Sketches of the History of Man ...: In Four Volumes ...

W. Creech, 1778
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Página 282 - Who but must laugh if such a man there be ? Who would not weep if Atticus were he?
Página 325 - Locke, that nominal eflences only, which are the .creatures of our own minds, are perfectly comprehended by us, or can be properly defined ; and even of thefe there are many too fimple in their nature to admit of definition. When we cannot give precifion to our notions by a definition, we muft endeavour to do it by attentive reflection upon them, by obferving minutely their agreements and differences, and efpecially by a right underftanding of the powers of our own minds, by which fuch notions are...
Página 396 - ... reafoning of his antagonift. • Our reafoning power makes no appearance in infancy, but, as we grow up, it unfolds itfelf by degrees like the bud of a .tree. When a child firft draws an inference, or perceives the force of an inference drawn by another, we may call this the birth of his reafon : but it is yet like a newborn babe, weak and tender ; it muft be cherifhed, carried in arms, and have food of eafy digeftion, till it gather ftrength.
Página 368 - This is a principle of undoubted certainty indeed, but of no great depth.
Página 332 - The fame example may ferve to fhew, that it is fometimes difficult to fay, whether a propofition be univerfal or particular. 4. The quality of fome propofitions is fo dubious, that logicians have never been able to agree whether they be affirmative or negative ; as in this propofition, Whatever is infentient is not an animal.
Página 329 - Hence it is eafy to diftinguifh the thing affirmed or denied, which is called the predicate, from the thing of which it is affirmed or denied, which is called the fubject ; and thefe two are called the terms of the propofition.
Página 321 - I think it muft be allowed, that in things which need definition and admit of it, his definitions are commonly judicious and accurate ; and had he attempted to define fuch things only, his enemies had wanted great matter of triumph. I believe it may likewife be faid in his favour, that until Locke's efTay was wrote, there was nothing of importance delivered by philofophers with regard to definition, beyond what Ariftotle has faid upon that fubject.
Página 394 - Its profefled end is, to teach men to think, to judge, and to reafon, with precifion and accuracy. No man will fay that this is a matter of no importance ; the only thing therefore that admits of doubt, is, whether it can be taught. To...
Página 410 - Many things were assumed under that character without a just title : that nature abhors a vacuum ; that bodies do not gravitate in their proper place ; that the heavenly bodies undergo no change ; that they move in perfect circles, and with an equable motion.
Página 363 - ... both of the force of the reasoning power in man, and of the art of syllogism as its guide. Mere reasoning can carry us but a very little way in most subjects. By observation, and experiments properly conducted, the stock of human knowledge may be enlarged without end ; but the power of reasoning alone, applied with vigour through a long life, would only carry a man round, like a, horse in a mill who labours hard but makes no progress.

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