puted to be fufficient for raising a fubfidy of L. 50,000. It being found, that there were but 8700 parishes, exclufive of Wales, the parliament, in order to raise the faid fubfidy, affeffed on each parish L. 5, 16 s.

In impofing taxes, ought not the expence of living to be deducted, and to confider the remainder as the only taxable fubject? This mode was adopted in the ftate of Athens. A rent of 500 measures of corn, burdened the landlord with the yearly contribution of a talent: a rent of 300, burdened him with half a talent a rent of 200, burdened him with the fixth part of a talent; and land under that rent paid no tax. Here the tax was not in proportion to the estate, but to what could be fpared out of it; or, in other words, in proportion to the ability of the proprietor. At the fame time, ability must not be eftimated by what a man actually faves, which would exempt the profuse and profligate from paying taxes, but by what a man can pay who lives with oeconomy according to his rank. This rule is founded on the very nature of government: to tax a man's food, or the fubject that affords him bare neceffaries, is worse than

the

the denying him protection: it farves him. Hence the following propofition may be laid down as the corner ftone of taxation-building," That every man ought to contribute to the public re

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venue, not in proportion to his fub"ftance, but to his ability." I am forry to obferve, that this rule is little regarded in British taxes; though nothing would contribute more to fweeten the minds of the people, and to make them ford of their government, than a regulation fraught with fo much equity.

Taxes were long in ufe before it was discovered, that they could be made fubfervient to other purposes, befide that of fupporting government. In the fifteenth century, the ftates of Burgundy rejected with indignation a demand made by the Duke, of a duty on falt; tho' they found no other objection, but that it would opprefs the poor people, who lived moftly on. falt meat and falt fish. It did not occur to them, that fuch a tax might hurt their manufactures, by raifing the price of labour. A tax of two fhillings on every hearth, known by the name of hearthmoney, was granted to Charles II. his heirs

and

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and fucceffors, for ever. It was abrogated by an act of William and Mary, anno 1688, on the following preamble, "That "it is not only a great oppreffion upon "the poorer fort, but a badge of flavery upon the whole people, expofing every "man's houfe to be entered into and "fearched at pleasure, by perfons un"known to him." Had the harm done by fuch a tax to our manufactures been at that time understood, it would have been urged as the capital reafon against it. Our late improvements in commercial politics have unfolded an important doctrine, That taxes are feldom indifferent to the public good; that frequently they are more oppreffive to the people, than beneficial to the fovereign; and, on the other hand, that they may be fo contrived, as to rival bounties in promoting industry, manufactures, and commerce. Thefe different effects of taxes, have rendered the fubject not a little intricate.

It is an article of importance in govern ment, to have it afcertained, what proportion of the annual income of a nation may be drawn from the people by taxes, without impoverishing them. An eighth part

is held to be too much; hufbandry, commerce, and population, would fuffer. Davenant fays, that the Dutch pay to the public annually, the fourth part of the income of their country; and he adds, that their strict oeconomy enables them to bear that immenfe load, without raifing the price of labour fo high as to cut them out of the foreign market, It was probably fo in the days of Davenant; but, of late, matters are much altered: the dearnefs of living and of labour, has excluded all the Dutch manufactures from the foreign market. Till the French war in King William's reign, England paid in taxes but about a twentieth part of its annual income.

THat

SECT. II.

Power of impofing Taxes.

Hat to impofe taxes belongs to the fovereign, and to him only, is undoubted. But it has been doubted, whether even King and parliament, who pof

VOL. II.

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fefs

fefs the fovereign authority in Britain, can legally impofe a tax without consent of the people. The celebrated Locke, in his effay on Government (a), lays down the following propofition as fundamental. "'Tis true, governments cannot be fupported without great charge; and 'tis "fit every one who enjoys his share of protection fhould pay out of his eftate "his proportion for the maintenance of it. But fill it must be with his own confent, i. e. the confent of the majority, giving it either by themselves, or their representatives chofen by them; for if any one shall claim a power to lay and levy taxes on the people by his own au

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thority, and without fuch consent of "the people, he thereby invades the fun"damental law of property, and fubverts "the end of government. For what pro

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perty have I in that which another may by right take when he pleafes to him"felf?" No author has reflected more honour on his native country, and on mankind, than Mr Locke. Yet no name. is above truth;. and I am obliged to obferve, tho' with regret, that in the forego

(a) Chap. 11. § 140.