APPENDIX.

IN reviewing the foregoing sketch, it occurred, that a fair analysis of Aristotle's logic, would be a valuable addition to the historical branch. A distinct and candid account of a fyftem that for many ages governed the reasoning part of mankind, cannot but be acceptable to the public. Curiofity will be gratified, in seeing a phantom delineated that fo long fascinated the learned world; a phantom, which fhows infinite genius, but like the pyramids of Egypt or hanging gardens of Babylon, is abfolutely ufelefs unless for raifing wonder. Dr Reid, profeffor of moral philosophy in the college of Glasgow, relifhed the thought; and his friendship to me prevailed on him, after much folicitation, to undertake the laborious task. No man is better acquainted with Ariftotle's writings; and, without any enthusiastic attachment, he holds that philofopher to be a first-rate genius.

The

The logic of Ariftotle has been on the decline more than a century; and is at prefent relegated to fchools and colleges. It has occafionally been criticised by different writers; but this is the first attempt to draw it out of its obfcurity into day-light. From what follows, one will be enabled to pass a true judgement on that work, and to determine whether it ought to make a branch of education. The Doctor's effay, as a capital article in the progress and history of the sciences, will be made welcome, even with the fatigue of squeezing through many thorny paths, before a distinct view can be got of that ancient and ftupendous fabric.

It will at the fame time fhow the hurt that Ariftotle has done to the reasoning faculty, by drawing it out of its natural course into devious paths. His artificial mode of reasoning, is no lefs fuperficial than intricate: I fay, fuperficial; for in none of his logical works, is a fingle truth attempted to be proved by fyllogifm that requires a proof: the propofitions he undertakes to prove by fyllogifm, are all of them felf-evident. Take for inftance the following propofition, That man has a

power

power of felf-motion. To prove this, he affumes the following axiom, upon which indeed every one of his fyllogifms are founded, That whatever is true of a number of particulars joined together, holds true of every one feparately; which is thus expreffed in logical terms, Whatever is true of the genus, holds true of every fpecies. Founding upon that, axiom, he reafons thus: "All animals have a power "of

of felf-motion: man is an animal: ergo,

1

"man has a power of felf-motion." Now if all animals have a power of felf-motion, it requires no argument to prove, that man, an animal, has that power and therefore, what he gives as a conclufion or confequence, is not really fo; it is not inferred from the fundamental propofition, but is included in it. At the fame time, the felf-motive power of man, is a fact that cannot be known but from experience; and it is more clearly known from experience than that of any other animal. Now, in attempting to prove man to be a felf-motive animal, is it not abfurd, to found the argument on a proposition less clear than that undertaken to be demonftrated? What is here obferved, will be

found

found applicable to the greater part, if not the whole, of his fyllogifms.

Unless for the reafon now given, it would appear fingular, that Aristotle never attempts to apply his fyllogiftic mode of reafoning to any fubject handled by himfelf: on ethics, on rhetoric, and on poetry, he argues like a rational being, without once putting in practice any of his own rules. It is not fuppofable that a man of his capacity could be ignorant, how infufficient a fyllogifm is for difcovering any latent truth. He certainly intended his fyftem of logic, chiefly if not folely, for difputation: and if fuch was his purpose, he has been wonderfully fuccefsful ; for nothing can be better contrived for wrangling and difputing without end. He indeed in a manner profeffes this to be his aim, in his books De Sophi fticis elenchis.

Some ages hence, when the goodly fabric of the Romifh fpiritual power fhall be laid low in the duft, and scarce a veftige remain; it will among antiquaries be a curious enquiry, What was the nature and extent of a tyranny, more oppreffive to the minds of men, than the tyranny of

ancient

ancient Rome was to their perfons. During every step of the enquiry, posterity will rejoice over mental liberty, no less no precious than perfonal liberty. The despotism of Aristotle with respect to the faculty of reafon, was no lefs complete, than that of the Bishop of Rome with refpect to religion; and it is now a proper fubject of curiofity, to enquire into the nature and extent of that defpotifm. One cannot perufe the following fheets, without fympathetic pain for the weakness of man with respect to his nobleft faculty; but that pain will redouble his fatisfaction, in now beings left free to the dictates of reafon and common fenfe.niaol

In my reveries, I have more than once compared Aristotle's logic to a bubble made of foap-water for amusing children; a beautiful figure with fplendid colours; fair on the outfide, empty within. It has for more than two thousand years been the hard fate of Ariftotle's followers, Ixion like, to embrace a cloud for a goddess. But this is more than fufficient for a preface: and I had almost forgot, that I am detaining my readers from better entertainment, in liftening to Dr Reid.

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