by equivocal, and what by denominative. logola on 30 Then it is observed, that what we

5

fay is either fimple, without compofition or

structure, as man, horse; or, it has compofition and structure, as, a man fights, the borfe runs. Next comes a diftinction between a fubject of predication that is, a fubject of which any thing is affirmed or denied, and a fubject of inhefion. These things are faid to be inherent in a subject, which although they are not a part of the fubject, cannot poffibly exift as figure in the thing figured.

bes without it,

Of things that are, says Aristotle, fome may be predicated of a fubject, but are in no fubject; as man may be predicated of James or John, but is not in any fubject. Some again are in a fubject, but can be predicated of no fubject. Thus, my knowledge in grammar is in me as its fubject, but it can be predicated of no subject; because it is an individual thing. Some are both in a fubject, and may be predicated of a fubject, as fcience; which is in the mind as its fubject, and may be predicated of geometry. Lastly, Some things can neither be in a fubject, nor be predicated of any fubject. Such are all individual fub

ftances,

stances, which cannot be predicated, becaufe they are individuals; and cannot be in a fubject, because they are fubftances. After fome other fubtilties about predicates and fubjects, we come to the cate gories themselves; the things above mentioned being called by the fchoolmen the anteprædicamenta. It may be observed, however, that notwithstanding the distinction now explained, the being in a subject, and the being predicated truly of a fubject, are in the Analytics ufed as fynonymous phrafes; and this variation of style has led fome perfons to think that the Categories were not written by Aristotle.

These are

Things that may be expreffed without compofition or ftructure, are, fays the author, reducible to the following heads, They are either fubftance, or quantity, or quality, or relatives, or place, or time, or having, or doing, or fuffering. the predicaments or categories. four are largely treated of in four chapters ; the others are flightly paffed over, as sufficiently clear of themfelves. As a specimen, I fhall give a fummary of what he fays on the category of fubftance.

The first

Subftances are either primary, to wit, individual

I

individual substances, or fecondary, to wit, the genera and fpecies of fubftances. 100 bre subivibaren 21 substances neither are in a tub

Primary fubitance ra

ject, nor can be predicated of a fubject;

but all other things that exift, either are

in primary fubftances, or may be predicáted of them. For For whatever can be predicated of that which is in a fubject, may also be predicated of the fubject itself. Primary fubftances are more fubftances than the fecondary; and of the fecondary, the fpecies is more a fubftance than the genus If there were no primary, there could be no fecondary fubftances.

or

3.

The properties of fubftance are thefe 1. No fubftance is capable of intention o remiffion. 2. No fubftance can be in any other thing as its fubject of inhefion. No fubftance has a contrary; for one subftance cannot be contrary to another, nor can there be contrariety between a fubflance and that which is no fubflance. 4. The most remarkable property of fub-ftance, is, that one and the fame füb

fiance may, by fome change in itself, Become the fubject of things that are contrary. Thus, the fame body may be at one time hot, at another cold.

VOL. III.

Rr

Let

Let this ferve as a fpecimen of Ariftotle's manner of treating the categories. After them, we have fome chapters, which the fchoolmen call poftprædicamenta; wherein, firft, the four kinds of oppofition of terms are explained; to wit, relative, privative, of contrariety, and of contradiction. This is repeated in all fyftems of logic. Laft of all we have diftinctions of the four Greek words which anfwer to the Latin ones, prius, fimul, motus, and habére.

SECT. 4. Of the book concerning Interpre

tation.

We are to confider, fays Ariftotle, what a noun is, what a verb, what affirmation, what negation, what fpeech. Words are the figns of what paffeth in the mind; writing is the fign of words. The figns

both of writing and of words are different in different nations, but the operations of mind fignified by them are the fame. There are fome operations of thought which are neither true nor false. These are expreffed by nouns or verbs fingly, and without compofition.

A

A noun is a found which by compact fignifies fomething without refpect to time, and of which no part has fignification by itself. The cries of beasts may have a natural fignification, but they are not nouns : we give that name only to founds which have their fignification by compact. The cafes of a noun, as the genitive, dative, are not nouns. Non homo is not a noun, but, for diftinction's fake, may be called a nomen infinitum.

A verb fignifies fomething by compact with relation to time. Thus valet is a verb; but valetudo is a noun, because its fignification has no relation to time. It is only the present tense of the indicative that is properly called a verb; the other tenfes and moods are variations of the verb. Non valet may be called' a verbum infinitum..

Speech is found fignificant by compact, of which fome part is alfo fignificant. And it is either enunciative, or not enunciative. Enunciative fpeech is that which affirms or denies. As to fpeech which is not enunciative, such as a prayer or wifh, the confideration of it belongs to oratory, or poetry. Every enunciative fpeech must have Rr 2

a