to-port traffic or traffic that is handled partly by rail and partly by water. Concerns that conduct a business of forwarding, or furnishing wharfage, dock, warehouse, or other terminal. facilities in connection with a common carrier by water are subject to the provisions of the Shipping Act; yet concerns of this kind when handling interstate traffic moving partly by rail and partly by water are subject to the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act. A conflict of jurisdiction as between the Shipping Board and the Interstate Commerce Commission may arise unless the two administrative bodies work in close and friendly coöperation. FEDERAL REGULATION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN CARRIERS In addition to the navigation laws of the United States and the various statutory provisions regulating the services and charges of carriers by water, there are a number of important statutes that regulate the relations between ocean carriers and between ocean and rail carriers. The Shipping Act of September 7, 1916, just referred to in connection with the regulation of services and charges is also of principal importance in connection with conferences, agreements, pools and other arrangements between ocean carriers. Having discovered that such relations between ocean carriers are general throughout the greater part of the maritime world, Congress wisely decided that the Sherman Antitrust law should not apply in the future. Section 15 of the Shipping Act expressly provides that all agreements, modifications or cancellations approved or ordered by the United States Shipping Board shall be excepted from the provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act and the antitrust provisions contained in the tariff law of 1894. Instead it provides that all copies of agreements, pools, understandings, or other conference arrangements of ocean carriers subject to the act, shall be filed with the Shipping Board; and it empowers the board to disapprove, cancel, or modify any such agreements or arrangements. It provides that "agreements existing at the time of the organization of the board shall be lawful until disapproved by the board," and "that it shall be unlawful to carry out any agreement or any portion thereof disapproved by the board." The act wisely substituted the policy of regulating conference arrangements for the previous policy of prohibition under the federal antitrust laws. Section 14 of the act, however, explicitly prohibits certain objectionable features of the ocean conference arrangements. It prohibits the payment of deferred rebates, the use of fighting ships, and retaliation by reducing, or threatening to reduce, space accommodations, or by resorting to other discriminating or unfair methods against shippers who patronize other carriers or who file complaints with the Shipping Board. This section also declares unlawful any unfair or unjustly discriminatory contracts with shippers based upon the volume of freight offered, and any unfair treatment or discrimination against shippers in the matter of cargo space, loading and discharging of freight in proper condition, or in the matter of adjusting and settling claims. Any violations of section 14 which prohibits the objectionable practices referred to are punishable by a fine not exceeding $25,000 for each offense. Consolidations of ocean carriers by stock ownership, merger, outright purchase, or otherwise than by means of agreements, pools, understandings and other conference arrangements, are not specifically included within the Shipping Act. It is therefore probable that the federal antitrust laws are applicable to any such consolidations as result in unreasonable restraint of trade. The federal antitrust laws referred to are the Sherman Act of 1890, the antitrust provisions of the tariff law of 1894, and the Clayton Act of 1914. Section 11 of the Panama Canal Act of 1912, moreover, contains a special provision which prohibits any vessel that is owned, chartered, operated, or controlled by any concern that is doing business in violation of the federal antitrust laws from navigating the Panama Canal. The conditions under which the antitrust laws are applicable to ocean steamship consolidations have not thus far been de fined by the United States Supreme Court. There is reason to believe, however, that the application of these statutes is not dependent upon the place of incorporation of the consolidated companies nor upon the foreign or interstate character of the traffic in which they are engaged. The United States Supreme Court (U. S. v. Pacific and Arctic Rwy. and Nav. Co., et al., 228 U. S. 87, April 7, 1913) ruled that "while the United States may not control foreign citizens operating in foreign territory, it may control them when operating in the United States in the same manner as it may control citizens of this country." (See also U. S. v. Great Lakes Towing Co., et al., 208 Fed. Rept. 733, Feb. 11, 1913.) The relations between ocean carriers and the railroads are governed principally by the provisions of the Panama Canal Act of 1912. Section 11 of that statute which amends the Interstate Commerce law, affects the relations between carriers by water and rail carriers in two principal respects: (1) It prohibits any railroad-owned or controlled carrier by water which is or may be competitive from passing through the Panama Canal. The act confers jurisdiction on the Interstate Commerce Commission to determine questions of fact as to competition or possible competition. (2) The Panama Canal Act prohibits the railroad ownership or control of carriers by water that compete or may compete for traffic against the proprietary railroads anywhere in the coastwise, Great Lakes or other interstate commerce of the United States, unless it may be shown that such railroad-owned carrier by water is "operated in the interest of the public and is of advantage to the convenience and commerce of the people," and also that the future railroad ownership or control will "neither exclude, prevent, nor reduce competition on the route by water under consideration." It is the Interstate Commerce Commission again that is authorized to determine questions of fact as to the actual existence or possibility of competition. In this case, however, the Commission has greater latitude, for it is authorized to determine whether in its opinion the railroad-owned or controlled carriers by water are operated in the interest of the public, whether they are of advantage to the convenience and commerce of the people and whether or not the fact of railroad ownership or control excludes, prevents or reduces competition. If these facts are established in favor of the railroad owning or controlling the competitive carrier by water, the Commission may authorize such ownership or control to continue in the future, subject, however, to the proviso that in every case of such extension, the rates, schedules, and practices of such water carrier shall be filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission and shall be subject to the act to regulate commerce and all amendments thereto in the same manner and to the same extent as the railroad or other common carrier controlling such water carrier or interested in any manner in its operation. The Commission has, in various instances, required the railroads to dispose of their ownership or control of competitive carriers by water; in other instances, it has permitted the control or ownership by railroads to continue. REFERENCES Guaranty Trust Company of New York. Digest of the United Navigation Laws of the (Contains the passenger act of 1882, amended to date.) -(Interstate Commerce Commission). The Act to Regulate Commerce and Acts Supplementary Thereto (January 1, 1917). United States Immigration Statute of 1917. CHAPTER XXVI AID AND REGULATION BY THE STATES AND MUNICIPALITIES State and federal powers over commerce, 389. Decisions of Supreme Court defining these powers, 389. State and municipal aid, 391. Control of pilots and pilotage, 393. Health and quarantine control, 395. Comparative statement of pilotage charges, 396. Regulation of water terminals, 399. Police supervision, 401. References, 402. THE power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the states, is vested in the National Government by the Constitution, which also provides that "no State shall, without the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws," and also that "no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty of tonnage." The clauses seem very clear and definite; but a long line of decisions of the Supreme Court has been necessary to define the limits of federal and state authority over commerce. At the time of the adoption of the Constitution each state in its own way was aiding and regulating commerce; and instead of immediately ceasing to exercise authority over interstate commerce, the states have abandoned commercial regulation gradually as the Federal Government has assumed the powers it possesses. Fortunately for the development of the United States, the powers of Congress over interstate commerce were broadly interpreted by Chief Justice Marshall in 1824, in the celebrated case of Gibbons v. Ogden (9 Wheaton, 1), in which the Supreme Court held that a vessel enrolled by the Federal Government to engage in coastwise interstate commerce could not be required to obtain a state license. It was held that |