T O avoid the rapacity of farmers, a mild government will, in most cases, prefer management; i. e. it will levy taxes by officers appointed for that purpofe. Montefquieu (a) has handled that point with his ufual fprightly elegance. Importation duties are commonly laid upon the importer before the cargo is landed, leaving him to add the duty to the price of goods; and facility of levying is the motive for preferring that method. But is it not hard that the importer fhould be obliged to advance a great fum in the name of duty, before drawing a fhilling by the fale of his goods? It is not only hard, but grofsly unjuft: for if the goods perish without being fold, the duty is loft to the importer; he has no claim against the public for reftitution. This has more the air of defpotifm than of a free government. Would it not be more equitable, that goods fhould be lodged in a public warehouse, under cuftody of revenue officers, the importer paying the duty as the goods are fold? By the prefent method, the duty remains with the collector three years, in order to be repaid to the importer, if the goods be exported within that time: but, by the method propofed, the duty would be paid to the treafury as the goods are fold, which might be within a month from the time of importation, perhaps a week; and the treasury would profit, as well as the fair trader. There are public warehoufes adjoining to the customhoufe of Bourdeaux, where the fugars of the French colonies are depofited, till the importer finds a market; and he pays the duty gradually, as fales are made. It rejoices me, that the fame method is practifed in this island, with refpect to fome foreign articles neceffary in our trade with Africa: the duty is not demanded till the goods are shipped for that continent. (a) L'Efprit des Loix, liv. 13. chap. 19. tinent. It is also put in practice with respect to foreign falt, and with respect to rum imported from our fugar-colonies. : Befide the equity of what is here propofed, which relieves the importer from advance of money, and from rifk, many other advantages would be derived from it. In the first place, the merchant, having no occafion to referve any portion of his capital for anfwering the duty, would be enabled to commence trade with a small stock, or to increase his trade, if his ftock be large trade would flourish, and the public revenue would increase in proportion. Secondly, It would leffen fmuggling. Many a one who commences trade with upright intention, is tempted to fmuggle for want of ready money to pay the duty. Thirdly, This manner of levying the duty would not only abridge the number of officers, but remove every pretext for claiming discount on pretence of leakage, famples, and the drying or fhrinking of goods. In the prefent manner of levying, that discount must be left to the difcretion of the officer: a private underftanding is thus introduced between him and the merchant, hurtful to the revenue, and deftructive to morals. Fourthly, The merchant would be enabled to lower his prices, and be forced to lower them, by having many rivals; which, at the fame time, would give access to augment importation-duties, without raifing the price of foreign commodities above what it is at prefent. But the capital advantage of all would be, to render, in effect, every port in Britain a free port, enabling English merchants, many of whom have great capitals, to outstrip foreigners in what is termed A COMMERCE OF SPECULATION. This ifland is well fituated for fuch commerce; and were our ports free, the productions of all climates would be stored up in them, ready for exportation, when a market offers; an excellent plan for increafing our shipping, and for producing boundless wealth. V.. SECT. RULES TO BE OBSERVED IN TAXING. HE different objects of taxes, and the intrica Try thereby occafioned, require general rules, cy not only for directing the legiflature in impofing them, but for enabling others to judge what are beneficial, and what hurtful. The first rule I fhall fuggeft is, That wherever there is an opportunity of fmuggling, taxes ought to be moderate; for fmuggling can never effectually be reftrained, where the cheapnefs of imported goods is in effect an enfurance against the risk; in which view, Swift humorously obferves, that two and two do not always make four. A duty of 15 per cent. upon printed linen imported into France, encourages fmuggling a lower duty would produce a greater fum to the public, and be more beneficial to the French manufacturer. Bone-lace imported into France is charged with a duty of 20 per cent. in order to favour that manufacture at home: but in vain; for bone-lace is eafily fmuggled, and the price is little higher than before. The high duty on "fuccus liquoritiæ" imported into Britain, being 71. 