breath by endless fubdivifions, there is still a negative term left behind, which shows that you are no nearer the end of your journey than when you began,

»

Until fome more effectual remedy be found for the imperfection of divifions, I beg leave to propofe one more fimple than that of Ramus. It is this: When you meet with a divifion of any fubject imperfectly comprehended, add to the last member an et cetera. That this et cetera makes the divifion complete, is undeniable; and therefore it ought to hold its place as a member, and to be always understood, whether expreffed or not, until clear and pofitive proof be brought that the divifion is complete without it. And this fame et cætera is to be the repofitory of all members that fhall in any future time fhew a good and valid right to a place in the fubject.

T

SECT. 3. On Diftinctions.

Having faid fo

much of logical divi

Tt 2

fions,

fions, we fhall next make fome remarks upon diftinctions

Since the philofophy of Ariftotle fell into difrepute, it has been a common topic of wit and raillery, to enveigh against metaphysical distinctions. Indeed the abuse of them in the fcholaftic ages, feems to juftify a general prejudice against them! and fhallow thinkers and writers have good reafon to be jealous of distinctions, because they make fad work when applied to their flimfy compofitions, But every man of true judgement, while he condemns diftinctions that have no foundation in the nature of things, muft perceive, that indifcriminately to decry diftinctions, is to renounce all pretenfions to just reasoning: for as false reasoning commonly proceeds from confounding things that are different; fo without diftinguifhing fuch things, it is impoffible to avoid error, or detect fophiftry. The authority of Aquinas, or Suarez, or even of Ariftotle, can neither ftamp a real value upon diftinctions of bafe metal, nor hinder the currency of those of true metal.

Some diftinctions are verbal, others are real. The first kind diftinguifh the vari

ous

ous meanings of a word; whether proper, or metaphorical. Diftinctions of this kind make a part of the grammar of a language, and are often abfurd when tranflated into another language. Real diftinctions are equally good in all languages, and fuffer no hurt by tranflation. They distinguish the different fpecies contained under fome general notion, or the different parts contained in one whole.

Many of Ariftotle's diftinctions are verbal merely; and therefore, more proper materials for a dictionary of the Greek language, than for a philofophical treatise. At least, they ought never to have been translated into other languages, when the idiom of the language will not justify them: for this is to adulterate the language, to introduce foreign idioms into it without neceffity or ufe, and to make it ambiguous where it was not. The diftinctions in the end of the Categories of the four words, prius, fimul, motus, and habere, are all verbal.

The modes or fpecies of prius, according to Aristotle, are five. One thing may be prior to another; firft, in point of time; fecondly, in point of dignity; thirdly, in

The modes

point of order; and fo forth. The

of fimul are only three. It feems this word was not used in the Greek with fo great latitude as the other, although they are relative terms,....

The modes or fpecies of motion he makes to be fix, to wit, generation, corruption, increase, decrease, alteration, and change of place.

The modes or species of having are eight. 1. Having a quality or habit, as having wisdom. 2. Having quantity or magni→ tude. 3. Having things adjacent, as having a fword. 4. Having things as parts, as having hands or feet. 5. Having in a part or on a part, as having a ring on one's finger. 6. Containing, as a calk is faid to have wine. 7. Poffeffing, as having lands or houses. 8. Having a wife,

Another diftinction of this kind is Ariftotle's diftinction of caufes; of which he makes four kinds, efficient, material, formal, and final. These distinctions may deserve a place in a dictionary of the Greek language; but in English or Latin they adulterate the language. Yet fo fond were the schoolmen of distinctions of this kind, that they added to Aristotle's enumeration,

an

an impulfive caufe, an exemplary caufe, and I don't know how many more. We seem to have adopted into English a final caufe; but it is merely a term of art, borrowed from the Peripatetic philofophy, without neceffity or ufe: for the English word end is as good as final cause, though not fo long nor fo learned.

SECT. 4. On Definitions.

It remains that we make fome remarks on Aristotle's definitions, which have expofed him to much cenfure and ridicule. Yet I think it must be allowed, that in things which need definition and admit of it, his definitions are commonly judicious and accurate; and had he attempted to define fuch things only, his enemies had wanted great matter of triumph. I believe it may likewife be faid in his favour, that until Locke's effay was wrote, there was nothing of importance delivered by philofophers with regard to definition, beyond what Ariftotle has faid upon that fubject.

He confiders a definition as a speech declaring