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INDEX.

[Q. B. VOL. IV.

TIME FOR DISCHARGE-continued.
contract implied by law is, that each party will
use reasonable diligence in performing that part
of the delivery which by the custom of the port
falls upon him; and there is no implied contract
that the discharge shall be performed in the time
usually taken at the port. Where therefore a
ship, under such a charterparty, was in the course
of unloading at the port of discharge, and owing
to a threatened bombardment of the port, the au-
thorities there refused for several days to allow
any more of the cargo to be landed, the loss from
the delay must fall on the shipowner, and he cannot
recover damages from the charterer.
COTESWORTH

SUSPENDED ORDER OF REMOVAL-continued.
an order was obtained for the removal of J. G. and
E. his wife from St. M. to S., and on the same day
the order was suspended on account of the sick-
ness of J. G., and he remained incapable of being
removed until he died on the 13th of June, 1861.
Shortly before J. G.'s death E. became unable to
travel by reason of sickness, and continued sick
until she died in April, 1867, having in March,
1866, become irremoveable under 28 & 29 Vict.
c. 79, s. 8, by reason of having resided before No-
vember, 1860, for one year in St. M. without
receiving parish relief. An order Laving been
obtained after the death of E. by St. M. on S. for
the expenses of maintenance of E. subsequent to
the death of J. G., under 35 Geo. 3, c. 101, s. 2 :—
Held, that although the order of removal was sus-
pended in consequence of the sickness of J. G., it
continued suspended as to E., and that all the
expenses of her maintenance up to March, 1866,
must be paid by S.-Held, also, that the order for
the payment of the expenses was rightly made in
April, 1867, on the death of E., although she had
become irremoveable in March, 1866, by virtue of TITLE
28 & 29 Vict. c. 79, s. 8. THE QUEEN v. SCUL
33

COATES

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TELEGRAPH COMPANY-Negligence-Liability
for Mistake in Message-Privity of Contract.] The
plaintiff, a merchant in London, having a cargo
of ice at Grimsby, wrote and requested R. & H. at
Hull to make an offer for it by telegraph. R. & H.
sent by the defendants' telegraph a message:
can give you 238. for cargo now at Grimsby;" and
paid them for the transmission. By the custom of
the ice trade, if an offer by telegraph is accepted,
the vendor pays the vendee the cost of the mes-
sage. The message was misread by the defend-
ants' clerk in London, and was forwarded to the
plaintiff We can give you 278.," &c. The plain-
tiff sent the cargo round to Hull; but R. & H.
refused to accept the ice except at 23s. The
plaintiff brought an action against the defendants
for the consequent damage:-Held, that the de-
fendants' liability arose only from contract; that
as the message was sent by R. & H. on their own
account and not on behalf of the plaintiff, there
was no privity between the plaintiff and the de-
fendants, and the fact, that in the event of the
plaintiff accepting the offer there was an implied
understanding that he would reimburse R. & H.,
the cost of the message made no difference; and
that the plaintiff could not maintain an action
against the defendants for their negligence. PLAY-
FORD . THE UNITED KINGDOM ELECTRIC TELE-
GRAPH COMPANY, LIMITED
TENANT : See LANDLORD AND TENANT.
TENEMENT-Settlement by renting tenement-
Evidence

706

341

See DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST. TENEMENTS-Value-County court jurisdiction See COUNTY COURT JURISDICTION. [4 TIME FOR DISCHARGE- Charterparty- Contract implied by Law, when Charterparty silent.] Where a charterparty provides that the ship shall proceed to a certain port, and there, or as near thereto as she can safely get, deliver the cargo in the usual and customary manner, but is silent as to the time to be occupied in the discharge, the

TITLE-Conditions of sale

See CONDITIONS OF SALE.
Slander-Personalty

See SLANDER OF TITLE.

FORD V.

127

159

730

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See LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT, 1858. ss. 14, 20, 25

163

326

See PAROCHIAL ASSESSMENTS.
UNION ASSESSMENT, &c., ACT, 1864, s. 1- 323
See VALUATION LIST.

