army, for defence as well as offence; which has reduced every nation in Europe, to a precarious ftate. If the army of a nation happen to be defeated, even at the most distant frontier, there is little refource against a total conqueft. Compare the history of Charles VII. with that of Lewis XIV. Kings of France. The former, tho' driven into a corner by Henry V. of Eng land, was however far from yielding: on the contrary, relying on the military fpirit of his people, and indefatigably intent on ftratagem and furprise, he recovered all he had loft. When Lewis XIV. fucceeded to the crown, the military fpirit of the people was contracted within the narrow fpan of a standing army. Behold the confequence. That ambitious monarch, having provoked his neighbours into an alliance against him, had no resource against a more numerous army, but to purchafe peace by an abandon of all his conquefts, upon which he had lavished much blood and treafure (a). France at that period contained feveral millions capable of bearing arms; and yet was not in a condition

(a) Treaty of St Gertrudenberg,

to make head against a difciplined army of 70,000 men. Poland, which continues upon the ancient military establishment, wearied out Charles XII. of Sweden; and had done the fame to feveral of his predeceffors. But Saxony, defended only by a ftanding army, could not hold out a fingle day against the prince now mentioned, at the head of a greater army. Mercenary troops are a defence ftill more feeble, against troops that fight for glory, or for their country. Unhappy was the invention of a standing army; which, without being any strong bulwark against enemies, is a grievous burden on the people; and turns daily more and more fo. Listen to a first-rate author on that point. "Sitôt

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qu' un état augmente ce qu'il appelle "fes troupes, les autres augmentent les "leurs; de façon qu'on ne gagne rien '66 par-là que la ruine commune. Chaque monarque tient fur pied toutes les armées qu'il pourroit avoir fi fes peuples étoient en danger d'être exterminées;

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et on nomme paix cet état d'effort de હ tous contre tous. Nous fommes pau66 vres avec les richeffes et le commerce de 66 tout l'univers; et bientôt à force d'avoir

"des

"des foldats, nous n'aurons plus que des "foldats, et nous ferons comme de Tar* (a)."

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tares

But with respect to Britain, and every free nation, there is an objection ftill more formidable; which is, that a standing army is dangerous to liberty. It avails very little to be fecure against foreign enemies, fuppofing a standing army to afford fecurity, if we have no fecurity against an enemy at home. If a warlike king, heading his own troops, be ambitious to render himself abfolute, there are no means to evade the impending blow; for what avail the greatest number of effeminate

*"As foon as one ftate augments the number of "its troops, the neighbouring ftates of course do "the fame; fo that nothing is gained, and the ef"fect is, the general ruin. Every prince keeps as 66 many armies in pay, as if he dreaded the exter

mination of his people from a foreign invafion; "and this perpetual ftruggle, maintained by all a"gainst all, is termed peace. With the riches and 46 commerce of the whole univerfe, we are in a state "of poverty; and by thus continually augmenting our troops, we shall foon have none elfe but fol"diers, and be reduced to the fame fituation as the Tartars."

(a) L'efprit des loix. liv. 13. chap. 17.

C 2

cowards

cowards against a difciplined army, devoted to their prince, and ready implicitly to execute his commands? In a word, by relying entirely on a flanding army, and by trufting the fword in the hands of men who abhor the reftraints of civil law, a folid foundation is laid for military government. Thus a ftanding army is dangerous to liberty, and yet no fufficient bulwark against powerful neighbours.

Deeply fenfible of the foregoing objections, Harrington proposes a militia as a remedy. Every male between eighteen and thirty, is to be trained to military exercifes, by frequent meetings, where the youth are excited by premiums to contend in running, wrestling, fhooting at a mark, &c. &c. But Harrington did not advert, that fuch meetings, enflaming the military fpirit, must create an averfion in the people to. dull and fatiguing labour. His plan evidently is inconfiftent with industry and manufactures: it would be fo at least in Britain. An unexceptionable plan it would be, were defence our fole object; and not the lefs fo by reducing Britain to fuch poverty as fcarce to be a tempting conqueft. Our late war with France is a conspicuous inftance

inftance of the power of a commercial state, entire in its credit ; a power that amaz'd all the world, and ourselves no lefs than others. Politicians begin to confider Britain, and not France, to be the formi→ dable power that threatens univerfal monarchy. Had Harrington's plan been adopted, Britain muft have been reduced to a level with Sweden or Denmark, having no ambition but to draw fubfidies from its more potent neighbours.

In Switzerland, it is true, boys are, from the age of twelve, exercised in running, wrestling, and fhooting. Every male who can bear arms is regimented, and fubjected to military difcipline. Here is a militia in perfection upon Harrington's plan, a militia neither forc'd nor mércenary; invincible when fighting for their country. And as the Swifs are not an idle people, we learn from this inftance, that the martial fpirit is not an invincible obftruction to induftry. But the original barrennefs of Switzerland, compelled the inhabitants to be fober and induftrious; and industry hath among them become a fecond nature; there fcarcely being a child above fix years of age but who is employ'd,

not