The pursuit of truth is no less pleasant than the pursuit of any other good *.

Our knowledge of what is agreeable and difagreeable in objects is derived from the sense of beauty, handled in Elements of Criticism. Our knowledge of right and wrong in actions, is derived from the moral fenfe, to be handled in the sketch immediately following. Our knowledge of truth and error is derived from various fources.

Our external senses are one fource of knowledge: they lay open to us external fubjects, their qualities, their actions, with events produced by these actions. The internal senses are another fource of knowledge: they lay open to us things passing in the mind; thinking, for example, deliberating, inclining, refolving, willing, consenting, and other acts; and they also lay open to us our emotions and paffions. There is a sense by which we perceive the truth of many propositions; fuch as, That every thing which begins

* It has been wisely observed, that truth is the fame to the understanding that mufic is to the ear, or beauty to the eye.

to exist must have a cause; That every effect adapted to some end or purpose, proceeds from a designing cause; and, That every effect adapted to a good end or purpose, proceeds from a designing and benevolent cause. A multitude of axioms in every science, particularly in mathematics, are equally perceived to be true. By a peculiar sense, of which afterward, we know that there is a Deity. There is a sense by which we know, that the external figns of passion are the fame in all men; that animals of the same external appearance, are of the same species; and that animals of the same species, have the fame properties (a). There is a fenfe that dives into futurity: we know that the fun will rife to-morrow; that the earth will perform its wonted course round the fun; that winter and summer will follow each other in fucceffion; that a ftone dropt from the hand will fall to the ground; and a thousand other fuch propositions.

.

There are many propositions, the truth of which is not so apparent: a process of

(a) Preliminary Difcourse.

1

reasoning reasoning is necessary, of which afterward.

Human testimony is another source of knowledge. So framed we are by nature, as to rely on human testimony; by which we are informed of beings, attributes, and events, that never came under any of our fenfes.

The knowledge that is derived from the fources mentioned, is of different kinds. In fome cafes, our knowledge includes absolute certainty, and produces the highest degree of conviction: in other cafes, probability comes in place of certainty, and the conviction is inferior in degree. Knowledge of the latter kind is diftinguished into belief, which concerns facts; and opinion, which concerns relations, and other things that fall not under the denomination of facts. In contradistinction to opinion and belief, that fort of knowledge which includes absolute certainty and produces the highest degree of conviction, retains its proper name. explain what is here faid, I enter into particulars.

To

The sense of feeing, with very few exceptions, affords knowledge properly fo

termed: it is not in our power to doubt of the existence of a person we fee, touch, and converse with. When fuch is our constitution, it is a vain attempt to call in question the authority of our sense of feeing, as fome writers pretend to do. No one ever called in question the existence of internal actions and paffions, laid open to us by internal sense; and there is as little ground for doubting of what we fee. The fense of feeing, it is true, is not always correct: through different mediums the fame object is seen differently: to a jaundic'd eye every thing appears yellow; and to one intoxicated with liquor, two candles fometimes appear four. But we are never left without a remedy in such a cafe: it is the province of the reasoning faculty, to correct every error of that kind.

An object of fight recalled to mind by the power of memory, is termed an idea or secondary perception. An original perception, as faid above, affords knowledge in its proper sense; but a fecondary perception affords belief only. And Nature in this, as in all other instances, is faithful to truth; for it is evident, that we

cannot

:

cannot be so certain of the existence of an

object in its absence, as when present.

With refpect to many abstract propofitions, of which instances are above given, we have an abfolute certainty and conviction of their truth, derived to us from various senses. We can, for example, entertain as little doubt that every thing which begins to exist must have a cause, as that the fun is in the firmament; and as little doubt that he will rise to-morrow, as that he is now set. There are many other pro-positions, the truth of which is probable only, not abfolutely certain; as, for example, that winter will be cold and fummer warm. That natural operations are performed in the simplest manner, is an axiom of natural philofophy: it may be probable, but is far from being certain *.

In