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properly fo termed in the following particular, that it produces different degrees of conviction, fometimes approaching to certainty, fometimes finking toward the verge of improbability. The conftancy and uniformity of natural operations, is a fit fubject for illuftrating that difference. The future fucceffive changes of day and night, of winter and fummer, and of other fucceffions which have hitherto been constant and uniform, fall under intuitive knowledge, because of these we have the highest conviction. As the conviction is inferior of fucceffions that hitherto have varied in any degree, these fall under intuitive opinion. We expect fummer after winter with the utmost confidence; but we have not the fame confidence in expecting a hot fummer or a cold winter, And yet the probability approaches much nearer to certainty, than the intuitive opinion we have, that the operations of nature are extremely fimple, a propofition that is little rely'd on.

As to opinion founded on reasoning, it is obvious, that the conviction produced by reasoning, can never rise above what is produced by the intuitive propofition up

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on which the reasoning is founded. And that it may be weaker, will appear from confidering, that even where the fundamental propofition is certain, it may lead to the conclufive opinion by intermediate propofitions, that are probable only, not certain. In a word, it holds in general with refpect to every fort of reasoning, that the conclufive propofition can never rise higher in point of conviction, than the very lowest of the intuitive propofitions employ'd as steps in the reasoning. The perception we have of the contingency of future events, opens a wide field to our reasoning about probabilities. That perception involves more or less doubt according to its fubject. In fome instances, the event is perceived to be extremely doubtful; in others, it is perceived to be lefs doubtful. It appears altogether doubtful, in throwing a dye, which of the fix fides will turn up; and for that reason, we cannot juftly conclude for one rather than for another. If one only of the fix fides be marked with a figure, we conclude, that a blank will turn up; and five to one is an equal wager that fuch will be the effect. In judging of the future behaviour

haviour of a man who has hitherto been governed by intereft, we may conclude with a probability approaching to certainty, that interest will continue to prevail.

Belief comes laft in order, which, as defined above, is knowledge of the truth of facts that falls below certainty, and involves in its nature fome degree of doubt. It is alfo of two kinds; one founded upon intuition, and one upon reasoning. Thus, knowledge, opinion, belief, are all of them equally diftinguishable into intuitive and difcurfive. Of intuitive belief, I discover three different fources or caufes. First, A prefent object. Second, An object formerly present. Third, The teftimony of others.

To have a clear conception of the first caufe, it must be obferved, that among the fimple perceptions that compofe the complex perception of a prefent object, a perception of real and prefent existence is one. This perception rifes commonly to certainty; in which cafe it is a branch of knowledge properly fo termed; and is handled as fuch above. But this perception falls below certainty in fome inftances; as where an object, feen at a

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great distance or in a fog, is perceived to be a horse, but fo indiftinctly as to make it a probability only. The perception in fuch a cafe is termed belief. Both perceptions are fundamentally of the fame nature; being fimple perceptions of real exiftence. They differ only in point of diftinctnefs the perception of reality that makes a branch of knowledge, is fo clear and diftinct as to exclude all doubt or hefitation: the perception of reality that occafions belief, being lefs clear and diftinct, makes not the exiftence of the object certain to us, but only probable.

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With refpect to the fecond caufe; the existence of an abfent object, formerly feen, amounts not to a certainty; and therefore is the fubject of belief only, not of knowledge. Things are in a continual flux from production to diffolution our fenfes are accommodated to that variable fcene: a prefent object admits no doubt of its exiftence; but after it is removed, its existence becomes lefs certain, and in time finks down to a flight degree of probability.

Human teftimony, the third caufe, produces belief, more or lefs ftrong, accor

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ding to circumstances. In general, nature leads us to rely upon the veracity of each other; and commonly the degree of reliance is proportioned to the degree of veracity. Sometimes belief approaches to certainty, as when it is founded on the evidence of perfons above exception as to veracity. Sometimes it finks to the lowest degree of probability, as when a fact is told by one who has no great reputation for truth. The nature of the fact, common or uncommon, has likewife an influence: an ordinary incident gains credit upon very flight evidence; but it requires the strongest evidence to overcome the improbability of an event that deviates from the ordinary courfe of nature. At the fame time, it must be observed, that belief is not always founded upon rational principles. There are biaffes and weakneffes in human nature that fometimes disturb the operation, and produce belief without fufficient or proper evidence: we are difpofed to believe on very flight evi dence, an interefting event, however rare or fingular, that alarms and agitates the mind; because the mind in agitation is remarkably fufceptible of impreffions: for D d which

VOL. III.

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