UNREASONABLENESS OF CREDITORS' DEED-
Deed of Composition-Inequality-Bankruptcy Act,
1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 134), s. 192.] By a deed,
with the requisite consents, &c., under the Bank-
ruptcy Act, 1861, between the debtor of the first
part, P., a creditor, of the second part, and the
other creditors of the third part, the debtor cove-
nanted to pay P. a composition of 58. in the pound
by two equal instalments at four and twelve
months, and the debtor and P., as surety, each
covenanted with the other creditors to pay them a

UNREASONABLENESS OF CREDITORS' DEED continued.

composition of 58. in the pound on their respective debts by two instalments as above. The debtor assigned all his effects to P., upon trust to apply the proceeds towards the payment of the above composition, and afterwards towards payment of the remaining 158. in the pound of P.'s debt; it being stipulated that P. should have the advantage of this security for the remainder of his debt in consideration of his undertaking the liability of suretyship; and should stand possessed of the surplus, if any, in trust, for the debtor. It was also agreed that if P., as such surety, should arrange with any creditor to make an immediate payment of the composition payable to him with a deduction by way of discount, P. should be at liberty to repay himself out of the trust moneys the whole amount of the composition payable to such creditor. In consideration of the premises, the parties of the second and third parts released their respective debts-Held, that the deed was valid and binding on non-assenting creditors under 8. 192: for that there was no such inequality in P. as vitiated the deed, as the purchase of his suretyship must be taken to be an advantageous bargain for the creditors at large; and that the clause as to payment in advance was not objectionable, as it must be assumed that P. would only avail himself of it when he could do so consistently with carrying out the trusts. BISSELL v. JONES 49 Construction-Deed unduly favouring debtor

[61

See CONSTRUCTION OF CREDITORS' DEED. “USUALLY SOLD"-Bread 559, 565

See BREAD. 1, 2.

VALUATION LIST-Poor-rate-Appeal against Second Rate-Second Notice of Objection required under Union Assessment Committee Amendment Act, 1864 (27 & 28 Vict. c. 39), s. 1.] By 27 & 28 Vict. c. 39, s. 1, it is enacted that before any appeal shall be heard by any sessions against a poor-rate, the appellant shall give twenty-one days notice, with the grounds, to the assessment committee; provided, that no person shall be empowered to appeal to any sessions against a poor-rate made in conformity with the valuation list approved by the committee, unless he shall have given the committee notice of objection against the list, and shall have failed to obtain such relief in the matter as he deems just. The appellants, having been assessed to a poor-rate in conformity with a valuation list, gave notice to the committee of their objection to the list, but the committee refused to alter the list, and on appeal the rate was confirmed, subject to a case. While the case was pending, a second rate was made in conformity with the list which remained unaltered as to the appellants, and the appellants having given the twenty-one days notice of appeal against the rate to the committee, applied to the quarter sessions to enter the appeal against the second rate, without having given a fresh notice to the committee of objection to the list :-Held, that a fresh notice of objection to the list was a condition precedent to the right to enter the appeal against the second rate. THE QUEEN v. THE GREAT WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY 823

VOL IV.-Q. B.

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See COUNTY COURT JURISDICTION. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Conditions of sale -Title

See CONDITIONS OF SALE. VESTRY-Notice for holding vestry

159

577

See NOTICE FOR HOLDING VESTRY. VEXATIOUS INDICTMENTS ACT (22 & 23 Vict. c. 17, s. 2-Duty of Justice as to taking Recognizance of Prosecutor-Conspiracy by Members of Parliament.] A magistrate, if he refuses to commit or bail the person charged, is bound under 22 & 23 Vict. c. 17, s. 2, to take the recognizance of the prosecutor, if the information discloses any of the offences mentioned in the statute; but he has a discretion to refuse if no indictable offence is disclosed. Where, therefore, the offence charged is that of conspiracy, by three persons, two of whom are members of the House of Lords, to deceive the House, and so to prevent the due course of justice and prejudice a third person, by making statements in the House which they knew to be false, the magistrate is right in refusing to take any proceedings: as members of either House of Parliament are not civilly or criminally liable for any statements made in the House, nor for conspiracy to make such statements. WASON

1862

Ex parte 573

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VOLUNTARY WINDING-UP-Companies Act,
See COMPANIES ACT, 1862.
VOTING PAPERS-Municipal corporation-Elec-
tion-Misnomer

See ELECTION OF TOWN COUNCILLOR.