2s. 6d. per hundred weight, was a great encouragement to fmuggling; for which it is reduced to 30. per hundred weight (a). The fmuggling of tea, which extracts great fums from Britain, is much encouraged by its high price at home. As far as I can judge, it would be profitable, both to the public and to individuals, to lay afide the importation-duty, and to fubftitute in its ftead a duty on the confumer. Freedom of importation would enable the Eaft India company to fell fo cheap, as effectually to banish fmuggling; and the low price of tea would enable the confumer to pay a pretty smart duty, without being much out of pocket. The following mode is propofed merely as an example: (a) 7o Geo. III. cap. 47. it it is a hint that may lead to improvements. Let every man who uses tea be subjected to a moderate tax, proportioned to his mode of living. Abfolute precifion cannot be expected in proportioning the tax on families; but grofs inequality may eafily be prevented. For inftance, let the mode of living be determined by the equipage that is kept. A coach or chaife with two horfes fhall fubject a family to a yearly tax of 10l. heightening the tax in proportion to the number of horfes and carriages; two fervants in livery, without a carriage, to a tax of 40s.; every other family paying 20s. Every family where tea is ufed must be entered in the collector's books, with its mode of living, under a heavy penalty; which would regulate the coach-tax, as well as that on tea.. Such a tax, little expenfive in levying, would undoubtedly be effectual: a mafter of a family is imprudent indeed, if he puts it in the power of the vender, of a malicious neighbour, or of a menial fervant, to fubject him to a heavy penalty. This tax at the fame time would be the leaft difagreeable of any that is levied without difguife; being in effect a voluntary tax, as the mode of living is voluntary. Nor would it be difficult to temper the tax, fo as to afford a greater fum to the public than it receives at prefent from the importation-duty, and yet to coft our people no more for tea than they pay at prefent, taking into computation the high price of that commodity. High duties on importation are immoral, as well as impolitic; and it would be unjustifiable in the legislature, first to tempt, and then to punish for yield-· ing to the temptation. Our A fecond rule is, That taxes expenfive in the levying ought to be avoided; being heavy on the people, without a proportional benefit to the revenue. land-tax is admirable: it affords a great fum, levied with very little expence. The duties on coaches, and on gold and filver plate, are fimilar; and fo would be the tax on tea above propofed. The taxes that are the most hurtful to trade and manufactures, K 4 fuch fuch as the duty on foap, candle, leather, are expenfive in levying. A third rule is, To avoid arbitrary taxes. They are difguftful to all, not excepting those who are favourably treated; becaufe felf partiality feldom permits a man to think that juftice is done him in fuch matters. A tax laid on perfons in proportion to their trade, or their opulence, must be arbitrary, even where ftri&t justice is intended; because it depends on the vague opinion or conjecture of the collector : every man thinks himself injured; and the fum levied does not balance the difcontent it occafions. The tax laid on the French farmer in proportion to his fubftance, is an intolerable grievance, and a great engine of oppreffion: if the farmer exerts any activity in meliorating his land, he is fure to be doubly taxed. Hamburgh affords the only inftance of a tax on trade and riches, that is willingly paid, and that confe. quently is levied without oppreffion. Every merchant puts privately into the public cheft the fum that in his own opinion he ought to contribute: a fingular example of integrity in a great trading town; for there is no fufpicion of wrong in that tacit contribution. But this flate is not yet corrupted by luxury. Because many vices that poifon a nation arife from inequality of riches, I propofe it as a fourth rule, to remedy that inequality as much as poffible, by relieving the poor, and burdening the rich. Proprie tors of overgrown eftates can bear without inconvenience very heavy taxes; and thofe efpecially who convert much land from profit to pleasure, ought not to be spared. Would it not contribute greatly to the public good, that a tax of 50l. fhould be laid on every houfe that has 50 windows; 150l. on houfes of 100 windows; and 4col. on houfes of 200 windows? By the fame principle, every deer-park of zoo acres ought to pay 50l.; of 500 acres 200l.; and of 1000 acres 600l. Fifty acres of pleasure ground to pay 30l.; 100 fuch acres Sol.; 150 acres 200l.; and 200 acres 300/. Such a tax would have another good effect: it would probably move high minded men to leave out more |