346

WARRANTY OF NATIONALITY—Ship and Shipping-Marine Insurance-Perils of the Seas-Sum paid under Decree of Foreign Court, to regain Goods-General Average-Salvage — Jurisdiction of Local Court in case of Wreck.] The plaintiff's effected a policy of insurance in London with the defendants, on "five boxes of bar gold in the ship called the Dutchman, at and from London to Constantinople, including all risks from the Bank of England until safely delivered to the consignees at Constantinople." The perils insured against were the usual perils, including of the seas, with the usual suing and labouring clause. At the time the insurance was effected the Dutchman was an English ship, but she was transferred the next day to Russian owners, and was duly certified and became a Russian ship; neither the plaintiff's nor the defendants were aware of the change until after the voyage was at an end. The ship sailed with the gold and other cargo on board, and was stranded in Turkish territory, about 100 miles from Constantinople, and within the jurisdiction of that port. The gold was immediately landed by the captain, and deposited with the Russian consul; and the consignees were compelled in order to obtain it to make a deposit of 20 per cent. upon the gold, as security for the payment of any sum that might be awarded against them as average or salvage expenses by the Russian consular court. In Turkish territory, by capitulations

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WARRANTY OF NATIONALITY-continued. with the Great Powers, all matters touching ships and their cargoes are decided by the consular court of the country to which the ship belongs. After the gold had been landed, operations were commenced to get the vessel off, which proved ineffectual. But most of the cargo was saved, and many parts of the fittings of the ship. According to the practice, the Russian consul appointed a curator of the wreck; and three persons were appointed by the Russian consul to decide upon the average to be paid by all parties concerned. They found it not a case of average, but a case of salvage, and they awarded that the cargo, including the gold, must contribute to the expenses in certain proportions according to the value; and this threw by far the greater part of the expenses on the gold. The agents of the plaintiffs and defendants protested against the award, as the gold had been landed before any of the operations had been commenced; but the award was ratified by the Russian minister at Constantinople, and no notice of appeal to the court at St. Petersburg having been lodged within eight days, it became a definite judgment binding on all parties. Had the ship remained under the English flag, the expenses would have been adjusted according to English law, and a great part of the sum charged against the gold would not have been charged. The plaintiffs, having been thus obliged to pay the sum awarded against the gold, brought an action to recover a proportionate part of it from the defendants, as a partial loss by the perils insured against. In addition to the above facts, contradictory evidence was given as to what principle had been adopted in the award, and as to whether or not the proper law had been followed in the decree of the Russian consular court:- Held, 1. That, the fact of the change of nationality of the ship could not affect the contract of insurance, as there was no express warranty or condition in the policy that the ship should continue English, and such a condition could not be implied. 2. That it was unnecessary to go into the question of whether or not the judgment of the Russian consular court was strictly according to the law administered in that court; the ship having been wrecked, the consequence was that the gold had got into the hands of the Russian authorities, and in order to get it back the plaintiffs had been compelled to pay the sum claimed, and this was the immediate consequence of the wreck; and the plaintiffs were, therefore, entitled to recover the money as a loss by perils of the sea. 3. That the plaintiffs had done all that a reasonable uninsured owner would have done, and were not bound to have appealed to the court at St. Petersburg. DENT v. SMITH, P. O.

414

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See COUNTY COURT JURISDICTION. WRIT OF RESTITUTION-Jurisdiction of Court of Queen's Bench-21 Hen. 8, c. 11; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, 8 100.] The Court of Queen's Bench had at common law no jurisdiction to issue a writ of restitution except as part of the judgment on an appeal of larceny; and 21 Hen. 8, c. 11, and 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, s. 100, only confer this jurisdiction on the Court before whom the felon has been convicted. Where, therefore, a person has been convicted of housebreaking and larceny before the Central Criminal Court, the Court of Queen's Bench has no power to award a writ of restitution of the proceeds of the larceny. THE QUEEN v. THE Lord Mayor and Corporation of LONDON 871

END OF VOL. IV.

LONDON: PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWKS AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.

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